

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. October 1905.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(8520.)

*L. 61
2 1/2*

PART II.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF PERSIA.

April to June 1905.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
1	Sir C. Hardinge ..	57 Tel.	Apr. 1, 1905	Riots at Meshed. Originated in intrigue of Armenian with a Mussulman woman ..	1
2	Sir A. Hardinge ..	46 Tel.	2.	Riots at Meshed. No further news as to dispatch of Cossacks ..	1
3	" ..	47 Tel.	3.	Riots at Meshed. Refers to No. 141, Part I. No excuse for dispatch of Cossacks ..	1
4	India Office	5.	Henjam-Bunder Abbas telegraph extension. Refers to No. 123, Part I. Sir A. Hardinge should endeavour to secure: 1. That Henjam end of line shall terminate in and be worked by British officer in Henjam; 2. That a British signaller shall be employed to deal with State messages at Bunder Abbas ..	2
5	Sir A. Hardinge ..	48 Tel.	5.	Riots at Meshed. Battalion of Russian infantry left Ashkhabad for Persian frontier ..	2
6	India Office	5.	Quarantine arrangements in Persia. Transmits inclosures in letter from Foreign Secretary of 9th March ..	2
7	"	5.	Telegraph extensions. Questions concerning conveying Mr. Brodrick's approval of Sir A. Hardinge's action in asking for concessions equal to those granted to Russia ..	4
8	Imperial Bank of Persia	5.	Loan to Persia. Communicates Russian offer of 400,000 <i>l.</i> to the Shah on condition of the Persian army being reorganized by Russians. Appeals to British Government to make advances to the Shah in order to prevent this ..	4
9	Sir A. Hardinge ..	49 Tel.	10.	Loan to Persia. Refers to No. 140 <i>c.</i> Part I. Reports scheme of Persian Government to raise money from Imperial Bank. If this fails, is he authorized to treat with Grand Vizier on basis of 1903 proposals? ..	4
10	To Sir A. Hardinge ..	35 Tel.	10.	Kuhmalikis - Seistan telegraph extension. Refers to No. 113, Part I. Leaves to the discretion of Sir A. Hardinge the selection of a favourable opportunity for pressing this extension ..	5
11	" ..	36 Tel.	10.	Henjam telegraph extension. Refers to No. 123, Part I. Giving instructions as to demands he should make, viz: 1. The line shall terminate in British office at Henjam and be worked by it; 2. A British signaller shall, if necessary, be employed at Bunder Abbas ..	5
12	India Office	10.	Seistan, Urmia, and Mijawa: questions as to: transmits telegram to Viceroy dealing with ..	6
13	To Imperial Bank of Persia	12.	Loan to Persia. Informing the Imperial Bank that His Majesty's Government are contemplating offering an advance of 200,000 <i>l.</i> ..	6
14	India Office	13.	Loan to Persia. Refers to No. 140 <i>c.</i> Part I. Transmits telegram, dated 2nd April, requesting Viceroy to communicate his views on the subject, and reply, dated 13th April. Government of India adhere to views already expressed ..	6

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
15	Imperial Bank of Persia	Apr. 12, 1905	Loan to Persia. Refers to No. 8. Funds will be privately provided for Shah's journey, but does the British Government desire to make an advance for local requirements? ..	7
16	To India Office	13.	Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer. Case of. Refers to No. 127, Part I. Proposing to approve of Sir A. Hardinge's action ..	7
17	Sir A. Hardinge ..	51 Tel.	17.	Seistan, Governors of. The Hashmat-ul-Mulk has obtained Governorship. May Sir A. Hardinge advance him 900 <i>l.</i> from Imperial Bank? ..	7
18	To Sir A. Hardinge ..	38 Tel.	17.	Loan to Persia. Refers to Nos. 1, 4, and 9. Authorizing him to treat on basis of Viceroy's telegram of 13th April ..	8
19	India Office	18.	Loan to Persia. Transmits No. 14 (Inclosure 2). Communicating views of Government of India ..	8
20	Sir A. Hardinge ..	52 Tel.	18.	Loan to Persia. Recommending that Imperial Bank should be permitted to negotiate loan. May he inform the Bank that the British Government loan need not interfere with theirs? ..	8
21	To Sir A. Hardinge ..	40 Tel.	18.	Seistan, Governor of. Refers to No. 17. Sir A. Hardinge may advance the 900 <i>l.</i> required to the Hashmat-ul-Mulk ..	9
22	To India Office	18.	Loan to Persia. Transmits No. 20. With Mr. Brodrick's consent, Sir A. Hardinge is to be informed that His Majesty's Government prefer to make the advance themselves ..	9
23	"	18.	Seistan, Governor of. Transmits Nos. 17 and 21. Discussing question of loans to the Hashmat ..	9
24	India Office	18.	Seistan arbitration. Transmits telegram from Viceroy, requesting Sir A. Hardinge to hasten on settlement of the Seistan Boundary question ..	10
25	"	18.	Seistan arbitration. Transmits telegram from Sir A. Hardinge to Government of India. Instructions respecting Colonel McMahon's exporting grain. Transmits also telegram from Colonel McMahon relative to export of grain from Seistan ..	10
26	"	18.	Persian telegraphs. Transmits telegram from Government of India to Sir A. Hardinge with reference to businessmen at Robat, who should be withdrawn ..	11
27	Imperial Bank of Persia	19.	Loan to Persia. The Imperial Bank do not propose to proceed further with negotiations without further communication with Foreign Office ..	11
28	Sir A. Hardinge ..	53 Tel.	20.	Seistan arbitration. Has telegraphed to India proposals as to delimitation and as to export of grain ..	12
29	India Office	20.	Seistan, Governor of. Refers to No. 23. Mr. Brodrick concurs in instructions given to Sir A. Hardinge in regard to money to be advanced to the Hashmat ..	12
30	"	20.	Loan to Persia. Refers to Nos. 22 and 18. Mr. Brodrick concurs in instructions sent to Sir A. Hardinge ..	12

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
31	Imperial Bank of Persia	..	Apr. 20, 1903	Loan to Persia. Transmits telegram from and to Imperial Bank in Persia, which announces that Persian Government is anxious for an answer	13
32	India Office	..	19,	Quarantine arrangements in Persian Gulf. Transmits letter from the Government of India giving information as to the substitution of European for native doctors in Gulf ports	13
33	To Sir A. Hardinge	41 Tel.	22,	Loan to Persia. Refers to Nos. 18 and 20. His Majesty's Government prefer to make the advance themselves	14
34	Sir A. Hardinge	56	Mar. 16,	Amir of Kain; death of, reporting; and discussing possible successors	15
35	" "	59	20,	Detention of the "Kasara" at Bushire. Transmits correspondence with M. Naus, who refused indemnity claim presented by Sir A. Hardinge	15
36	" "	60	21,	Persian telegraphs. Refers to Nos. 125 and 113, Part I. Transmits correspondence as to Russian telegraphists in Khoresan	16
37	" "	61	22,	Luristan expedition. Refers to No. 123, Part I. Transmitting note from the Mushir-ed-Dowleh as to number of troops sent against the Lurs	18
38	" "	62 Confidential	22,	Questions pending between His Majesty's Government and Persian Government. Refers to Nos. 1, 35, and 113, Part I. Reporting a conversation with the Grand Vizier as to—1. Governorship of Seistan; 2. Compensation to Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorne. Transmits communications from the Mushir-ed-Dowleh	19
39	" "	64	24,	Telegraphic communication between Herjan and Bender Abbas. The Persian Government consents to the establishment of telegraph line. Transmits draft Agreement	22
40	" "	66 Confidential	24,	Persian army: reorganization of. Communicating French and Russian plans for. Transmits list of Sardars	23
41	" "	67	24,	Abwaz dam scheme: reports conversation with M. Naus as to	25
42	" "	68	24,	Province of Kerman: condition of. Transmits despatch from Major Sykes, proposing measures to protect British subjects in the district	26
43	" "	69 Confidential	24,	M. Naus. Agitation against. Refers to No. 128, Part I. Giving account of the religious agitation against M. Naus, and announcing latter's probable departure. Transmits translation of a speech made against him at a religious assembly in Tehran, also an autograph from the Shah, and a note from Consul-General Preece describing intrigues at Isfahan	28
44	" "	14 Commercial	22,	Indian Commercial Mission in Southern Persia. Transmits correspondence with reference to suspicions which had fallen on the Mission of being political. Sir A. Hardinge assured the Persian Government of the neutrality of those rumours	31

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
45	Sir A. Hardinge	72 Confidential	Mar. 29, 1903	Nizam-es-Sultanch: appointment of as Grand Vizier. Reports this appointment during absence of Valiahd. Transmits correspondence with His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez	35
46	" "	73 Confidential	28,	Persian Minister in London. Bestowal of title of "Highness" on	37
47	" "	74 Confidential	31,	The Shah's doctors. Communicating difficulties caused by the supplanting of Sir Hugh Adcock by Dr. Schneider	38
48	" "	75	Apr. 1,	Indian Commercial Mission. Attack on. Transmits telegrams from His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz, reporting attack on the Mission at Mehrabad, also his own telegrams to Mr. Grahame and to His Majesty's Consul-General Preece	39
49	" "	76	1,	M. Naus. Agitation against. Refers to No. 49. Transmits telegrams received by the Tehran clergy from the great Ulama of Nejed, and information with regard to the Meshed riots	41
50	" "	77 Confidential	3,	Summary of events in Persia. Transmits reports from each of the chief towns	42
51	" "	79 Confidential	3,	Luristan expedition. Refers to No. 79, Part I. Transmits despatch from Lieutenant Williams, describing difficulties of the Ferman Feraish's position at the head of the expedition	46
52	" "	81	8,	Riots in Meshed. Refers to No. 49. Transmits report of the riots from His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed, also telegram from Captain Smythe respecting the dispatch of Russian troops from Ashkhabad	47
53	" "	82	8,	English missionaries in Persia. Refers to No. 129, Part I. Reports having sent Rev. O. Parry's letter (to the Archbishop of Canterbury) to Mr. Wratislaw, with remarks on Mr. Parry's opinions	49
54	India Office	..	26,	Loan to Persia. Transmits copy of telegram sent to Indian Government, informing them of Sir A. Hardinge's instructions	50
55	" "	..	26,	Loan to Persia. Transmits copy of telegram sent to Indian Government, informing them that financial assistance to Persian Government, though sometimes inevitable, is not desirable in principle	51
56	Imperial Bank of Persia	..	26,	Loan to Persia. Informing Foreign Office that they have decided that Imperial Bank is not competent to make loan	51
57	Sir A. Hardinge	57 Tel.	27,	Herjan telegraph extension. Refers to No. 11. Reporting agreement accepted by Persian Government, but a Persian as well as English officer at Herjan has been insisted on	51
58	India Office	..	27,	Pearl fisheries in the Persian Gulf. Transmits letter sent to Indian Government as to territorial fishing rights in the Gulf	52
59	To Sir A. Hardinge	42 Tel.	28,	Loan to Persia. Informing Sir A. Hardinge that the Imperial Bank of Persia have decided not to make loan	52
60	Sir A. Hardinge	58 Tel.	29,	Loan to Persia. Communicating information that the bank has not yet made any formal refusal, and regretting its action in drawing back	53

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
61	To Sir A. Hardinge ..	68	Apr. 29, 1905	The Shah's doctors. Refers to No. 47. Conveying approval of action taken ..	53
62	To India Office ..	Confidential	May 1,	Loan to Persia. Inclosing Nos. 60 and 68, with remarks as to action to be taken by Sir A. Hardinge ..	53
63	India Office	2,	Loan to Persia. Transmits copy of telegram to the Viceroy, communicating Sir A. Hardinge's instructions..	54
64	Sir A. Hardinge ..	59 Tel.	2,	Export of grain. Refers to No. 28. Shall he accept offer of Persian Government to permit 1,500 kharwars of grain to be exported?	54
65	India Office	3,	Loan to Persia. Refers to No. 62. Mr. Brodrick concurs in the terms of telegram (No. 68) to be sent to Sir A. Hardinge ..	54
66	" "	3,	British post offices in Persian Gulf. Refers to No. 126, Part I. Mr. Brodrick concurs in Lord Lansdowne's proposal to approve terms of Sir A. Hardinge's notes to M. Nuss ..	55
67	" "	3,	Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer. Attack on. Refers to No. 16. Mr. Brodrick concurs in Lord Lansdowne's proposal to approve Sir A. Hardinge's action ..	55
68	To Sir A. Hardinge ..	45 Tel.	3,	Loan to Persia. Refers to No. 60. Sir A. Hardinge should endeavour to negotiate on basis of Viceroy's telegram of 13th April ..	55
69	India Office	3,	Seistan Mission. Transmits telegram from Government of India, proposing to withdraw Colonel McMahon's Mission ..	55
70	To Sir A. Hardinge ..	45 Tel.	4,	Export of grain. Refers to No. 64. Sir A. Hardinge should, in accordance with the Viceroy's recommendation, accept the 1,500 kharwars proposal ..	56
71	India Office	4,	Export of grain. Transmits telegrams to and from Viceroy, who advises that the offer of 1,500 kharwars should be accepted ..	56
72	Sir A. Hardinge ..	61 Tel.	5,	Loan to Persia. Refers to No. 68. Reports conversation with Grand Vizier. The decision now rests with the Shah, who may object to the Karun condition ..	56
73	To Sir A. Hardinge ..	69	5,	British post offices in Persian Gulf. Refers to No. 126, Part I. Approving notes addressed to Persian Government ..	57
74	" " ..	70	5,	Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer. Attack on. Refers to No. 127, Part I. Approving of action taken ..	57
75	To India Office ..	Confidential	6,	Loan to Persia. Transmits Nos. 72 and 76, which awaits Mr. Brodrick's approval to be sent to the Imperial Bank ..	57
76	To Imperial Bank of Persia	Secret	6,	Loan to Persia. Refers to No. 56. Commenting negotiations in progress at Tehran, with request to authorize their Tehran manager to sign the Agreement ..	58
77	Sir A. Hardinge ..	62 Tel.	7,	Dam at Ahwaz and loan to Persia. Refers to No. 72. Transmits proposed article, asking loan of 100,000 £ a result of the realization of the Ahwaz dam scheme ..	58
78	India Office	8,	Seistan Mission, withdrawal of; transmits copy of telegram to the Viceroy, acquiescing in ..	58

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
79	India Office	May 8, 1905	Karun irrigation. Transmits telegram from Viceroy. Dutch engineer has left Ahwaz for Mohammerah ..	59
80	" "	8,	Loan to Persia. Mr. Brodrick concurs in proposal to approve article suggested by Sir A. Hardinge in No. 77 ..	59
81	Imperial Bank of Persia	..	8,	Loan to Persia. Refers to No. 76. The bank has done what has been suggested by British Government ..	59
82	To Sir A. Hardinge ..	47 Tel.	8,	Loan to Persia. Approving of article suggested in No. 77 ..	60
83	India Office	6,	Loan to Persia. Refers to No. 75. Mr. Brodrick concurs in the terms of draft letter to be sent to Imperial Bank ..	60
84	To Treasury	9,	Indian escort at Isfahan Consulate. Will the Treasury sanction payment from Imperial funds of the salaries of extra guards? ..	60
85	Sir A. Hardinge ..	63 Tel.	10,	Loan to Persia. Refers to No. 72. The Karun condition has been refused by Persian Government, who have applied for a loan from Russia ..	60
86	India Office	10,	Province of Kerman. Condition of. Remarks on Sir A. Hardinge's information in No. 42 ..	61
87	" "	10,	Persian telegraphs. Mr. Brodrick concurs in the terms of Sir A. Hardinge's note to the Persian Government on the subject of Russian telegraphists in Khormassan ..	61
88	" "	10,	Benjam-Bunder Abbas telegraph. Mr. Brodrick concurs in approval of Sir A. Hardinge's action ..	62
89	" "	12,	Loan to Persia. Transmits copy of telegram to Viceroy, requesting his opinion as to advancing, without political conditions, from Indian revenues ..	62
90	To Sir A. Hardinge ..	48 Tel.	12,	Benjam-Bunder Abbas telegraph. Refers to No. 57. Approving suggested course ..	62
91	" " ..	77	13,	Persian telegraphs. Refers to No. 36. Approving note addressed to Persian Government relative to Russian telegraphists in Khormassan ..	62
92	Sir A. Hardinge ..	65 Tel.	13,	Export of grain. Refers to Nos. 57 and 70. Agreement has been signed, stipulating—(1) Right of British post at Padah to obtain water from Misjavar; (2) Abandonment of re-examination of frontier; (3) Export of 1,500 kharwars annually ..	63
93	" " ..	83 Confidential	Apr. 14	The Valiabad. Political views of. Transmits Report from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez as to Valiabad's Russian proclivities ..	63
94	" " ..	84	14,	Mirza Hussein Agha. Removal of from Urmia. Refers to No. 50. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez as to the circumstances of the removal ..	64
95	" " ..	86 Confidential	14,	The Shah's doctors. Refers to No. 47. Reporting having settled the affairs of Sir Hugh Adcock satisfactorily ..	66

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
86	Sir A. Hardinge ..	87	Apr. 15, 1905	Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer. Attack on. Transmits despatch from Captain Williams respecting punitive measures against the Lurs	66
97	" ..	89 Confidential	18,	Seistan and Mirjawar frontier questions. Refers to No. 104, Part I. Transmits copy of his note to Grand Vizier as to Governorship of Seistan, and other outstanding questions	70
98	" ..	91	18,	Turkish troops in Sammar. Reporting probable disturbances in Sammar	74
99	" ..	92	18,	English missionaries in Persia. Transmits letter from Mr. Parry relative to state of the Bakhtiari Road	75
100	" ..	93	18,	Luristan expedition. Refers to No. 37. Transmits despatch from Captain Williams as to Persian troops available for the expedition	75
101	" ..	96 Confidential	18,	The Shah's journey. Details as to ; and suggestions as regards loan	76
102	India Office	May 17,	Seistan water award. Transmits telegram from Viceroy, reporting the acceptance by the Amir of Colonel McMahon's water award	78
103	"	17,	Loan to Persia. Transmits telegram from Viceroy, who is opposed to further advance to Persian Government from Indian revenues without political conditions	78
104	Sir A. Hardinge ..	66 Tel.	17,	Loan to Persia. Affirming he does not advocate advances without political conditions	78
105	Persian Transport Company	17,	New route between Dizful and Sulaimabad. Communicating account of action taken by the Company, with statement of advantages of new route	79
106	India Office	19,	Seistan Mission. Withdrawal of. Transmits telegram from Viceroy, reporting departure of Mission from Seistan	80
107	Sir A. Hardinge ..	68 Tel. Confidential	22,	Persian telegraphs. Reporting that Shah has consented to allow provisional access to Seistan line offices for Russian telegraphists	80
108	Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas	26,	Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer. Attack on. Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas giving circumstances of attack and suggestions for punishment	80
109	Post Office,	29,	Post offices in Persian Gulf. Transmits Report from British postmaster at Constantinople as to parcel mails, with rules and forms	81
110	India Office	30,	Seistan Crown lands. Transmits telegram from Viceroy, asking if there is any truth in the report of the sale of these lands	86
111	Sir A. Hardinge ..	70 Tel.	31,	Seistan Crown lands. Refers to No. 110. The Mushir-ed-Dowleh denies the report of the sale	87
112	" ..	71 Tel.	June 2,	Seistan Governorship. Report that it has been offered to the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, with remarks	87

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
113	Sir A. Hardinge ..	72 Tel.	June 3, 1905	Nakhichevan. Disturbances at. Reporting serious bloodshed between Armenians and Moslems, which may spread to Tabreez	87
114	To India Office	3,	Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer. Attack on. Transmits Nos. 97 and 108. Proposes to authorize Sir A. Hardinge to agree to the arrangement suggested by Captain Williams	87
115	"	3,	British post offices in Persian Gulf. Transmits No. 109. Proposes to authorize Sir A. Hardinge to conclude an Agreement with the Persian Government similar to that in force at Constantinople	88
116	Sir A. Hardinge ..	97	Apr. 27,	Nasr-ul-Mulk. Return of. Reports return of the Nasr-ul-Mulk, with remarks on the latter's character and policy	88
117	" ..	99	May 10	The Shah's journey. Refers to No. 101. Transmits Circular addressed to the foreign Legations. Communicates information as to the expenses of the tour, and gives report of a farewell <i>tehriz</i>	89
118	" ..	100 Confidential	12,	Loan to Persia. Giving a lengthy account of the recent efforts made by the Persian Government to obtain financial assistance. Transmits correspondence with the Ain-ed-Dowleh and M. Naus	91
119	" ..	101 Confidential	12,	M. Naus. Agitation against. Refers to No. 108, Part I. Reporting protest of Tehran merchants against M. Naus' Customs Administration. Transmits their Petition to Shah	95
120	" ..	102	15,	Mirjawar frontier and grain export Agreement. Refers to No. 92. Transmits copy of Agreement, with remarks	97
121	" ..	103	15,	Seistan water award. Reporting conversation with the Mushir-ed-Dowleh	100
122	" ..	104	15,	Henjam telegraph extension. Refers to Nos. 90 and 92. Transmitting copy of Agreement, with remarks, and his letter to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh as to establishment of a Persian telegraph office at Henjam	100
123	" ..	105 Confidential	15,	Russian policy in Persia. Reports attitude of new Russian Minister. Transmits letter from the Mushir-ed-Dowleh to Count Lamsdorff	104
124	" ..	106	17,	English missionaries in Persia. Transmits correspondence with His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez, proposing—(1) A friendly settlement between Kurds and Christians; (2) Steps for protection of the Mujid-es-Saltaneh against the Valiabad	105
125	" ..	108 Secret	17,	1899 railway Agreement. Reporting conversation with the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, who possessed no copy of the Agreement	108
126	" ..	109	17,	Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer. Attack on. Refers to No. 96. Reports Captain Williams' opinion as to the punishment of the Direkweeds	109
127	" ..	110	17,	Monthly summary. Transmits monthly summary of events in the various towns of Persia	110
128	" ..	73 Tel.	June 5,	Afghan Boundary Commissioner. Arrest of. Reports arrest by Ameer	112

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
129	Sir A. Hardinge ..	74 Tel.	June 7, 1905	Loan to Persia. Refers to Nos. 85 and 126. Reports that Russian Government have offered an unconditional advance of 100,000 <i>l.</i> to Persia	112
130	India Office	9,	British post offices in Persian Gulf. Refers to No. 115. Mr. Brodrick concurs in Lord Lansdowne's proposals	113
131	" "	10,	Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer. Attack on. Refers to No. 114. Mr. Brodrick concurs in Lord Lansdowne's proposals	113
132	Sir A. Hardinge ..	112	May 21,	Mirjavar frontier and grain export Agreement. Refers to No. 120. Reports complaints by the Mushir-ed-Dowleh as to Padaha	113
133	" " ..	113 Confidential	22,	Military attacké at Meshed. Appointment of. Giving advantages of such an appointment	114
134	" " ..	115 Confidential	22,	The Resht-Kazian road and Enzeli harbour. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Acting Consul at Resht, reporting completion of these works	115
135	" " ..	116 Confidential	24,	Persian telegraphs. Refers to No. 107. Reporting conversation with the Mushir-ed-Dowleh as to Russian telegraphists in Kherassan	116
136	" " ..	118 Secret	26,	Loan to Persia. Reporting his opinions on Russian loan proposals	117
137	To Sir A. Hardinge ..	51 Tel.	June 14,	Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer. Attack on. Refers to Nos. 96 and 126. Approving Captain Williams' proposals, with suggestions	118
138	" " ..	96	16,	Amin-es-Sultan. Reporting conversation with him	118
139	Sir A. Hardinge ..	77 Tel.	17,	Cossacks at Meshed. Twenty Russian Cossacks have reached Meshed. Is he to take any action?	118
140	To Sir A. Hardinge ..	85	17,	Interference of Persian Customs at Bashiye. Refers to Nos. 86 and 126, Part I. Transmits No. 109, with instructions to conclude an Agreement with the Persian Government similar to that in force at Constantinople	119
141	Sir A. Hardinge ..	79 Tel.	22,	Cossacks at Meshed. In reply to a remonstrance by the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, the Russian Minister promised that no more Cossacks would be sent	119
142	India Office	23,	Persian telegraphs. Transmits telegram from the Viceroy as to the necessity of English signallers on the Meshed-Seistan telegraph line.. .. .	119
143	Sir A. Hardinge ..	80 Tel.	23,	Persian telegraphs. Refers to No. 142. The Viceroy's demand has been recognized as reasonable by the Mushir-ed-Dowleh	120
144	" " ..	81 Tel.	24,	Motor cars in Persia. The Russian Ministry of Finance has organized a service of motor cars. The British Government should do the same if it wishes to keep British trade in Central Persia	120

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Persia.

PART II.

No. 1.

Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 1, 1905.

IN reply to your Lordship's telegram No. 34 of the 31st ultimo, I am informed that in consequence of disorders at Kuchan and Meshed the threat was made to send Russian Cossacks to the frontier. The riots in question are now over, and it is not known whether the Cossacks were actually dispatched or not.

The riots which took place at Meshed are stated to have originated in an intrigue of an Armenian with a Mussulman woman and were not of an anti-Russian character.

No. 2.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 46.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 2, 1905.

FOLLOWING repeated to India:—

His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed telegraphs as follows:—

"Riots were suppressed fairly quickly.

"No further news has reached me with regard to the dispatch of Cossacks to Meshed, and I suspect that the authorities at Askabad have been trying to frighten the Persians. In 1892 Astrabad was occupied for three weeks by Cossacks, but it would be a much more serious step to send a Cossack force to a sacred city like Meshed."

No. 3.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 47.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 3, 1905.

FOLLOWING repeated to India.

I only received your Lordship's telegram No. 33 of the 31st March in decypherable form this morning. It had been delayed in transmission.

The riot at Meshed, like that at Baku, was due to conflict between Armenians and Mussulmans. There is no reasonable excuse for dispatch of Cossacks. A good deal of property was damaged but no lives were lost. The town is quiet again and order can now be maintained by Persian troops.

[1552]

The Persian Government and Grand Vizier are already aware that we should make a countermove in the south if Russian troops entered Meshed or Tabreez, and, unless they broach the subject themselves, I propose to say nothing to them (see instructions contained in your Lordship's private letter of the 17th August, 1903, and my despatch No. 173 of the 24th October, 1903).

No. 4.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 6.)

Sir,

India Office, April 5, 1905.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo, inclosing, for Mr. Secretary Brodric's observations, a copy of Sir A. Hardinge's telegram No. 37 of the 26th ultimo, reporting the terms of the Agreement which he has drafted defining the conditions for the construction by the Indo-European Telegraph Department of the Henjam-Bunder Abbas line.

In reply, I am to say that Mr. Brodric, while concurring in the terms of the draft note, would suggest that Sir A. Hardinge should be instructed to endeavour to secure the following further conditions, viz. :—

1. That the Henjam end of the line shall terminate in, and be worked by, the British office on Henjam.

2. That a British signaller shall be employed to deal with State messages at the Bunder-Abbas office, should His Majesty's Government so desire.

Some expense, in addition to the estimate of 75,000 rupees for the construction of the line, will be incurred in the equipment of the cable houses and the Bunder-Abbas office; but Mr. Brodric does not propose to vary the terms of the draft Agreement in respect of this charge.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 5.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 5, 1905.

FOLLOWING repeated to India.

His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed telegraphs as follows :—

"Newswriter at Ashkabad reports that on the 25th March a battalion of Russian infantry, acting on telegraphic orders from Tashkend, left Ashkabad for the Persian frontier. On the following day another battalion was to be dispatched. I have no information as to the present whereabouts of these forces."

I hear further from Meshed that a guard of 50 Cossacks for the Consulate-General and bank at that place was asked for by the Russian Consul-General, but that he is not supported by the Russian Minister here in pressing the Persian Government for satisfaction, but is ordered by him to be conciliatory. The Consul-General threatens to resign in consequence.

No. 6.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodric, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 9th March, relative to quarantine arrangements in Persia.

India Office, April 5, 1905.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

Captain Macpherson to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

Nasratabad, February 18, 1905.

DIRECTOR OF CUSTOMS, accompanied by Russian doctor, left on 15th February to establish quarantine (at) Bandan against arrivals from Birjand, where there has been a recent slight epidemic of cholera, but which is now practically extinct. If quarantine considered necessary, which is extremely doubtful, I venture to submit protest should be made against any Russian interference in arrangement.

(Addressed to Minister, repeated to Foreign and Meshed.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

Sir A. Hardinge to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, February 19, 1905.

YOUR telegram No. 18 of yesterday.

I have protested against the interference of the Russian doctor, and would now suggest you should inform the Director of Customs of my action, and should send your Hospital Assistant to Bandan to report proceedings there.

(Addressed Seistan, repeated Meshed and Government of India.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 6.

Sir A. Hardinge to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, February 24, 1905.

YOUR telegram No. 18.

The Minister of Customs replied to my protest that, owing to the reports about cholera at Birjand, the Persian Government, pending dispatch of a doctor of its own, had authorized the local authorities to consult the Russian doctor as a specialist, but added that the proposed sanitary measures had been cancelled as unnecessary. It is therefore, in my opinion, unnecessary that you should take further steps for the present, but you may unofficially inform the Director of Customs of my protest, so as to make him more careful in future.

(Addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Seistan. Repeated to Foreign Secretary, Government of India.)

Inclosure 4 in No. 6.

Captain Macpherson to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

Rebat, February 24, 1905.

YOUR telegram No. 29.

I am sending hospital assistant with three men of my escort to-morrow to show themselves at Bandan and inquire into proceedings of Russian doctor and Director of Customs there.

Intention to establish quarantine, however, seems to have been abandoned for the present, as party, I hear, are now on their way back to Seistan.

Under the circumstances, do you still wish me to inform Director of your protest, as absolute proof of Russian interference may be difficult to obtain now?

(Addressed to Minister, repeated to Foreign and Meshed.)

No. 7.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 6.)

Sir,

India Office, April 5, 1905.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd March, forwarding the copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, dated the 18th March, dealing with the questions of (1) the employment of Russian signallers on the Meshed-Seistan telegraph line; (2) the Henjam-Bunder Abbas extension; and (3) the Kuhimaliksia-Seistan extension.

In reply, I am to say that, as regards the first of these questions, Mr. Secretary Brodrick sees no objection to Sir A. Hardinge's action in addressing an official note to the Persian Government asking, on our behalf, for concessions identical with any which may be given to the Russians.

As regards the Kuhimaliksia-Seistan extension, Mr. Brodrick is disposed to leave to Sir A. Hardinge's discretion the selection of a favourable opportunity for renewing our demand for the construction of the line.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 8.

The Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received April 6.)

Sir,

25, Abchurch Lane, London, April 5, 1905.

I AM desired by the Board of the Imperial Bank of Persia to invite your attention to the following extract from a letter of Mr. Rabino, Chief Manager of the Bank in Persia, dated the 13th ultimo:—

"*Voyage of the Shah.*—We hear every day a new decision on this point; but, in our opinion, the money seems to be the real difficulty. Russia, we understand, has offered a loan of 100,000*l.*, but on stringent political conditions, one being the reorganization of the Persian army under Russian officers."

We hear by telegram from Tehran, under date of the 30th March, that the Shah's journey appears to be decided.

2. The Directors of the Imperial Bank cannot but hope that His Majesty's Government may be able to offer the Persian Government such moderate advances on reasonable and even advantageous terms as might prevent the Shah from acceding to the compromising conditions which Russia is asserted to ask, and which, if granted, would immensely strengthen her hold upon Persia and seriously imperil English and Indian interests.

The Directors do not think it probable that His Majesty the Shah is likely to grant Russia so dangerous a power within his dominions; but it seems impossible for him to travel without some pecuniary assistance, while the reverses of Russia in the Far East will make her more eager to improve her political and strategical position in Persia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. NEWELL, Manager.

No. 9.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 11.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 10, 1905.

MY telegram No. 45 of the 31st March.

The latest scheme of the Persian Government is to raise another 100,000*l.* from the Imperial Bank by agreeing to redeem the annual royalty of 1,000*l.* paid in virtue of its concession by the Bank.

The Directors may object to this, and if they do, I shall probably be again applied to by the Grand Vizier, who says that my last message is under consideration.

In this case, am I authorized to treat with him on the basis of the proposals made in 1903 to his predecessor?

The Grand Vizier has contributed out of his own pocket part of the money which has been got together for the Shah's journey.

(Repeated to India.)

No. 10.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 10, 1905.

THE selection of a favourable opportunity for pressing for the extension of the telegraph line from Kuhimaliksia to Seistan is left to your discretion.

The above is with reference to your telegram No. 34 of the 18th March.

No. 11.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 36.)

Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 10, 1905.

YOU should endeavour to secure the following further conditions in the draft Agreement on the subject of the Henjam telegraph extension, referred to in your telegram No. 37 of the 26th March, the terms of which are approved by His Majesty's Government:—

1. That the line shall terminate at Henjam in the British office, by which it shall be worked.

2. That, if His Majesty's Government desire, a British signaller shall be employed to deal with State messages at the Bunder Abbas office.

No. 12.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 11.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 28th March, relative to outstanding questions with Persia.

India Office, April 10, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 12.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

March 28, 1905.

INSTRUCTIONS to the following effect were sent on the 23rd instant to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, in reply to his telegrams of the 13th and 22nd instant, regarding questions outstanding with Persian Government:—

His Majesty's Government have decided not to insist on the retention of the Hashmat-ul-Mulk in the Governorship of Seistan, and they do not wish to incur any responsibility for the appointment of his successor. This decision was arrived at after the Defence Committee had been consulted in connection with your telegram to me, dated the 3rd January last. There is, however, no objection to Sir A. Hardinge endeavouring to procure for the Hashmat another Governorship, but Kain need not be insisted upon if the Persian Government prefer Tabas.

As regards Urumia and Military Attaché claims, His Majesty's Government prefer that, before the sequestration of Jask royalty is considered, diplomatic pressure at Tehran should be continued.

As regards Mirjawa, the arrangement proposed in Sir A. Hardinge's telegram of [1552]

the 22nd instant is approved. In this connection please see my telegram to you of the 20th instant.

As regards the Ahwaz irrigation loan, the scheme will be considered on its merits when report of engineer is before His Majesty's Government, but pending receipt of this no decision will be arrived at.

No. 13.

Foreign Office to Imperial Bank of Persia.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 12, 1905.

THE Marquess of Lansdowne has had under his consideration your letter of the 12th instant, relative to a proposal made by the Russian Government that the Imperial Bank of Persia should make them an advance of 150,000*l.* You inquire whether His Majesty's Government do not themselves desire to advance the money, through the medium of the Imperial Bank, in accordance with the course followed in the case of the two previous loans to Persia, or whether they have any suggestions to offer on the subject.

I am directed by his Lordship to thank you for this communication and to inform you, in reply, that His Majesty's Government are themselves considering the question of making an advance of a sum not exceeding 200,000*l.* to the Persian Government on certain conditions, which His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has been instructed to propose to them, should they apply to him in the matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GORST.

No. 14.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 3rd instant, and of his Excellency's reply, dated the 13th instant, relative to the proposed further loan to Persia.

India Office, April 13, 1905.

Inclosure 1 in No. 14.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, April 3, 1905.

PERSIA. I shall be glad to receive your views on Hardinge's telegram No. 45 of the 31st ultimo regarding loan proposals.

Inclosure 2 in No. 14.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

April 13, 1905.

PERSIAN loan. Yours of the 3rd instant.

Government of India adhere to the views expressed in the telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated the 26th February, 1903, and in the subsequent correspondence connected therewith. There would, however, be a difficulty about providing any large sum at the present time for the purpose of loan. We are prepared to agree to original loan being completed by the advance of a further sum, up to a maximum of 200,000*l.*, on the security of the southern customs. We would make it a condition of this further advance that the execution of the Karan undertaking shall be entrusted only to such agency as may be approved by us, in the event of the project eventually developing.

No. 15.

The Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received April 13.)

Sir,

25, Abchurch Lane, London, April 12, 1905.

IN continuation of my letter of the 5th instant, I am directed by the Board of the Imperial Bank of Persia to inform you that they have to-day been informed by their Chief Manager in Tehran, by telegram, that the Shah and Sadr Azam will provide funds privately for His Majesty's journey to Europe; but that there will be considerable local requirements to meet. The Chief Manager asks if we are prepared to advance 150,000*l.* at 8 per cent. interest payable half-yearly, the capital to be reimbursed by the bank royalty, which is a minimum payment of 4,000*l.* per annum to the Persian Government.

Before seriously considering how far we can make such an advance in accordance with the clause of the charter which limits the amount of the bank's advances to the Persian Government, the Directors have the honour to inquire whether the Foreign Secretary has any wish or suggestion to convey to them regarding this demand. It may be that the Foreign Office or the Indian Government might desire themselves to make the advance, through the Imperial Bank, as has before been satisfactorily arranged. In that case, and this is the course the Directors would prefer, acting merely as intermediary the Imperial Bank would be quite content with the 1 per cent. before agreed upon. Or it may be that the Foreign Office has other suggestions to make or conditions to impose; or does not desire to concern itself in any way with the transaction. But as I was directed to express in my letter of the 5th instant, the Directors are anxious that this loan should not fall to the Russian Treasury.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. NEWELL, Manager.

No. 16.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 13, 1905.

WITH reference to my letter of the 1st instant, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran relative to the attack by Lar tribesmen on Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer.*

Lord Lansdowne proposes, if Mr. Brodrick concurs, to approve the language used by Sir A. Hardinge to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh and the terms of the note which he has addressed to his Excellency on this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ELDON GORST.

No. 17.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 17, 1905.

THE Governorship of Seistan has been offered to the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, who is also trying to secure that of Kain, and with some prospect of success.

For this he has to thank the heavy payments which he has made to Ministers and courtiers here rather than my efforts on his behalf in the past; but as he has been successful, it seems that my best policy would be to befriend him, and continue to treat him as our man for the present. He wants money in connection with the bribes which he has promised, and has asked for a further loan of 900*l.* from the Imperial Bank, which he wishes me to guarantee.

It would be a pity now to disoblige him, and I therefore ask your Lordship's sanction, as, if I refuse or delay answering, the Russians will step in and do it for him.

I would beg a reply within the next day if possible.

(Repeated to India.)

No. 18.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 38.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 17, 1905.

I HAVE repeated to you in my telegram No. 37 a telegram from the Viceroy of the 13th instant on the subject of the loan to Persia.

You are authorized to treat with the Persian Government on the basis of that telegram.

The proposed arrangement referred to in your telegram No. 49 of the 10th instant has been communicated to us by the bank, who have asked our views on the subject. Our reply will be to the effect that the question of an advance of 200,000*l.* on terms which will be negotiated by you with the Persian Government, should they apply to you in the matter, is now being considered by His Majesty's Government.

No. 19.

India Office to Foreign Office,—(Received April 18.)

Sir,

India Office, April 18, 1905.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to inclose, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, a copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 13th April,* expressing the views of the Government of India on Sir A. Hardinge's telegram No. 45 of the 31st ultimo, in which he requested that he should be furnished with instructions as to the attitude which he should adopt towards a proposal to negotiate with him for a further advance of 200,000*l.* which, he anticipates, may shortly be received from the Persian Government.

Lord Lansdowne will see that the Government of India adhere to the view which they held when the subject of an advance to the Persian Government was under consideration in 1903. This view Mr. Brodrick understands to be that advances should only be made in consideration of material concessions calculated to increase our hold on Southern Persia.

In the present case the Government of India propose that a condition of the proposed loan should be that, if the Karun project should eventually be carried out, the undertaking shall be intrusted only to an agency approved by His Majesty's Government.

Subject to this condition, the Government of India express their willingness to advance a further sum not exceeding 200,000*l.* on the security of the customs of Southern Persia.

This sum would complete the advance of 500,000*l.* sanctioned in April 1903 by the Secretary of State in Council, on the understanding that His Majesty's Government guaranteed the Government of India against loss on the transaction, both as regards principal and interest, to the extent of one half the amount involved; and, on the same understanding, the Secretary of State in Council is prepared to agree to authority being given to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to negotiate with the Persian Government on the basis of the Viceroy's telegram of the 13th April.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 20.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne,—(Received April 18.)

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 18, 1905.

FOLLOWING telegram repeated to India:—

Some or all of the terms contemplated in 1903 may possibly, I think, be got from the Persian Government, but the proposed operation would be advantageous to the Imperial Bank, and it appears to me simpler that they should be encouraged to

* Inclosure 2 in No. 14.

undertake it unless His Majesty's Government is desirous of advancing the money. Persian Government will certainly want more money for the Karun scheme, and if the Bank undertake the present operation, it will leave us free to offer our advance later.

Might I suggest, therefore, that I should inform Bank that we are disposed to view their negotiations favourably, and that our proposed loan need not interfere with them?

No. 21.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 40.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 18, 1905.

YOU are authorized to guarantee a further loan to the Hashmat-ul-Mulk of 900*l.* as suggested in your telegram No. 51 of yesterday.

No. 22.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 18, 1905.

WITH reference to my letter of yesterday's date, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the subject of the proposed advance to Persia.²

It will be seen that Sir A. Hardinge suggests that the Imperial Bank of Persia should be encouraged to lend the money now required by the Persian Government, and that the advance which His Majesty's Government are, under certain conditions, prepared to make should be reserved for a loan in connection with the Karun irrigation scheme.

I am also to inclose copy of a telegram which it is proposed, if Mr. Brodrick concurs, to address to Sir A. Hardinge,† stating that His Majesty's Government prefer to make the advance themselves.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GORST.

No. 23.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 18, 1905.

WITH reference to your letter of the 4th February last, and to previous correspondence, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran relative to the Hashmat-ul-Mulk.²

Sir A. Hardinge reports that the Hashmat has been offered the Governorship of Seistan, and may possibly be given that of Kain also. He requests authority to guarantee a further loan of 900*l.* which the Hashmat is endeavouring to obtain from the Imperial Bank of Persia.

I am also to inclose copy of a telegram which, with the verbal concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, has been sent to Sir A. Hardinge in reply,† authorizing him to give the required guarantee.

It appears to Lord Lansdowne that the question of deciding how the sums guaranteed are to be made good can stand over until the necessity for discussion arises in case of default on the part of the Hashmat, an eventuality which Sir A. Hardinge considers to be improbable.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GORST.

* No. 20.
[1552]

† No. 21.

‡ No. 17.

No. 24.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forward herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 18th April, relative to the Seistan Arbitration.

India Office, April 18, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 24.

Government of India to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Telegraphic.) P.

SEISTAN Boundary Commission.

Your telegram of the 13th instant to McMahon.

There is no special necessity for retaining McMahon in Seistan, personally, now that he has delivered Water Award; if, therefore, by the end of April the Seistan and Mirjawa questions have not been settled on terms approved by His Majesty's Government, Viceroy proposes to allow him discretion to return to India, subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State. The Mission escort would in this case have to stay on for another summer, but in order that the whole Mission may be enabled to return before really hot weather begins, Viceroy earnestly hopes you will do your utmost to settle these questions before departure of the Shah.

(Repeated to Secretary of State and Colonel McMahon.)

Tehran, April 18, 1905.

No. 25.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 16th March, relative to the Seistan Arbitration.

India Office, April 18, 1905.

Inclosure 1 in No. 25.

Sir A. Hardinge to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 6, 1905.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 4th March.

In a note dated the 25th February, the Persian Government have agreed to Colonel McMahon exporting 600 kharwars of barley and the same quantity of flour, which is equivalent to 4,800 Indian maunds of each. They point out that, according to their own reports, grain is scarce in Seistan, but that, although the export may cause inconvenience to the local population, it has been sanctioned for the sake of meeting our wishes. Colonel McMahon has exported 4,000 maunds of each already, and is therefore free to export 5,600 more. The note does not refer to the question of duty, but I have claimed exemption from Minister of Customs as a diplomatic privilege, and anticipate that I shall easily secure a settlement of this question. It is, however, important that Colonel McMahon should comply with the usual legal formalities respecting declarations, as all diplomatic officers have to do.

(Repeated Colonel McMahon, Seistan.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 25.

Colonel McMahon to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Telegraphic.)

Seistan, March 10 (Robat, March 12), 1905.

YOUR telegram of the 6th March.

I am much obliged for permission to export, which you have kindly obtained. In case Persian Government again wish to make capital out of concession by argument that grain can with difficulty be spared from Seistan, I might remark that all grain I have exported, and intend to export, was bought out of the harvest of 1903. There is no scarcity of grain in Seistan—quite the reverse. Reports to that effect are partly result of Governor's efforts to avoid compliance with revenue demands, and partly, I believe, due to Russian desire to prevent prohibition against export from Seistan being cancelled, as they know this will benefit our trade route and our trade. I have reason to believe Molitor is assisting Russian in this matter.

(Repeated to Government of India.)

No. 26.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of an inclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated the 9th March, relative to Persian telegraphs.

India Office, April 18, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 26.

Government of India to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Calcutta, March 6, 1905.

MY telegram of the 14th May last.

The Director-General of Telegraphs is anxious to relieve the linesmen remaining at Robat, who are costing over 200 rupees a-month. In view of opinion of Director-in-chief, Indo-European Telegraph Department, dated the 8th September, 1904, the Government of India consider it impracticable to institute a wireless telegraphic installation between Koh-i-Malik Shah and Nasratabad. If you consider that the extension of land line must be deferred indefinitely, the working party at Robat had better be withdrawn at once. Would you kindly favour me with your opinion?

No. 27.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received April 20.)

Sir,

25, Abchurch Lane, London, April 19, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Confidential letter of the 17th instant, which has to-day been laid before the Directors of the Imperial Bank of Persia. Previous to its receipt we had, on the same date, telegraphed to the Chief Manager at Tehran that the lock-up of our funds for so long a time was undesirable, but that we had submitted the matter to the Foreign Office. The Board of the Imperial Bank desire me to say that they do not propose to proceed further with the negotiations at the present time or without further communication with you, as they fear that this might in some degree interfere with the action of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, which we desire in every way to support.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. NEWELL,
Manager.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 20, 1905.

FOLLOWING sent to Government of India to-day :—

Your telegram of the 18th April.

I to-day received a verbal reply from the Persian Government to my note of the 8th April, embodying proposals as to the Mirjavar and Seistan questions.

Their reply is to the following effect :—

1. They agree that further delimitation be abandoned, and that water from Persian territory may be taken by our posts at Padaha and elsewhere.

2. The principle of export of supplies for Robat and other British posts is agreed to, but Persian Government wish the amount to be definitely fixed, and are disposed to regard the yearly minimum suggested by Colonel MacMahon (2,000 harwars of grain and 80 of ghi), as excessive.

We are still engaged in discussing this point.

3. Persian Government ask postponement of our demand with regard to the acquisition of Crown lands in Seistan. (See Government of India's despatch of 18th January.)

Their plea is that in Astrabad Province they have enforced prohibition, whereas "Crown" land in Seistan means most of the province. The withdrawal of the Gumbah Kebabs is being negotiated with the Russians, and I suspect that the Persians are advancing the plea that identic rights are claimed by us in Seistan. They are also negotiating for the repurchase of Russian buildings, and they profess to have issued the two prohibitions mentioned with this object, hinting at the same time that these can only be of a temporary nature.

The Hamid-i-Nizam has telegraphed that Persian interests are much injured by MacMahon's Water Award, and the Government are asking him for explanations by telegraph. I told them that I had not yet received a copy from MacMahon, but would also telegraph to him, and hoped to be in a position to discuss the question with them in a day or two. A draft of his Award is in my possession, but he does not wish this to be known. Until this point is cleared up, the Persian Government would wish MacMahon to remain in Seistan.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 21.)

Sir,

India Office, April 20, 1905.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to acknowledge Sir E. Gorst's letter of the 18th instant, relative to a further guarantee by His Majesty's Legation at Tehran of an advance by the Imperial Bank of Persia to the Hashnat-ul-Mulk.

Mr. Brodrick concurs in the instruction given by Lord Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge on the subject, on the understanding stated in the last paragraph of Sir E. Gorst's letter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 21.)

Sir,

India Office, April 20, 1905.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to acknowledge Sir E. Gorst's letter of the 18th instant, inclosing a copy of a telegram from Sir A. Hardinge, in which he suggests that the Imperial Bank of Persia should be encouraged to lend the money now required by the Persian Government, and that the advance of 200,000*l.*, which His Majesty's Government are prepared to make under certain conditions, should be reserved for a loan in connection with the Karun irrigation scheme.

In reply I am to say that Mr. Brodrick concurs in Lord Lansdowne's view that it is better to adhere to the instructions conveyed to Sir A. Hardinge in his Lordship's telegram No. 38 of the 17th instant.

If Sir A. Hardinge is able to secure the condition that the Karun undertaking shall be intrusted only to an agency approved by His Majesty's Government, it may possibly not be necessary to make any further advance from public funds for this purpose, should the project promise to be remunerative.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received April 21.)

Sir,

25, Abchurch Lane, London, April 20, 1905.

WITH reference to my letter of yesterday, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your information, translation of a telegram received to-day from our Chief Manager in Tehran, together with a copy of our reply.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. NEWELL,
Manager.

Inclosure 1 in No. 31.

Imperial Bank of Persia, Tehran, to Imperial Bank of Persia, London.

(Telegraphic.)

April 20, 1905.

PERSIAN Government anxiously awaiting an answer, as must make other arrangements, State requirements being very urgent.

Inclosure 2 in No. 31.

Imperial Bank of Persia, London, to Imperial Bank of Persia, Tehran.

(Telegraphic.)

April 20, 1905.

IN reply to your telegram of to-day, Foreign Office have proposed certain arrangements; you had better consult British Minister.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter from the Government of India, dated the 23rd ultimo, relative to quarantine arrangements in the Persian Gulf.

India Office, April 19, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 32.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

Sir,

Fort William, March 23, 1905.

IN continuation of His Excellency the Viceroy's telegram dated the 24th February, 1905, we have the honour to report the measures recently adopted for more efficient control of quarantine arrangements in the Persian Gulf.

2. In your Secret despatch of the 14th October, 1901, our opinion is desired on two proposals made by His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran: (1) That the Govern-

ment of India should undertake to bear the cost of the Indian doctors at the gulf ports; and (2) that European rather than native doctors should be deputed for the work at those ports.

3. The first of these proposals was made in August 1904, at a period when His Britannic Majesty's Minister anticipated, from the temper of the Persian Government, that they would accept only a provisional *modus vivendi*, and that even this would be subject to conditions as to their right to issue direct instructions to the Indian quarantine doctors. Sir Arthur Hardinge accordingly anticipated that the maintenance of our direct control over the doctors would involve the payment of their salaries by the Indian Government.

During the six months which have since elapsed, the Persian Government have given no indication, so far as we are aware, of an intention to disturb existing arrangements. In his despatch No. 170, dated the 9th September, 1904, to Lord Lansdowne, the Minister was able to report that the Grand Vizier had promised His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to instruct the Director-General of Customs at Bushire "to desist for the present from all further interference with quarantine in the ports of the gulf." That promise appears to have been kept; and, if at any time it is broken, there would be valid reason to protest against attempts to disturb the position now held *de facto* by our doctors in the gulf ports.

4. In the same despatch Sir A. Hardinge expressed his opinion as to the possibility of a revival of interference after M. Naus' return from leave—a contingency which, however, he did not regard as very probable. We now observe with satisfaction that, in his despatch of the 30th December, 1904, written after M. Naus' return, he adheres to the view that the question of quarantine is not likely to be reopened in the near future by the Persian Government. We have already expressed, in the Viceroy's telegram of the 24th February, our complete agreement with him as to the inadvisability of reopening the point ourselves. Such being the case, we would allow the question, as to whether the Government of India should undertake to pay the quarantine staff in the Persian Gulf, to stand over for the present.

5. We are fully in accord with the views of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, in regard to the substitution of Europeans for the Eurasian and Native Assistant Surgeons at ports in the Persian Gulf, and have already replaced the Assistant Surgeons at Mohammerah and Bunder Abbas by pure Europeans. Arrangements are also being made to replace the Assistant Surgeon in charge of the Residency Dispensary at Bushire and the Assistant Surgeon at Jask. The doctor at Lingah (Mr. Kirkpatrick) is a European who is reported to be perfectly satisfactory. No alteration is accordingly proposed in regard to that port.

We have, &c.
(Signed) CURZON.
KITCHENER.
E. R. ELLES.
A. T. ARUNDEL.
DENZIL IBBETSON.
H. ERLE RICHARDS.
J. P. HEWETT.
E. N. BAKER.

No. 33.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 41.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 22, 1905.

A LETTER has been addressed to the Bank on the subject of the Persian loan in the sense of my telegram No. 38 of the 17th instant, and we think it will be better to make the advance ourselves.

It might be difficult for the Bank to make the loan in view of the limitations imposed on their lending powers by their charter. In informing us of the Persian proposal they intimated that they would prefer an arrangement on the lines of previous loans—namely, that the money should be lent by us through their intermediary, they receiving 1 per cent. commission.

The above is with reference to your telegram No. 52 of the 18th April.

No. 34.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 56.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 16, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report that the British Agent at Birjand announces the death, on the 14th instant, of the Shaukat-ul-Mulk, Ameer of Kain. I communicated this intelligence, as soon as it reached me, to the Hishmat-ul-Mulk.

The Shaukat-ul-Mulk, who had long been in failing health, and had made this an excuse for not attending the meeting of Provincial Governors here last spring, was deposed from his Governorship a few months ago, notwithstanding the strenuous efforts made by the Russians to persuade the Grand Vizier to keep him in office. He was unfriendly to British interests on the merely personal ground that his brother, the Hishmat, was believed to have supported them, and he hoped, by denouncing him as a traitor in our pay, to unite Seistan and Kain under his own rule, and to obtain Russian assistance in the prosecution of this scheme. Should the Ain-ed-Dowleh set aside the claims both of the Hishmat-ul-Mulk and of the Shaukat-ul-Mulk's younger brother, Mahomed Ibrahim Khan, now in Tehran, to succeed to the chieftainship, he will have an opportunity of dealing a further blow at the feudal system in Eastern Persia by transferring the Government of Kain from the family of its former Amirs to an official from Tehran or Meshed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 35.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 59.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 20, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report, in continuation of my despatch No. 21 of the 4th February, that I presented on the 17th instant a claim for damages amounting to 50*l.* on behalf of the British India Steam Navigation Company for the detention for twenty-four hours of the steam-ship "Kasara," owing to the interference of the Bushire Customs with His Majesty's mails in December 1904.

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of M. Naus' reply and of a note which, on receipt of it, I addressed to His Excellency, and request your Lordship's further instructions on this point.

The matter may possibly be settled in connection with the new Agreement respecting the post-offices in the Gulf which M. Naus is anxious to negotiate, but respecting the proposed outlines of which the Government of India desires me to obtain further information before it consents to discuss it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 35.

M. Naus to Sir A. Hardinge.

M. le Ministre,

Téhéran, le 19 Mars, 1905.

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception à votre Excellence de son office du 17 Mars courant relatif à la demande d'indemnité présentée par la British India Steam Navigation Company du chef "des pertes qu'elle aurait eu à subir par suite de la détention de son vaisseau quand les valises de la poste Indienne ont été saisies par la Douane Impériale de Bouchir."

J'ai déjà eu l'honneur de faire remarquer à votre Excellence que la Douane n'a pas "saisi" les valises de la poste Indienne, mais qu'elle s'est bornée, conformément aux stipulations formelles des Articles 27 et 51 du Règlement Légal, à faire conduire les colis débarqués dans les locaux douaniers pour y être soumis à la vérification douanière.

Au surplus, conformément à l'obligation inscrite aux Articles 40 et 43 du Règle-

nient Légal, la déclaration du capitaine du steamer "Kasara" ne faisait pas mention des marchandises imposables contenues dans les sacs postaux. Le dit capitaine se trouvait donc en contravention aux dispositions du Règlement Légal, et en vertu de l'Article 99 les dites marchandises trouvées en plus des indications de la déclaration pouvaient être confisquées. La Douane de Bouehir a néanmoins pas usé de ce droit incontestable; elle n'a exercé aucune action contre le capitaine.

Si le steamer "Kasara" est resté à cette occasion en rade un peu plus longtemps que d'habitude et s'il a manqué la marée, cela n'a pas été parce que la Douane aurait exercé une action illégale, mais uniquement du plein gré du capitaine, sans doute par suite de pourparlers avec le Consulat.

Dans ces conditions la demande d'indemnité formulée par la British India Steam Navigation Company n'est pas recevable; j'ajouterai même que j'ai été très étonné de la voir se produire.

Je vous prie, &c.
(Signé) J. NAUS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 35.

Sir A. Hardinge to M. Naus.

M. le Ministre,

Téhéran, le 20 Mars, 1905.

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser à votre Excellence réception de sa note en date d'hier relative à la détention du paquebot "Kasara" à Bouehir au mois de Décembre 1904.

Votre Excellence connaît déjà, je le pense, le point de vue auquel se place le Gouvernement des Indes en ce qui concerne l'application aux valises postales Anglaises destinées aux bureaux postaux du Golfe Persique des Articles 27 et 51 du Règlement Douanier. Il estime que l'accord intervenu au mois de Juin 1903 entre M. le Directeur-Général des Douanes du Sud et la Résidence Britannique au Golfe Persique ne peut être considéré comme modifié, à défaut d'une nouvelle entente explicite, par les provisions du Règlement Légal, lesquelles ne visent point les attributions spéciales des bureaux postaux Anglo-Indiens, et que l'action de M. Waffelaert, qui a rendu nécessaire la détention du "Kasara," était par conséquent absolument incorrecte. Je ne désire point revenir sur les arguments que j'ai déjà eu l'honneur d'exposer à votre Excellence à l'appui de cette manière de voir. Il ne me reste qu'à transmettre au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de Sa Majesté Britannique, ainsi qu'au Gouvernement de Calcutta, la note qu'elle a bien voulu m'adresser, quitte à l'entretenir de nouveau de cette question aussitôt que j'aurai reçu leurs réponses.

Je vous prie, &c.
(Signé) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 36.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 21)

(No. 60.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 21, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith with reference to my despatch No. 34 of the 23rd ultimo, and to my telegram No. 34 of the 18th instant, copies (1) of telegrams received and sent by me; (2) of a Memorandum by Mr. Churchill of a conversation with the Mukhter-ed-Dowleh, Minister of Telegraphs; and (3) of a note addressed by me to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh on the subject of Russian telegraphists in Khocassan.

Mr. Churchill tells me that the Mukhter-ed-Dowleh informed him that the Russian telegraphists at Meshed and Turbat-i-Haidari had for a long time past received and transmitted messages for the public in Russian, and that they did all they could to induce natives to let them dispatch their telegrams. The only reason for their doing so, as the receipts are paid into the Persian Telegraph Department, is a desire to strengthen their control over the line and get its working as much as possible into their hands. The Mushir-ed-Dowleh, when I spoke to him on the 15th instant on the subject, seemed unaware of this latter circumstance, and said that the receipt or dispatch of messages by the Russian telegraphists for the general public was unauthorized. He

added that no new Russian telegraphists were employed on the Meshed-Seistan line, and that the so-called telegraph "Gholams" whom the Russian Government had recently tried to introduce were still excluded by the Persian authorities from the telegraph offices. It would appear, therefore, that the impression which I derived from Colonel Minchin's telegram of the 11th instant that a new Concession had been made to the Russians at Turbat-i-Haidari is incorrect, but I think the intimation contained in my note to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, especially if followed up by the dispatch of an English signaller to Turbat, will furnish the Persian Government with fresh arguments for resisting the pressure which the Russian Legation is now applying in connection with this question.

The statement made by the Mushir-ed-Dowleh that the Persian Government intends to connect Bujuird with Bajgiran on the Perso-Russian frontier between Meshed and Ashkabad will, if it is confirmed, afford us a good ground for reopening the question of the Kuhl-Malek Siah-Seistan extension to which the Government of India attaches so much importance, and I have, therefore, mentioned it, without quoting my authority, in my note to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh. The Persian Government will probably, however, make a point of building both these lines themselves and working them exclusively with Persian as opposed to either Russian or British employés.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

P.S. March 25.—I inclose a copy of a telegram just received from His Majesty's Consul in Seistan from which your Lordship will observe that both the British and Russian telegraphists there receive and transmit messages for the public in their respective languages.

A. H. H.

Inclosure 1 in No. 36.

Colonel Minchin to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Meshed, March 11, 1905.

RUSSIAN telegraphist at Kuchan has now commenced to receive and forward telegrams. Russian telegraphists at Turbat, who have up till now only done Captain Yas' work, have received permission from Mukhter-ed-Dowleh to accept messages for the public, and they have been given a separate room in the telegraph office at Turbat-i-Haidari.

Inclosure 2 in No. 36.

Sir A. Hardinge to Government of India.

(No. 44.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

March 13, 1905.

WITH reference to Colonel Minchin's telegram of the 11th instant, I have little doubt that this concession is due to financial pressure brought to bear on Persian Government by the Russians in connection with military proposals during the last few weeks. I propose to ask that British telegraphist to be sent to Turbat should receive equal facilities, and that either Russian signallers should be removed, or that English signallers shall be employed at every place between Seistan and Meshed where Russian signallers are employed, in the same way, should we require them.

Inclosure 3 in No. 36.

Sir A. Hardinge to Captain Macpherson.

(No. 15.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, March 21, 1905.

IN view of statement of Persian Minister of Telegraphs that permission has been given for some time past to Russian telegraphist at Turbat to forward messages for the public in Russian, you should authorize British signallers in Seistan to receive similar messages in English, should they be presented.

Inclosure 4 in No. 36.

Memorandum.

I CALLED on the Mukhber-ed-Dowleh this afternoon as instructed by you and informed him of the news received from Meshed respecting the telegraphist at Turbat who transmitted messages for the public.

His Excellency replied that the Russian telegraphists along the whole line transmitted messages in Russian for the public with the authorization of the Persian Government and that what I reported to him was nothing new.

He said that the Persian Government was about to connect Bajnurd and Bajgiran by wire as well as Khaf and Atteh, the latter a distance of 2 farsakhs.

(Signed) G. CHURCHILL.

Tehran, March 12, 1905.

Inclosure 5 in No. 36.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh.

Your Excellency,

Tehran, March 20, 1905.

IN his note of the 19th November last, Mr. Grant-Duff had the honour by direction of His Majesty's Government to inform you that, in the event of Russian signallers being allowed access to the telegraph offices on the Meshed-Seistan line, identical facilities would be claimed for an equal number of English signallers.

I have now been informed by His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed that a Russian signaller has for some time past been transmitting messages in Russian not merely for the chief of the Russian quarantine cordon at Turbat-i-Haidari, but also for the general public. Your Excellency, at an interview which I had the honour of having with you three days ago, said that this telegraphist was allowed to send messages along the line, but only, so I understood you, in Russian for the Russian officers. The Government of India propose to dispatch an English signaller to Turbat who will have precisely similar rights. It is of course understood that this claim will not be made, should the Russian signaller at Turbat be withdrawn, but that so long as a Russian signaller transmits messages in Russian for Captain Yas, we expect that Captain Winter shall be recognized as entitled to the same privilege. A report has further reached me that it is contemplated by the Persian Government to connect Meshed and Astrabad by a telegraph line via Bajgiran on the Perso-Russian frontier. Should this concession be made to the Russian Government my Government would expect as an equivalent permission to connect Nasratabad in Seistan with the Indian frontier at Kuh-i-Malek Siah.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 6 in No. 36.

Captain Macpherson to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Seistan, March 22, 1905.

BOTH Russian and British signallers here, ever since the line was opened, have without restriction sent messages in their own languages for the public.

No. 37.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 61.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 22, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 38 of the 24th ultimo, on the subject of the Luristan expedition, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a translation of a note which I have received from the Mushir-ed-Dowleh as to the strength of the troops available for the punishment of the Direkwand Lurs.

I do not consider this reply by any means as satisfactory, but I think it will be extremely difficult for me to extract any more definite information from the Persian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 37.

The Mushir-ed-Dowleh to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, March 19, 1905.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's note inquiring as to the number of troops sent against the Direkwand Lurs. In reply, I have the honour to inform you that the garrison of that place consists of two regiments of infantry and 500 cavalry. Besides the above force there are two camps, one under the Salar-i-Moazzem and the other under the Ferman Ferman, prepared for the purpose, and they are sufficient to inflict punishment on the offenders.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MUSHIR-ED-DOWLEH.

No. 38.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 62. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 22, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my despatch No. 50 of the 4th instant and to my telegram No. 34 of the 13th instant, that on three of the questions pending between His Majesty's Legation and the Persian Government—namely, the Urmia incidents, the compensation to Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer, and the Governorship of Seistan—both the Grand Vizier and the Mushir-ed-Dowleh behaved in so unsatisfactory a manner that I had to inform them that I should be obliged to appeal to the Shah. They had, in the face of repeated reminders from me, allowed the month of Moharrem to commence without fulfilling their promise to remove the Urmia Mujtehed, and they attempted to get me to agree to a further postponement of his departure for another six weeks or two months. In the Luristan matter the Mushir-ed-Dowleh replied to my representations by the note of which I transmit a copy herewith, and which amounts to a refusal of the compensation demanded by me. As regards Seistan, the Ain-ed-Dowleh would give nothing but evasive replies to my request for a definite decision as to the reappointment of the Hashmat-ul-Mulk.

On my asking for an audience of the Shah they replied that His Majesty would receive me, if I still insisted on it, on the 19th instant; but they added that if I would wait two days more, when the Grand Vizier would see me, they hoped to be able to arrange all these matters to my satisfaction. To this I consented, but at the same time dispatched my telegram No. 34 to your Lordship, so as to be able, if I still made no progress, to bring more serious pressure to bear on them than I could venture to do without definite instructions from His Majesty's Government. Upon this they agreed to remove the Mujtehed in the week following the "Ashureh," the 10th day of the sacred month, on which the martyrdom of Hussein is celebrated, and addressed to me the note of which a copy is inclosed herewith. The Valiahd, whom Mr. Wratishaw was simultaneously pressing by my directions, sent orders to the same effect to the Governor of Urmia, who has now reported that the Mujtehed would start at once.

Under these circumstances I withdrew for the present my application for an audience of the Shah, and confined myself to an interview with the Grand Vizier, whom I saw (as reported in my telegram No. 35) yesterday. I told His Highness that I was willing to allow for the difficulty of removing the Mujtehed during the "Ashureh" week, but that this difficulty was entirely due to the dilatory conduct of the Persian Government, which had had three months since Ramazan to fulfil its pledges, and that I could consent to no further delays. I then broached the subject of the Governorship of Seistan, and asked him if it was intended to send back the

Hashmat-ul-Mulk. The Ain-ed-Dowleh replied that the Hashmat was not a sufficiently capable Governor to be entrusted with a post of such importance, and that he earnestly hoped that we should not press for his reappointment. He would, however, continue to retain the rank and emoluments of Governor, while residing for the present at Tehran. I asked why he could not be given Kain, and said I would be prepared to recommend this compromise to your Lordship as part of a general settlement of Seistan and frontier questions, which might include a permanent arrangement for the export of grain and other provisions to our frontier posts in British Beluchistan in return for our agreeing to abandon our claim to redelimit the Holdich boundary in the neighbourhood of Mirjawar. If this were done I might be able to prevail on your Lordship to acquiesce in the selection of a new Governor for Seistan proper, and perhaps even to withdraw your opposition to the appointment in that capacity of the Yamin-i-Nizam, to which, as he knew, we had objected.

His Highness replied that it was almost, but not quite, decided to separate both Kain and Seistan from the Governor-Generalship of Khorassan, and to constitute them into a distinct province, and it was clear to me from the manner in which he received my remark about the Yamin, who was, he said, most unjustly suspected by us of unfriendliness to British interests, that he had at least thought of him for the post. He did not, however, say who the new Governor was to be, beyond that he would not be a local man, but he added that the younger brother of the late Shaukat-ul-Mulk, Mohammed Ibrahim Khan, would probably act as his Vice-Governor in Kain, while the son of the Hashmat would be retained in the same capacity in Seistan proper. As regarded the Hashmat himself, some other employment might be found for him here or elsewhere, so that he should not be the sufferer by these changes.

I said this reply was tantamount to a rejection of our request. It was absurd to suppose that the retention of the Hashmat in Tehran as a kind of State prisoner, or his appointment to some Governorship or office far away from his own country, would not be a practical punishment, which, whatever the real motives of the Persian Government might be, would bear the semblance of having been inflicted because he had striven to cultivate friendly relations with our officers in a frontier district of great importance to our interests. If this were so, His Majesty's Government would have, in your Lordship's words to the Ala-es-Saltaneh, "to reconsider the whole question of their policy as regarded Seistan," and I thought it, speaking personally and unofficially, quite possible that they might be forced to take measures for the protection of their interests on the Indian frontier similar to those adopted by the Russians in the province of Astrabad. It was already three months since I had given him your Lordship's final message to me on the subject, and it now merely remained for me to report to you that his answer to that message was a refusal.

The Ain-ed-Dowleh declared that I had entirely misunderstood him. What he proposed out of a desire to meet your Lordship's wishes, and to show his friendship for His Majesty's Government, was to offer the Hashmat-ul-Mulk another Governorship in his own country, and he now pledged himself to give him either Tabas, the ancestral home of his family, or send him back to Seistan proper. He pledged me his word that it should be one or the other. I said this was at least a step in the right direction, and that I would telegraph to you the answer which he had given me, and suggest that we might perhaps accept a compromise on these lines, if accompanied by the settlement of the other outstanding questions at issue on the frontier. I then explained to him the Mirjawar question, about which he appeared to know nothing, and the importance, in the interest of good relations between the two neighbouring countries, of our being able to draw supplies from Mirjawar and other places between that point and Kul-i-Malik Shah for our garrisons, and for the trade route from Quetta. He expressed in rather general terms his readiness to meet our views in these respects, if I would give him details as to the form which the proposed Agreement should take, and the amount of grain and supplies which we wished to be empowered to procure. I said that I would do so after reference to your Lordship and the Government of India, but I reminded him that it would first be necessary for me to obtain your adhesion to the compromise I had suggested, as my orders from you were to insist on the reappointment of the Hashmat-ul-Mulk to Seistan, and I could not say beforehand what view you would take of the alternative proposal as to Tabas.

As regards this latter point, it is my personal opinion that the Hashmat would be well advised to accept Tabas, and to get away from Tehran as soon as possible. Once he is back in Eastern Persia, in a district long ruled by his family, he will be in a stronger position for pressing his ulterior claims than he can occupy whilst a practical hostage at the capital. As your Lordship is aware, the situation in Seistan

proper has undergone a marked change since his departure, and his return to Nasratabad is no longer greatly desired by His Majesty's Consul or by Colonel McMahon, whose relations with the Tehran officials, the Yamin-i-Nizam, and the Mustansir-ul-Mulk, are now friendly, whilst the Hashmat's representative and son, the Deputy-Governor, is showing signs of a disposition to intrigue against them with the Russians. The fact, of course, is that all these Persian Chiefs and dignitaries are guided in their relations with the rival foreign Consulates solely by the consideration of their own personal interests for the moment, and that their friendship cannot be relied upon as a permanent factor by either Power, whilst the main object of the Persian Government is not so much to promote or oppose either British or Russian interests, as to strengthen the authority of Tehran by undermining that of the local feudatories. The death of the Amir of Kain and the presence of the Hashmat-ul-Mulk in Tehran as a hostage in his hands have given the Ain-ed-Dowleh an opportunity of doing this, of which, as I ventured to predict in my despatch No. 56 of the 17th instant, he has not been slow to take advantage. He probably feels that his new Governor will have a fair chance of consolidating his position so long as he has only to deal with inexperienced youths, such as the son and deputies of the two former Chiefs, but that he will find it more difficult to do so if the Hashmat is allowed to return to Seistan and intrigue against the new régime with either the English or Russian Consul, or with the powerful local elements long accustomed to his influence and lead. Whether the Hashmat himself will care to accept Tabas by itself may perhaps be open to question, but I shall sound him on the subject, and endeavour to prevail on him to do so, at least provisionally, should your Lordship be disposed to accept the arrangement. He was ready I know to take Kain in lieu of Seistan, but Tabas alone may be another matter.

I referred before leaving the Ain-ed-Dowleh to the question of compensation to Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer, and to certain matters outstanding at Urmia, such as the punishment of Captain Gough's assailants and the blood money due to the heirs of Mushi Daniel, as points on which I should have to insist on satisfaction, but I thought it best not to mix them up with affairs in Seistan, and I contented myself for the present with the assurances which he gave me that he would do his best to meet our views respecting them. If the worst comes to the worst we can settle these mainly pecuniary claims for ourselves by a sequestration of the Jask Royalty, without exposing ourselves, as we are liable to do in Seistan, to any danger of complications with the Russians.

His Highness referred in the course of our discussion to the pressure which the Russian Legation was applying to the Persian Government in connection with its proposed military reforms, and asked me to assist him in resisting this pressure instead of making his position more difficult by driving him too hard on other questions. The Russian Minister has, I hear, at two successive audiences which he has had within the last few days of the Shah, insisted strongly on compliance with his Government's demands; and having failed to produce any impression on His Majesty, he to-day again urged them without effect at an interview with the Mushir-ed-Dowleh. The latter informed me this afternoon that the discussions on this subject with M. de Speyer had reached a dead-lock, and I am assured from another trustworthy source that the offers of a fresh Russian advance for the Shah's journey to Europe, tendered in the hope of rendering the Persian Government more pliable, have been definitely and even sharply refused by it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 38.

The Mushir-ed-Dowleh to Sir A. Hardinge.

Tehran, March 12, 1905.

REITERATES old arguments. There is no difference between local officials and Government officials. They warned the two gentlemen of the insecurity of the district, and as they insisted on going on all the same, no responsibility rests with the Persian Government, though it is taking measures to restore order in those parts.

(Signed and sealed) Mushir-ed-Dowleh.

Inclosure 2 in No. 38.

The Mushir-ed-Dowleh to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, March 18, 1905.

IN reply to your Excellency's note of the 9th instant, respecting the movements of His Imperial Highness the Valiabd and Haji Mirza Hussein Agha, I have the honour to inform you that the latter has been summoned to Tehran, and that he will start by the 27th of March. Necessary instructions have also been sent for the punishment of the Kurds.

I avail, &c.
(Signed and sealed) Mushir-ed-Dowleh.

No. 39.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 64.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 24, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a translation of the reply of the Persian Government to our proposal to establish telegraphic communication between Henjam and Bunder Abbas. In its original form the last passage in this note merely stated that "the workmen on the line" ("Amelajat") would not be foreigners, but at my request the Mushir-ed-Dowleh inserted the words "and employés" ("va mustahdimin"), so as to meet the views expressed in your Lordship's telegram No. 76 of the 9th December, 1904.

Your Lordship will observe that as the Persian Government have expressed their intention to work the line themselves they do not consider a regular Convention with us, such as those of 1872 and 1900, to be necessary, but I have explained to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh that I think it important that a formal Agreement should be concluded between his Excellency or the Minister of Telegraphs and myself, embodying the conditions under which the Indo-European Telegraph Department supplies the engineers and material for building the line. The Mushir agreed in principle, and said he thought it would be simpler that the Agreement should be concluded with himself rather than with the Mukhtbar-ed-Dowleh, a view in which I concur, since its terms will in any case be referred to him as Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have the honour to append the text of a draft Agreement which I am sending him, should your Lordship, to whom I am telegraphing on the subject, express to me your approval of its provisions.

I am inclined to think that when the time comes for the Persian Government to pay the bill they may find it inconvenient to do so, and that we may then easily come to an arrangement which will secure the practical control of the new line by the Indo-European Department on the basis of a division of receipts. I would therefore be in favour of accepting their proposal to build it themselves with English assistance, rather than that by raising objections in the hope of obtaining a more satisfactory agreement on paper, we should give the Persian Government a fresh pretext for delaying the commencement of the work.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 39.

The Mushir-ed-Dowleh to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

March 18, 1905.

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Excellency's note respecting the telegraph line between Bunder Abbas and Henjam, and the estimate of its cost. I have much pleasure in informing you that the Persian Government has consented to the construction of the proposed line via Keshm, and the Ministry of Telegraphs has been instructed to get the line constructed out of the Government fund. As I have already informed you verbally, there will be no need for an Agreement, since it is to be constructed by the Persian Government itself. The labourers and employés on the line

will not be foreigners, and the only engineer required for the construction of the line will be temporarily engaged from England, and the materials will also be bought in that country. I am ready to discuss the matter with you any day that may suit you.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) MUSHIR-ED-DOWLEH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 39.

Draft Agreement.

THE Persian Government having resolved to construct a line of telegraph from Henjam to Bunder Abbas across Keshm, and His Majesty's Government having authorized the Indo-European Telegraph Department to provide the engineers and materials necessary for the construction, it is agreed that two European engineers with the necessary native staff shall be provided by the Department for the purpose, and that the telegraph ship belonging to the Department shall, as soon as the season permits, lay the two submarine ends between Henjam and Keshm and Bunder Abbas respectively.

2. As soon as the line is completed and the cost of the materials and charges of the engineers and telegraph-ship paid, the line shall be handed over to the Persian Ministry of Telegraphs.

3. The charges to be made by the Indo-European Department for the services of the engineers and telegraph-ship shall not exceed 75,000 rupees, and the payment of the above sum is guaranteed by the Persian Government.

4. The declaration of the Persian Government, that it will not employ foreign, i.e., non-Persian, subjects in the working of the line, shall not be held to preclude it from employing such subjects in the service of the Indo-European Department for any repairs to the submarine cable or other works which may be necessary in connection with the maintenance and up-keep of the line, and the latter shall in this case be entitled to make the usual charges for such services.

No. 40.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 66. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 24, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a list of the 12 Sirdars among whom the command of the Persian army is to be distributed in accordance with the new scheme of reorganization, showing the number of troops assigned to each. The total strength of the army on paper is 136,000 men, 76,000 of whom are assigned to the 11 Sirdars, whilst 60,000 are to be placed under the command of the Grand Vizier himself.

The annual estimate for the army, exclusive of the Cossack brigade, is 6,000,000 tomans, or rather over 1,000,000*l.*, made up by the contributions of the various provinces of Persia. It is to the manipulation of this sum, of which a comparatively small part is really spent on the purposes to which it is nominally affected, that the great wealth of former Persian Commanders-in-chief, and notably of the late Sepah Salar, was due.

When the Sepah Salar died a couple of months ago, M. Naos urged the Grand Vizier to seize the opportunity of entirely reorganizing the army, pointing out that he could easily effect such a saving as would re-establish once for all the financial equilibrium of the State. He showed that the army in its present condition was incapable of offering resistance to any of Persia's neighbours, as a war with even the weakest of them, Afghanistan, would practically mean one with Great Britain; that a regular army, in the European sense of the word, was therefore, under existing circumstances, an useless luxury, and that the wisest course would be to reduce it to a small but really efficient and mobile force of from 10,000 to 20,000 men, distributed in

the principal cities. The maintenance of such an army on European lines, with a garrison of, say, 2,000 men in each large centre would, he calculated, cost the Government about 3,000,000 tomans, or 600,000*l.* a-year, and it would suffice to enforce throughout the country the authority of the Persian Government, which is now constantly defied and set at naught. The 600,000*l.* thus saved on the military budget would not only at once clear off the existing deficit, but would give the Grand Vizier a yearly surplus of nearly 500,000*l.*, which could be employed on remunerative expenditure.

M. Naus' advice was very sound, and, though he probably underrated both the opposition which the Grand Vizier would encounter from vested interests, and the amount of the savings thus effected which he would have to pay as pensions or commutation fees to existing holders of regiments and superfluous commands, the cautious adoption of his scheme by gradual reductions would have been a real and useful reform. Unfortunately, the Aini-ed-Dowleh was unable to resist the temptation of securing for himself and his chief supporter, the Vazir-i-Darbar, a large portion of the profits accruing from the Commandership-in-chief, and the only change so far effected is that the office has been put into commission, and the lion's share of its emoluments assigned to the Prime Minister.

The Russian reorganization scheme also contemplated, I understand, a reduction of the army, though on a smaller scale than that proposed by M. Naus. The expenditure of the 400,000*l.* promised by Russia for the remodelling of the army was, however, to have been in the hands, or, at least, under the control of the Russian officers to be placed by her at the disposal of the Shah, who were to include instructors for the various provincial garrisons. The net result would have been that the entire Persian army would have been almost as completely under Russian control as the Cossack brigade. M. Naus, in discussing this scheme with me, expressed his astonishment at the audacity of this attempt on the part of the Russian Government, but confirmed the information which I had gathered in other quarters that M. de Speyer had pressed it with great persistency. I understand that, at his second audience on the 19th instant, he reproached the Shah with having broken the promise given by the Aini-ed-Dowleh at St. Petersburg that Russian officers and not Austrians would be engaged for the military reorganization, but that the Shah cut him short by saying that he was master of his own army; that he had already given the Russian Government his answer, and could not now re-discuss the question.

The Austrian Minister informs me that, although the contracts of the Austrian officers are signed, they are to await the Shah's arrival in Austria, at Carlsbad or Marienbad, to be presented to His Majesty, and it appears to me within the bounds of probability that some effort may then be made to get them to accept the cancellation of their contracts, in order to avoid further protests from Russia.

Meanwhile, no one here takes the Aini-ed-Dowleh's reorganization scheme seriously, and it has already evoked loud remonstrances on the part of certain Persians of influence. The Zil-es-Sultan is furious at his regiments having been taken from him and given to the Vazir-i-Darbar, and he has threatened to resign the Governorship of Isfahan if his son, Prince Akbar Mirza, who is now in Tehran, fails to get this arrangement rescinded. The Commander of the Zinjan troops has taken sanctuary with the Vazir-i-Darbar, as a protest against his being placed under the orders of the Aini-ed-Dowleh, and several of the new Sirdars are complaining that the commands assigned them are less lucrative than those bestowed on others, whose claims they consider to be unequal to their own, and are asking to be permitted to resign.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 40.

List of Sirdars, and troops under their respective command.

No.	Name.	Number of Men.	Remarks.
1	Amir Bahadar Jung, Vazir-i-Darbar	8,577	Chiefly in Kerman, Isfahan, and Shiraz.
2	Aini-ed-Dowleh	6,047	Chiefly in Kurdistan and Khauzeh.
3	Zafar-ed-Dowleh	6,949	Chiefly in Azerbaijan.
4	Amir Nizam	10,763	
5	Vazir Nizam	5,528	Chiefly in Irak, Malayir, and other districts of Central Persia.
6	Zafar-es-Saltaneh	6,120	Chiefly in Laristan and Arabistan.
7	Nasr-es-Saltaneh	6,583	Chiefly in Kuzvin and Ferozkoh.
8	Mohammed Sadik Khan, Emir Top-khaueh	6,556	Chiefly on Turkish frontier, Khoj, Uroia, &c.
9	Sirdar Afghani	4,151	Chiefly in Astrabad and on Russian frontier.
10	Hissam-ul-Mulk, Amir Afghani ..	5,629	Chiefly in Kermanshah, Nehavend, and adjacent districts.
Total, representing the provinces and exclusive of Tehran and Khorassan with its dependencies		66,903	
11	Amir Khan Sirdar	say 10,000	Tehran troops, including artillery.
Under the personal supervision and command of the Grand Vizir		60,000	Chiefly in the provinces east of Tehran.

It is proposed to give a cavalry command, under the Grand Vizir, to the Jalal-ed-Dowleh, and to place the Khorassan troops (also under the Grand Vizir) under the subordinate command of the Nazim-es-Saltaneh.

Grand total 136,000 men.

No. 41.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 67.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 24, 1905.

ONE of the Belgian engineers sent out on behalf of the Persian Government to examine M. Van Roggen's scheme for the Ahwaz dam having arrived here from the Karun a few days ago, I asked M. Naus if he had brought with him any news as to the doings of Major Morton, the expert sent there by the Government of India, from whom I had so far received no reports as to his mission.

His Excellency said that he had heard that Major Morton had made a thorough study of the problem, and had impressed all those with whom he had come in contact with his ability and valuable knowledge of all irrigation questions. He appeared to have quite mastered this particular subject, and M. Naus thought from what he had heard that the opinion which he was likely to express on the Ahwaz dam scheme would be favourable to the views of the Persian Government. He believed, however, that it would cost a good deal more than the 200,000*l.* which the Aini-ed-Dowleh had asked us to advance for it, and that half a million was a more likely estimate, but he also thought that the necessary funds could be easily raised by a Syndicate in Europe, and that the European capital required might thus, if necessary, be found without a foreign Government loan.

M. Naus went on to say that one serious difficulty in the way of the proposed scheme lay in the possible, and indeed probable, opposition of the Sheikh of Moham-marah, who would insist on his local interests being considered in connection with this question, and who, he added, had intimated pretty plainly that if they were disregarded he might give trouble, and perhaps even migrate with his whole tribe to the Turkish side of the Euphrates. This attitude on Sheikh Khazal's part may, I think, prove an

important card in our hands, should any attempt be made by the Grand Vizier to give effect to his Karun irrigation projects on lines not approved by the British or Indian Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 42.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 68.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 24, 1905.

I HAD the honour to receive in December last a despatch from the Government of India of the 8th November, a copy of which has doubtless reached Mr. Secretary Brodriek, instructing me to represent to the Persian Government the unsettled state of the Province of Kerman and the necessity for more vigorous measures for the protection of caravans on the trade route from Kerman to Bunder Abbas.

I replied that I would execute the instruction, but that I feared that my representations would produce little practical effect unless I could make some concrete proposals for giving effect to them, and that I was consulting His Majesty's Consul at Kerman on this point.

I have now received from Major Sykes the despatch of which I have the honour to inclose a copy herewith.

His suggestion of the formation of a mounted force under British officers must, I fear, be dismissed as impracticable. The Persian Government would never agree to it, and the Russians would oppose it as strongly as I have done their own recent military proposals.

The same may be said for the present of the suggested telegraph line from Kerman to Bunder Abbas. We may get this later on, but the attitude of the Persian Government in the matter of the Henjam-Bunder Abbas and Kuh-Malik Siah-Seistan extensions, and of the contemplated Russian lines in Khorassan, is a sufficient indication of the reception with which any such proposal would meet at the hands of the present Shah and Grand Vizier.

The appointment of Consular Agents or hospital assistants at Sirjan and Rafsinjan is more feasible, and I have no doubt that we could get one at Bampur if the Government of India would withdraw its objections to the residence of a Persian Consular officer at Quetta. I agree with the views expressed by Major Sykes on the latter point. The Russians could not claim a Russian Consul at Quetta because a Persian one resided there, any more than we could insist on the appointment of a British Consul in Russian Central Asia on the ground that Russia allows a Persian Consulate at Ashkhabad.

To sum up, I am afraid that Major Sykes' proposals, with the exception of that for the establishment of agencies at Rafsinjan and in Persian Beluchistan, do not bring us much nearer to any working arrangement which the Persian Government would be likely at present to accept. I can, however, put forward his last suggestion should I learn from your Lordship that it meets with your approval.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 42.

Major Sykes to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 20.)

Sir,

Kerman, February 27, 1905.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 1 of the 17th ultimo, I have been discussing the subject therein contained with Mr. Gleadowe Newcomen, and the views now expressed are for all practical purposes similar in purport to the recommendations which Mr. Newcomen will submit in his Report to the Upper India Chamber of Commerce.

We both agree that a really satisfactory state of affairs can only be established by the formation of a mounted force in Southern Persia under British officers, who, by mutual co-operation and incorruptibility, would very soon terminate the present state of

chronic insecurity which defeats all attempts at progress. In this connection I have frequently pointed out that the fact that the route passes across the territories of Kerman, Fars, and Bunder Abbas is a great hindrance to effectual protection, and, if such a corps were to be formed, it should be free to act wherever necessary. I would venture to state that it is our opinion that until some such action be taken no solution of this problem is possible.

Failing this, it is very difficult to make any practical suggestions to be laid before the Persian Government, as it is to be presumed that any and every official would steal the money that the Persian Government pays, and which, if honestly handled, should suffice for the purpose.

However, the Persian Government might certainly be induced to construct a land line of telegraph from Rafsinjan to Sirjan and Bunder Abbas. This, in our opinion, would do more than anything else both to develop trade and to increase the security of the route. It is quite possible that the Persian Government might prefer this alternative to the Henjam-Bunder Abbas section, which, of course, possesses great importance, but yet could be readily laid at an emergency. I have just been informed by M. Césari that my suggestion for the post to be carried by mounted guards has been accepted at Tehran.

This is certainly a step in the right direction, as the guards must now exist to some extent. If the above proposals were accepted and stations constructed to serve the purpose of "Chappar Khanehs," guard-houses, and telegraph offices alike, I think that caravans would possess a feeling of security which is now conspicuous by its absence.

In many ways the Belgian officials would be the most suitable individuals to be placed in charge of this duty, but as matters are, it would be, in our opinion, unwise to suggest their appointment to it.

To complete this subject, we recommend the establishment of agencies at Rafsinjan and Sirjan, more especially now that a special assistant will probably be appointed to this Consulate. Rafsinjan is the centre of the cotton district, and is near the point of junction where the Bunder Abbas post leaves the main Kerman-Yezd line.

It is on the Indo-European Telegraph system, and is also a centre whence cotton and gum are exported to Russia.

Finally, after Bam, it is the most populous district in the province, and its leading Khans and merchants are extremely friendly.

We strongly recommend that a telegraph office of the Indo-European Telegraph Department be opened at Rafsinjan.

Sirjan lies at the junction of the Bunder Abbas, Kerman, and Yezd route with that running from Shiraz to Kerman. It is surrounded by a nomad population, and a capable agent would be able to establish relations not only with the Kerman nomads but also with those of Fars. It is here that information as to robberies and robbers is to be obtained, and, in a word, it is the key of the main caravan routes mentioned in the above.

It is postally connected with Rafsinjan and Kerman, and if my reiterated proposal for a Bunder Abbas telegraph line come into being, Rafsinjan would be the junction, and Sirjan the most important office between it and Bunder Abbas. I would suggest that hospital assistants be appointed to these posts.

My experience of them in the case of Seistan and Birjand proves that, given good specimens of the class, they are invaluable.

In the case of Rafsinjan, Ali Naki Khan, the leading landowner, would, I have reason to believe, contribute handsomely towards the maintenance of a hospital. He is once again its Governor. Given that our proposals be adopted, an official would have little difficulty in finding out who were the brigands, and we could effectually aid the Persian Government by reporting all cases in which road guards were either non-existent or abettors of brigandage; otherwise an official travels about rather fruitlessly, and as soon as his back is turned the bad old order is wont to be re-established.

I have not in the above made any reference to the crying necessity for the appointment of a British Agent to Persian Beluchistan, where there are hundreds of British Indian subjects, not to mention the telegraph lines, most inadequately protected.

I was informed at the India Office, in 1901, that the present unsatisfactory state of affairs was mainly due to the fact that the Agent to the Governor-General in Beluchistan objected to the residence of a Persian Agent at Quetta on the ground that he might be a centre for Russian intrigues.

I would venture to combat the theory, as almost any Persian official appointed to Quetta would be only too glad, in return for a small consideration, to do absolutely

nothing; or, even better, such an official might be induced to assist in developing Indo-Persian trade. As Persians live mainly on their perquisites, which would be scanty at Quetta, such a post would rarely be occupied.

I would venture to submit that the fact that practically no claims have been paid in Mekran out of the very large sums awarded by the Mamurs in 1903, that no instalment due by Sardars Jhand Khan of Sarhad or by Sardar Shah Jehan of Magas has been paid, that the fort of the latter has been rebuilt, and, finally, that Persian Beluchistan is and will, in all human probability, remain in a state of chronic anarchy makes it imperative that British subjects should no longer be left to the tender mercies of a gang which is composed of authorized or unauthorized raiders. I imagine, too, that, for other reasons, the present occasion is a favourable one for the consideration of the above proposals.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Resident at Bushire for the information of the Government of India.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. MOLESWORTH SYKES.

No. 43.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 69. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 24, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report in continuation of my despatch No. 40 of the 28th February last, that the campaign against M. Naus has produced a good deal of excitement among the "tullab" or religious students during the period of the "Ashureh" (the Shiah Passion week), which terminated a few days ago, so much so that the Russian and one or two other foreign Ministers deemed it expedient to warn the Persian Government officially that it would be held responsible for any injury to foreign subjects which might result from fanatical disturbances. The chief leader in the movement was Seyyed Abdullah, one of the most important Mujtaheds of Tehran, who was helpful to His Majesty's Legation at the time of the Régie troubles, and has ever since maintained friendly relations with it, but who is at the same time a secret partisan of the Atabeg and an avowed enemy of the present Grand Vizier. At the religious services known as "Rozekhanehs," held during the week of mourning at his house, as well as at the mosques, the tullab interrupted the preachers, brandished photographs of M. Naus like that inclosed in my despatch No. 40, tore off their turbans and stamped on them, demanding vengeance on the infidel blasphemer, and during one of these sermons a mob of them surrounded the Turkish Ambassador, a pious but rather timid man, and called on him as the Representative of a Moslem Sovereign to obtain for them satisfaction from the Shah. On the eve of the Ashureh, Seyyed Abdullah himself mounted the minbar and pronounced the discourse, of which I inclose a translation, derived from an auditor, and which in any other country would be regarded as an incitement to murder. He and several other leading Mollahs, including the Pan-Islamist Mahommed Taki and the "malleus Judaeorum" Rehanullah, at the same time petitioned the Shah for the immediate dismissal of M. Naus.

The Persian Government, although the Grand Vizier pretended to me to treat the agitation with contemptuous indifference, took precautions to prevent its becoming really dangerous. The Shah addressed to Seyyed Abdullah a letter, of which I inclose a translation, and which was read aloud next day to the tullab; and the Ain-ed-Dowleh sent a money present to him as a hint to calm his followers and induce them to be content with the somewhat vague promises contained in His Majesty's reply. Bribes were also given, so I am credibly informed, to the two other Mollahs mentioned above, the first of whom, besides money, received a new carriage. Simultaneously with these concessions, certain military measures were adopted. On the morning of the 10th of Moharrem, troops were posted in front of M. Naus' house, and the gates of the Ark, or inner city, which contains the Palace, and within which his Excellency resides, were closed and guarded by soldiers. The Armenians were at the same time advised to remain at home. The critical day passed without any disturbance. Very few Europeans ventured into the bazaars or native quarters, but Mr. New of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, who met on his way to his office one of the usual processions of devotees beating and cutting themselves with knives, was not molested by them, and the only incident of disrespect to a foreigner of which I have heard,

was the throwing of stones by a few youths a day or two later at the carriage of the Austrian Minister.

The Russian Legation was very anxious lest the agitation might frighten the Shah into throwing M. Naus to the black-turbaned wolves, and M. de Speyer addressed to the Persian Government an official note in which he stated that the Russian loans had been accorded by his Government on the assumption or understanding that the customs, upon which they were secured would remain under a European administration. If this guarantee no longer existed, the Russian Government would have, the note added, "to take measures" for insuring the regular payment of the debt. The Ain-ed-Dowleh replied in general terms that the Persian Government had no present intention of dismissing M. Naus, and was quite capable of dealing with the situation; but I am told on good authority that he added, in answer to a verbal threat by M. Speyer, that these "other measures" would include the placing of Russian inspectors in the Customs, that M. Naus' retention or dismissal had nothing whatever to do with the loan contracts, and that Russia's right to interfere with the control of the customs could only be exercised in the event of Persia's failure to pay the interest and sinking fund for which those Agreements provided.

M. de Speyer's intervention was, I think, injudicious, and its only effect has, I hear, been to lead the Shah and Court to suspect that the agitation against the Belgians has really been engineered by the Russian Bank, with a view to affording the Russian Government a pretext for again demanding the appointment of Russian Customs officials. His object was, of course, the much simpler one of preventing the collapse of the Belgian Administration at a time when such a collapse would be very inconvenient to Russian interests, involving, as it would have done, a financial crisis, and, perhaps, the necessity of a discussion of the Persian question with ourselves at a moment when Russia would have to enter on it under rather unfavourable conditions for herself.

By the common people, who, as your Lordship knows, regard the Customs Department as a Russian institution, on account of the new tariff negotiated between the Russians and M. Naus, it was assumed that the agitation against the latter was supported by His Majesty's Legation, and this idea was encouraged in Russian circles. So general was it that I was actually sounded by a person connected with the movement as to my willingness to subscribe 5,000 tomans towards an attack by a mob of tullab on M. Naus' house. I thought it well, in view of this impression, to let it be known indirectly, both to the Grand Vizier, to the leaders of the Clerical party, and to M. Naus himself, that I disapproved of the aims and methods of the agitation, but I at the same time refrained from any formal or official expression of opinion with regard to the wider questions involved in it.

The excitement has now somewhat subsided, the divisions among the Ulema mentioned in my despatch No. 40 having prevented those of them who favour the Grand Vizier from affording it any overt support, but there is still a certain ferment among the tullab, who suspect that their leaders have been bribed and have kept them out of any share in the profits.

M. Naus' own position and prestige have, moreover, been so much shaken by it that he may possibly go on furlough for the sake of his health, and thus enable the Government to represent his departure as a concession to the demands of the clergy, and as a prelude to his eventual resignation. He has firmly resisted all the attempts which the agents of Seyyed Abdullah have made to blackmail him, by simply referring them to the Grand Vizier. He tells me that he believes the real instigators of the movement against him are the Nizam-es-Sultaneh, and Haji Moin-ut-Tajjar, a wealthy and intriguing Bushire merchant, who has given us a good deal of trouble in the South of Persia, and that these men have endeavoured to raise Nejef and Kerbela against him, but so far with only partial success.

As I have already reported to your Lordship, I have never much believed in any fanatical outbreak in Tehran, but I still think we may have trouble in the provinces, especially if the Shah goes to Europe. I would venture in this connection to invite your Lordship's attention to the inclosed copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Ispahan, which has always been a dangerous storm centre. There has been a riot at Meshed, due, I understand, to a quarrel between Persians and Armenians, and though His Majesty's Consul-General, in a telegram promising further details, says he thinks no lives have been lost and no damage done to British subjects or property, Russian shops have apparently been pillaged by the Mussulman mob.

There is certainly, from all I hear, a widespread feeling of unrest and discontent throughout the country, which the news of fresh Russian disasters and disorders seems likely still further to encourage.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

P.S. — Information has just been brought to me that Seyyed Abdullah having recommenced his agitation, the Grand Vizier has announced his intention of expelling him from Tehran.

A. H. H.

Inclosure 1 in No. 43.

Address delivered by Seyyed Abdullah on the 8th Moharrem (March 15), 1905.*

OH, all ye who are present here this afternoon, I know that you are Moslems and that your fathers and grandfathers were Moslems! I know also that in the beginning of Islam the number of Moslems was only 313, who were companions of the Prophet, whilst since then Islam has made such progress that the number of Moslems† has reached 30 crores in Persia, and about double that number in foreign lands. But I cannot understand what has befallen your religious zeal (literally, where your jealousy has gone). Know, then, that I shall never fear the Shah or his Ministers, and shall never flatter him.

The Shah has cannon, rifles, soldiers, and war material, but these are not to be used against us; they are to defend us against invasion by foreign enemies. Our Sovereign is a very good King, a lover of justice and of his people, and, above all else, he is a Mussulman. All the Tullabs and Mullabs present here, who have torn off their head-dresses, have a religious grievance, and are pressing me to pass a sentence for the killing of this wicked and misbegotten wretch (M. Naus). But I do not think it needful for me to issue such a sentence. The act which he has himself committed, outraging our Prophet and Ulama, renders him liable to be murdered by every Mussulman. There is no necessity for any "fetwa" from me.

However, I have written to the Shah about this matter, and have heard from an authentic source that His Majesty has consented to remove him from his office within a reasonable time; but I also heard that last night, after my letter had reached the Shah, he wished to dismiss the man immediately, only another person altered His Majesty's opinion and persuaded him to withhold the order. I do not say that this person was the Sadr Azam. It is another person,‡ and I shall mention his name to you to-morrow afternoon.

I am not speaking to you in this manner from any motive of self-interest. Should I have to leave this place and go elsewhere I shall be the better for it, for I care not for my present life, and have lost all hopes in it. But I repeat that the Shah is a just man and a Moslem.

Should a satisfactory answer not be received by me within the next three days, and the man be dismissed, then I say that we must continue the present agitation, and keep up "ashurehs" and "Katal," and celebrations of the day of Judgment.§ The killing of a single dog is not difficult at all. You should remain content (*sic*), and continue your lamentations (over the martyrdom of Hussein), and at the same time offer prayers for your King and father, which is one of your religious duties.

Inclosure 2 in No. 43.

Shah's Autograph to Agha Seyed Abdullah Mujtehed.

WE have seen your Excellency's Petition. We have also answered your previous Petition. We have never withdrawn our favour from the Priesthood, who are the well-wishers of the Government and the guides of the nation. Of course the Priest-

* The text of this address is only approximately correct, as it was written down from memory, but it represents the general substance of the Mujtehed's remarks.

† By "Moslems" Seyyed Abdullah presumably means Shiabs, otherwise his figures are unintelligible.

‡ Who this person was has not since transpired. It may be an allusion to the Russian Minister.

§ Celebrations of the tragedy of Kerbela.

hood must fulfil their duty, and it is also incumbent on us that in return for the benefits which the Almighty has conferred upon us by intrusting us with the rule of a country, we should do our utmost for the prosperity and welfare of the nation and for the protection of Islam, and whatever we consider our duty, intrusted to us by Providence, shall be carried out by the help of the last Imam. You can inform the community of Islam that, after the days of mourning, arrangements will be made to meet their complaints, and it is obvious that our responsibility for the protection of the faith is much greater than that of others.

2nd Moharrem, 1322 (March 9, 1905).

Inclosure 3 in No. 43.

Consul-General Preece to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 16. Confidential.)
Sir,

Ispahan, March 15, 1905.

I HAVE just had a conversation with a friend, a man of considerable learning, and who takes a great interest in the politics of Persia and its neighbours.

We were talking of the state of internal affairs in Russia, and I observed that I supposed the Persians were watching with interest what was happening. He said: "Yes, they were; and, what was more, they were working at the question; that in Tehran, Ispahan, Shiraz, and Yezd they had small committees of four or five men who had each subscribed 150 to 200 tomans to send men about in the districts to make arrangements and educate the people; that in the coming summer, if the Shah went to Europe, there would certainly be disturbances all over the country unless there was cholera, and that would put a stop to it."

Aga Nejefy said at a meeting where many were present a few days ago: "A new dog has appeared in Persia and was snapping at men's feet, but whether the dog went on a journey to Europe or died they would still get rid of him."

The new dog meant was the Ain-ed-Dowleh.

I cite these two things to show you that intrigues are going on in this place as well as in Tehran.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. PREECE.

No. 44.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 14. Commercial.)
My Lord,

Tehran, March 22, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Representative in the Persian Gulf on the subject of the Indian Commercial Mission now travelling in Southern Persia, together with one of an unofficial letter addressed to him by its President, Mr. Newcomen, which that gentleman had marked private, but which, as he is sending copies of it to his Chambers of Commerce, Major Cox felt justified in not treating as confidential.

The questions raised in the earlier part of Major Cox's despatch have been settled by Mr. Grahame's proceeding to meet the Mission at Yezd, whither Major Sykes was unable to accompany them in view of his impending transfer on acting duty to Meshed.

That relating to the status of the Mission has been dealt with by me in a telegram to Major Cox, of which I have the honour to forward a paraphrase herewith. I agree in principle with Mr. Newcomen that in a country like Persia it would be a mistake to try and minimize the connection of the Mission with the Government of India, as, whatever we said or did, it would be represented or believed to be political, whilst the fact that it has an official character and is known to be under Government patronage will ensure it more respectful treatment and will save it from annoyances such as it suffered on its first landing at Bunder Abbas, and which are of a nature to injure our prestige. For this reason when it arrived in Persia, I asked the Persian Government to accord it an official reception, and I have since applied for military escorts for it on its passage from one

commercial centre to another. I do not know what has led Mr. Newcomen to suspect that it has been sought "to divest it of political significance and official status," as nothing which has been said here could have conveyed such an impression, certainly not the note mentioned in my despatch No. 7 Commercial of the 2nd ultimo, a copy of which I have the honour to transmit herewith.

Nor have I received the slightest hint from the Government of India that it desired the private and purely commercial character of the Mission to be emphasized, though it is possible that Major Sykes may have been warned from Calcutta not to allow undue political significance to be attached to its visit to Kerman, and that a statement to this effect by him to Mr. Newcomen may have been misunderstood by the latter. This is the only explanation I can think of to account for Mr. Newcomen's complaints.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 44.

Major Cox to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 8.)
Sir,

Bushire, February 3, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to address you regarding the movements of the Commercial Mission now touring in Southern Persia.

I note from Foreign Department telegram No 154 East Africa of the 12th January that my telegram to the Government of India of the 1st January, on the subject of the proposed change of programme, was reported to your Excellency, and I further understand from your telegram No 10 of the 23rd January to my address that you approve the altered itinerary which will bring the Mission onwards from Kerman via Yazd and Abarguh to Shiraz and thence to Bushire, and that you also acquiesce in Major Sykes accompanying the Mission as far as the frontiers of Yazd.

I now venture to trouble your Excellency to consider certain details in connection with the execution of the programme as above modified.

The Mission expects to be back again at Kerman the last week in February, and would, I suppose, reach Yazd about a month later. Major Sykes suggests that his Kerman Sowars should accompany the Mission (including himself) during their visit to Yazd and afterwards as far as the Fars boundary on the Yazd-Abarguh-Shiraz route, and that Mr. Grahame should arrange the remainder of the tour.

For the Mission to continue its tour on the same lines would involve Mr. Grahame meeting the party at the frontier stage with his Sowars and piloting them to Shiraz and afterwards to the Fars frontier on the Bushire side, where I would arrange for them to be met.

I am sending this letter under flying seal to Mr. Grahame, in order that he may have an opportunity of adding his own comments on the above proposals, and if, after consideration of them, your Excellency will favour me with your views by telegram I shall be very much obliged.

For the next three weeks Major Sykes will be cut off from telegraphic communication, and it is not quite clear to me from his last message whether he proposes to arrange with you direct regarding Persian escort as far as the frontier of Yazd or whether he expects me to.

Presumably the same Persian escort would be able to remain with the Mission all through to Bushire, but as the Government of India will require to know whether the safety of the party has been assured over the new route, I request the favour of your taking this point into consideration also.

Lastly, your Excellency is better informed than I am as to the attitude of the Persian Government towards the Mission and as to how far with propriety we can make much of them. I shall therefore be glad to be favoured with your views and instructions on this head as regards Bushire, and I have no doubt Mr. Grahame will be anxious to have the same knowledge in respect to their prospective reception at Shiraz.

I have, &c.

(Signed) P. Z. COX.

Inclosure 2 in No. 44.

Letter communicated by Mr. A. Newcomen to Major Cox.

Kerman, December 29, 1905.

THOUGH I have never had the pleasure of meeting you, I have often heard of you officially and privately.

Doubtless you are aware that I am President of the Commercial Mission at present in South-East Persia.

As the portion of the country over which the Mission will tour is under your jurisdiction, I am most desirous of meeting you before my return to India, and, if possible, of visiting Bunder Abbas with you, if it can be so arranged.

There is much to be done if the resources of this part of the country are to be developed by us, before Russian competition attempts to oust us from our field of influence.

Of Russian activity, political and commercial, there are signs in plenty, and, to my mind, it is a case of "he who has ears to hear let him hear," or we may wake up suddenly and find that we slept, while we thought that we were awake.

As an instance of mistaken policy I may bring to your notice, although I am fully aware that you are not responsible for the situation, that it has been sought to divest this Mission of all political significance and official status, very weakly, it seems to me, for the simple reason that such a position is absolutely illogical. A Mission such as ours must have both a political significance and an official status.

Commerce and its development have long been acknowledged by Russia, Germany, and the United States, and other Powers as being inseparable from politics. Without commercial interests—and these words are very comprehensive—politics would have little meaning. The development of commercial interests means the increase of political importance and responsibilities.

Again, the desire to impress on officials and the world in general that this Mission has neither political nor official status, is more than I can clearly understand. For reasons I have already mentioned, I fail to see how this contention can be urged in the face of the fact that the Indian Government are paying nearly all our expenses; that they have given us a guard of regular cavalry; that they have attached a Government consular official to us; that they have obtained officially from the Persian Government a guard of infantry and cavalry to look after us, and that the Persian Government have sent a Sartip Mamoor from Tehran to accompany us. All this does not seem to show that the Mission of which I have the honour to be President was originally regarded in an unofficial light. Lastly, there are the official orders concerning us issued to the Bunder Abbas Government. Neither the Indian Government nor that of Persia can perform any but official acts. They are not private individuals or companies.

Is it to be argued that the increase of British influence in Persia is not a political matter, or that the official nature of the Mission has not enabled, and will not enable, it to do much more in this line than if it had been a mere bagman's tour through the country, trying to dispose of a few toman's worth of goods?

The most important and constant part of our work consists in the meeting of Headmen of villages, and of nomad tribes, and of officials, as well as the principal merchants and traders, explaining to them the great interest shown in their welfare by the Government of India, thereby of Great Britain, in having gone to such expense in sending out a Mission to inquire into their needs and troubles, and to suggest remedies and encourage the growth of favourable international commerce, thus pointing out clearly the vast difference between our policy and that favoured by Russia, whose "grab all" game played through the Belgian Customs is clearly seen and distinctly resented by the Persians.

I trust you will forgive me for my somewhat lengthy note. I am, however, so constantly having the non-official position of this Mission and its members impressed upon me that I think it is only fair to let you know how matters stand, and if you deem fit higher authority.

We might at least have been let alone, instead of having our arrival, as with the Governor-General of Kerman, heralded by disclaimers, in consequence of which the Governor-General was polite enough neither to return my call nor personally to take any notice of it.

Luckily no harm has been done, as owing to the very strong position held by Major Sykes, it has resulted in the Governor-General doing all that, in the face of his

[1552]

K

orders, he could do to render us honour. Had we not had this backing, our Mission would have been damned to a great extent, and its utility negatived for the rest of our tour, if not for the whole. News travels fast in the East, and all we have said in the past would have been looked upon as empty vapouring and vain words, a state of affairs hardly calculated to raise British prestige.

I hope the Government will find their way to approve of the altered itinerary suggested by me, and I beg that Major Sykes may be permitted to accompany the Mission to Yezd, which important trade centre seems to have been somewhat overlooked by my predecessors.

I am sending a copy of this letter to my Chambers, for their information.

Hoping to see you on my way through Bushire.

Inclosure 3 in No. 44.

Sir A. Hardinge to Major Cox.

(No. 31.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

INDIAN Commercial Mission.

Bushire, March 22, 1905.

Government of India have sent me no instructions respecting the exact status of the Mission, but on their arrival I considered it official, and asked the Persian Government to receive it as such. From Mr. Newcomen's letter it would appear that in certain quarters it is doubted whether my action in the matter was in conformity with the views of Government, but as I had no knowledge of those views, I do not see why I should reconsider it.

I am of opinion that local authorities at Shiraz and Bushire should receive Mission with as much display as they are willing to grant it, and that British representatives at both places should introduce President officially. To insist too tenaciously on points of detail in ceremonial of istekbal would be inadvisable, as no precedents exist, and President is not a Consular or Diplomatic official, but you should inform local Government that His Majesty's Legation desire and expect that proper honours should be paid to Mission, which comes here under auspices of Indian Government.

Inclosure 4 in No. 44.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh.

Tehran, January 11, 1905.

Your Excellency,

THE Meftah-es-Saltaneh came to see me yesterday, and read to me a telegram from the Government of Kerman about the Mission sent to South-eastern Persia by the Indian Chambers of Commerce. He was not authorized to leave me a copy of this document, but its substance, so far as my memory goes, was that suspicion had been aroused by the fact that members of the Mission had taken photographs and sketches, and had made suspicious inquiries about the number of troops in the province, and the produce of various places. It was added that some of them were believed to be military men. The writer of this communication evidently thought that the Government of India were preparing an invasion of Persia, and had sent officers disguised as merchants to spy out the land beforehand.

I can hardly suppose that your Excellency would take such ideas seriously, but if any doubt as to their absurdity should exist in your mind, I would beg you to inquire of your official representatives in India as to the persons composing the Mission, who are well-known commercial men. You are aware that the new tariff established two years ago caused a good deal of anxiety in English and Indian commercial circles, where it was believed to be likely to injure British trade with Persia, and that the Board of Trade in London dispatched Mr. Maclean to report on the general commercial situation in this country, with special reference to the new tariff. He visited and collected statistics for the whole of Persia with the exception of the provinces actually bordering on the Indian frontier, which concern India more closely than Great Britain, and the present Mission is now completing in those provinces the work done by him as regards the remainder of the country. The Kerman authorities may deem the Government of India unfriendly, but they ought really not to regard it as so foolish as to send a large Mission accompanied by an escort of Persian troops for the purpose of collecting political and military information, which most Governments obtain, when they wish to do so, through secret

and confidential agents, and which its own Consul in Kerman and Vice-Consul at Bam could, if necessary, procure for it. The Meftah-es-Saltaneh laid some stress upon the fact that the members of the Mission had inquired as to the number of troops in the district, which had seemed to the Kerman authorities a suspicious thing. If these authorities had taken the trouble to reflect, they would have seen that such a question was very much to the point on the part of persons interested in commerce, since the chief difficulty in the way of Indian trade in the Kerman and Baluchistan region has long been the insecurity of the trade routes, and the unfortunate inadequacy of the military and police arrangements provided for their protection. This point is one to which I have recently been requested by the Government of India to invite your Excellency's attention, with reference to frequent robberies of Indian traders on the road between Kerman and Bunder Abbas, and it is among the obvious duties of persons studying the commercial conditions of South-eastern Persia to ascertain and report accurately what armed forces are at the disposal of the authorities for the protection of caravans from robberies and for the recovery of goods plundered.

The Government of India is already well acquainted with the military situation in Beluchistan, and has, as your Excellency is aware, repeatedly urged the Persian Government to send artillery to that province and in general to increase its military forces there. I have myself constantly written notes to you on this subject, and have asked that Persian troops should in the common interests of the two Governments be dispatched to Irafshan and other points on our frontier. I can only suppose that the stories which have formed the subject of the paper read to me by the Meftah-es-Saltaneh came from the same quarters as those which spread in Seistan, in order to excite bad feeling between our two countries, reports, all of which proved to be as false as they were stupid, of Afghan armies concentrating on the Persian frontier and of intentions on the part of His Majesty's Government to seize large tracts of Persian territory, and I venture to hope that instructions may be sent to the Kerman authorities not to let themselves be made in future the instruments of such palpable intrigue.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 45.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 72. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 29, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Valiahd left Tabreez yesterday afternoon for Tehran, where he is to act as Regent during the Shah's absence. His Imperial Highness has rendered himself very unpopular in Tabreez by having engineered for his own benefit a corner in grain, which has brought up the price of bread, and I am informed that a popular outbreak against his rule would very likely have occurred had he not been summoned to the capital. It is, I hear, suggested by his entourage that he may be given another high post, perhaps the Governor-Generalship of Ispahan, after the Shah's return from Europe. I should not wish to see him at Ispahan, but a breach with the tradition, in virtue of which the Crown Prince has for nearly a century always resided at a city so dominated by Russian influence as Tabreez, would be a striking and salutary reform. His appointment as Regent can hardly fail to be unwelcome to the Ain-ed-Dowleh, whom he detests, and was, I believe, suggested to the Shah by Court influences unfriendly to his Highness.

The Nizam-es-Sultaneh has been appointed Vizier and Acting Governor-General of Azerbaijan during the absence of the Valiahd from Tabreez. He is probably known to your Lordship, from previous reports sent by me, as an old-fashioned Persian statesman, anti foreign, like the Grand Vizier, in his sympathies, but he is more of a diplomatist than the Ain-ed-Dowleh, and his patriotism has not prevented him from giving his son, who left Harrow a couple of years ago, the benefits of a European education. His administration of Arabistan was so unsatisfactory that my predecessor obtained from the Persian Government a pledge that neither he himself nor any member of his family should be employed in the south of Persia, but whilst acting some years ago as Vizier to the Valiahd at Tabreez he established friendly relations with Mr. Wood, then His Majesty's Consul-General. This led to a reconciliation with His Majesty's Legation, and in 1901 his nephew, the Salar-i-Moazzem, was sent, with my approval, as Governor to Bushire, in which capacity he received the Viceroy at Bunder Abbas

during his Excellency's tour in the Persian Gulf. The Nizam, however, made himself very objectionable to the Russian authorities at Tabreez and was always a bitter opponent both of the Russophil policy of the Atabeg-i-Azam, of the new Tariff, and of the Belgian administration. For this reason M. de Speyer objected, as I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 39 of the 27th instant, to his being appointed under the present circumstances to Tabreez. The Ain-ed-Dowleh, as I think rather unwisely, considering the importance of Russian interests at Tabreez, declined to listen to these objections, although they were supported by M. Nans, who has good reasons of his own for distrusting and disliking the Nizam-es-Sultaneh, and this attitude on his Highness' part has still further exasperated the Russian Legation, whose relations with him have for some time past been strained.

The Nizam-es-Sultaneh paid me a farewell visit yesterday and informed me he was leaving the same evening and would meet the Valiahd at Zinjan. As your Lordship will observe from the inclosed copies of telegraphic correspondence with Mr. Wratistaw, the Armenians at Tabreez have been a good deal alarmed by the news of the recent disorders in Khorassan, following close upon the massacre at Baku, and I took the opportunity of expressing to him my hope that he would prevent any disturbance of public order. He assured me that the knowledge that he was coming to Tabreez would act as a check on all the turbulent elements in that city. I have, as your Lordship knows, never felt much fear of a rising in Tehran, but the Mussulmans of Tabreez, who are Turks, not Persians, and more stupid and fanatic than the Tehranis, may easily get out of hand, especially during the interregnum in the Governor-Generalship. I do not for one moment believe that a disturbance is desired by the Russian authorities or would be otherwise than contrary to their interests. In view, however, of the fact that the massacre at Baku was apparently instigated and abetted by the Governor, the suspicions and alarm of the nervous Armenian population, who cannot be expected to allow for the different local political conditions, are, perhaps, under the circumstances, not unnatural.

The Nizam-es-Sultaneh mentioned in the course of conversation that the Valiahd, whom he knows well, and with whom he is not on friendly terms, was by no means so well affected to the Russians as the latter imagined, and that, though up to the present His Imperial Highness had professed for motives of his own to be their friend, they were greatly deceived as to his real sentiments. This, I think, is very probably correct.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 45.

Consul-General Wratistaw to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tabreez, March 27, 1905.

THERE is much alarm among the Armenians here owing to a report, apparently originating in the Russian Consulate-General, that the Armenians at Meshed have been massacred. I should like to be able to contradict this officially, if it is untrue.

It is firmly believed by the Christians here that as soon as the Valiahd leaves there will be disturbances, and that the Russians desire them. I hear that the Russian Armenians, who distrust the Russian Consulate-General, would, in case of need, take refuge in the British Consulate-General.

I spoke to the Imam Jumei on the subject about a month ago, and he assured me he would hold the Mahomedans in, but he said he thought that the Russians wanted to fish in troubled waters.

Several bakeries are closed to-day, and bread is very dear.

Inclosure 2 in No. 45.

Sir A. Hardinge to Consul-General Wratistaw.

Tehran, March 28, 1905.

(Telegraphic.) P.

FOLLOWING is our latest news from Meshed:—

"On the 22nd the mob sacked the establishments of three Russian Armenian merchants, and destroyed some 15,000*l.* worth of property. No lives lost, except two rioters, killed accidentally. The Armenians took refuge in Russian Consulate-General. No damage has been done to British subjects. Till late in the afternoon, the Governor-General took no steps for checking the riot. Then, when it was reported that the mob was going to attack the Russian Consulate for sheltering the Armenians, he sent soldiers and stopped the disturbance. His inaction is inexplicable, and confirms the rumour current here that he engineered the riot so as to make the Tehran Government reappoint him Governor-General for another year. All is quiet again now, but there is a good deal of anxiety still.

"I also hear that riots have recommenced at Kuchan, and that all Armenians there have fled to Ashkabad."

You may let this be known as you deem most judicious. I do not believe the Russians desire disturbances, but it is just as well to let the clergy think this to be their object, and to encourage them to try to defeat it. Inform Imam Jumei from me that I look to him to use his great influence to prevent the outbreak of disorders, which would be deplored by all friends of Persia at the present juncture.

No. 46.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 73. Confidential.)

Tehran, March 28, 1905.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Ala-es-Saltaneh, Persian Minister in London, has just received from the Shah the titles of "Prince" and "Highness" (Hazrat-i-Ashraf). A similar distinction, a very unusual one, was bestowed, on the recommendation of the Atabeg-i-Azam, on the Arfa-ed-Dowleh, during the latter's tenure of the post of Russian Minister at St. Petersburg, and is intended, I have little doubt, to indicate the importance attached by the Persian Government to its Mission in London, and to the good relations with His Majesty's Government which the Ala-es-Saltaneh has exerted himself since his arrival here to advocate. His Excellency, or to give him his new title, his Highness, is as your Lordship knows, somewhat retiring and reserved, and his long absence from Persia, joined to a naturally prudent and cautious temperament, has kept him from taking any part for many years in public affairs here. He has, however, been the object during his stay here of very flattering attentions from the Court, and the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, although secretly jealous of him as a possible candidate for his own post, has taken his cue from the Royal circle and has spoken of him to me in terms of the highest praise.

I paid the Ala-es-Saltaneh a congratulatory visit yesterday. He informed me that he was returning in a few days to England, and I understand that he is the bearer of a present to His Majesty from the Shah in the form of a new Persian carpet, specially ordered at the time of Lord Downe's Mission.

Simultaneously with his departure, the Naser-ul-Mulk, G.C.M.G., has been recalled from the Governorship of Kurdistan, where he has resided for the last four years as a practical exile. When the Ain-ed-Dowleh first took office there was a question of sending for him, but the proposal, for various reasons with which I need not trouble your Lordship, was dropped. It has now been revived, and the Naser-ul-Mulk will, I am told, accompany the Shah to Europe. The Grand Vizier's real object in recalling him seems to be to hold a kind of sword of Damocles over the head of the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, whom he has hitherto kept in order by summoning to his side as likely aspirants to the post of Foreign Minister, first the Arfa-ed-Dowleh,

and then the Ala-es-Saltaneh. The influence of the Naser-ul-Mulk, who though timid is an able man and a sincere Anglophil, is likely to be beneficial to our interests.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR HARDINGE.

No. 47.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 74. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, March 31, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, with reference to your telegram No. 29 of the 28th ultimo, that the difficulties which Sir Hugh Adcock is experiencing are mainly due to the fact that, during a lengthy absence last summer from Persia, he was supplanted in the favour of the Shah by Dr. Schneider, who has long been his rival and an aspirant to his position, and who succeeded, while Sir Hugh was away, in obtaining permission to call himself "*Médecin-en-Chef de Sa Majesté*." This permission was never actually accorded in any official document, the assumption of the title by Dr. Schneider being tacitly acquiesced in and implicitly recognized by its unchallenged use in the Minutes of the meetings of the "*Conseil Sanitaire*."

When Sir Hugh Adcock returned here at the end of last year he was coldly received by the Shah, and it was so plainly intimated to him that his attendance at Court was no longer desired that he ceased to appear at the Palace, and has since then never been sent for. He continued, however, to receive his pay.

Sir Hugh asked me to support the demand, which he thereupon made, that Dr. Schneider should no longer be permitted to assume the title of "*Médecin-en-Chef de Sa Majesté*"; that an official contradiction of his reported appointment in that capacity should be inserted in the European press; and that he himself should be formally recognized as the only person entitled to use the title. In the event of these demands not being complied with, he asked to be permitted to leave Persia, retaining the pay provided for in his contract, which, he contended, had been broken, not by himself, but by the Shah, when His Majesty permitted another doctor to usurp the functions which had been assigned to him in it.

I replied that interference by His Majesty's Legation in so delicate a matter as the Shah's relations with his various doctors was somewhat difficult, and that I should be indisposed to embark on it without instructions from your Lordship, but that I would mention Sir Hugh's wishes to you privately. In the meantime, I advised him to endeavour to settle the question himself with the Ain-ed-Dowleh, and promised that, if he failed to do so, I would do my best, unofficially and privately, to exert my influence with his Highness on his behalf.

The Ain-ed-Dowleh adopted the evasive tactics with which your Lordship is familiar in his political dealings, his real object being to keep Sir Hugh Adcock here as a sort of check on the influence of Dr. Schneider, much as he has used the Arfa-ed-Dowleh, and now means to use the Nasr-ul-Mulk, as a check on his Minister of Foreign Affairs. He contended that Sir Hugh Adcock was still the Shah's "*Médecin-en-Chef*," and that there was nothing to prevent His Majesty from having more than one physician so designated, the title "*Hakim Bashi*," which was its Persian equivalent, having been often bestowed on several persons at the same time, and whilst promising to adjust matters to Sir Hugh's satisfaction, he kept putting him off with the customary empty Persian assurances.

Finding that he could do nothing with the Grand Vizier, I took the matter up unofficially, and suggested in a private letter to his Highness a practical solution of the difficulty which Sir H. Adcock said would be acceptable to him. Its outlines were as follows:—

1. Sir Hugh would be allowed to resign his appointment as "*Médecin-en-Chef*" and be given the title of honorary Chief Physician to the Shah. There is a precedent for this in the case of the late Dr. Tholozan, who was Chief Physician to Nasr-ed-Din Shah, and was made honorary Chief Physician to His present Majesty on his accession to the throne.

2. Sir Hugh would further be appointed Persian Consul-General at Florence or at some other place in Italy, and would, in that capacity, continue to draw for the

remaining period of his contract a salary equal to that hitherto paid him as the Shah's chief doctor.

3. At the expiration of his contract he would draw the pension to which a Firman attached to that contract entitled him.

4. I suggested, without insisting on the point, as a *sine quâ non*, that a decoration of the same nature as that bestowed on Dr. Schneider for his services to the Shah during the late cholera epidemic should be conferred on Sir H. Adcock on the occasion of his leaving Persia.

I have reason to believe that this solution has in principle been accepted by the Ain-ed-Dowleh. When I told him that I had heard from Abbas Kuli Khan that he had agreed to it, and asked that the conditions embodied in it should be reduced to writing, he did not contradict me, but replied that he had given orders to that effect to his private secretary. The details are, however, still under discussion, and Sir H. Adcock has been referred to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, who has informed him that he is to be made Consul-General at Venice, but who would appear still to be haggling over the question of pay. I am, however, pretty confident now, especially that I have your Lordship's authorization to support Sir H. Adcock more strongly than I should under the circumstances have thought it wise to do without explicit instructions, that a satisfactory arrangement will, after the usual Persian delays, be arrived at. Sir Hugh's only course is obviously, now that he has lost the Shah's favour, to withdraw from Persia; for him to stay here, drawing his pay, but never being summoned to the Palace, or exposed whenever he went there to discourteous treatment at the hands of the Shah's courtiers, would have been an undignified and, indeed, an impossible course, and even if the Legation could have obtained for him the exclusive right to the title of "*Médecin-en-Chef*," it was clearly beyond my power to prevent the Shah from being guided in practice by the advice of the rival doctor; any attempt on my part to do so would, in fact, have provoked legitimate resentment.

Sir H. Adcock's influence practically perished with the death of the late Vazir Durbar (Hakim-ul-Mulk), who was his main support at Court. Though an able physician, he is totally devoid of the qualities of a courtier or a diplomatist, which are possessed in no small degree by his rival, and he lost all chance of maintaining his position when he left Persia on furlough last year for the sake of his health, and enabled Dr. Schneider to take command during the cholera epidemic. The frank manner in which, moreover, he warned His Majesty last summer of the probability of his early death was extremely disagreeable to an Oriental Sovereign, and the more reassuring predictions of Dr. Schneider, especially now that they have been justified by the event, not unnaturally rendered the latter a far more welcome medical attendant.

Sir Hugh Adcock's departure is, for obvious reasons, regrettable. But British influence in the Shah's inmost entourage is still represented by Dr. Lindley, who has recently renewed his contract on terms very advantageous to himself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 48.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 75.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 1, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz, who is on his way to that place from Yezd with the members of the Indian Commercial Mission, from which your Lordship will observe that the party were fired on at Mehrabad, near Aberguh, and that one sowar, whether Persian or Indian is not stated, was wounded.

The condition of the roads on the borders of the Provinces of Fars and Yezd has long been very dangerous, and has formed the subject of strong representations made by me to the Persian Government, with the result that orders have been sent for the payment of compensation for robberies to be divided between the Prince-Governor of Yezd, his Vizier, the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, who, in consequence, fled from Yezd to Shiraz, and various authorities of the Province of Fars.

Mr. Graham's statement that Mehrabad is in the Province of Isfahan does not tally with the maps or information we have here, but he is very likely right, as the

boundaries of the various Governorships often fluctuate and are readjusted by arrangement between the Governors and the Central Government.

I shall of course lose no time in demanding from the Persian Government vigorous measures for the punishment of the offenders.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

P.S.—I have just received a further telegram from Mr. Grahame on this subject, which I transmit herewith to your Lordship, together with a copy of my reply, and of a telegram I have sent to Mr. Consul-General Preece at Isfahan.

A. H. H.

Inclosure 1 in No. 48.

Consul Grahame to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Telegraphic.)

Dehbid, March 31, 1905.

GRAHAME and party now encamped at Heneslik, about 20 miles from Dehbid, on Yezd road. Their "pishkhaneh" was fired on by five armed men about 9 a.m. on 31st March, just outside Mehrabad. One sowar in charge received severe flesh wound, bullet penetrating thigh and coming out the other side.

Grahame proposes to remain at Dehbid until thorough investigation has been made and perpetrators of outrage caught.

Mehrabad is in Isfahan territory.

Inclosure 2 in No. 48.

Consul Grahame to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

[Received April 3, 1905.]

MY wounded sowar is doing well, but I have telegraphed this morning to Dr. Palmer, Shiraz, to come to Dehbid, as complications might arise. Country between Dehbid and Aliabad on Yezd road in state of continuous unrest. Aggressions and robberies occur daily on roads: local reports ascribe them to feud between Murtaza Kuli Khan, Zabit of Aberguh, and his brother, each stirring up robbers to commit aggressions in order to discredit his rival. Zabit of Aberguh was in Mehrabad at time that my sowar and party were fired on within a few hundred yards of that village. I suggest that Persian Government be instructed to instruct Zil-es-Sultan to send capable officer with six to ten mounted men to join me at Dehbid or Mehrabad and procure arrest of aggressors. Attack appeared to have been instigated by Kerbelai Karam, a forage seller of Mehrabad, who had a claim on the partner of one of our muleteers.

Inclosure 3 in No. 48.

Sir A. Hardinge to Consul Grahame

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 3, 1905.

I HAVE telegraphed to Preece in sense desired by you, as this will be quicker than taking steps here. I approve your remaining at Dehbid and letting Mission proceed to Shiraz, but I presume that all arrangements have been made for "istikbal" in latter place, and for presentation of members to local authorities by Jeffries. Perhaps you might overtake the Mission if they move slowly and halt a couple of days at Persepolis.

Inclosure 4 in No. 48.

Sir A. Hardinge to Consul-General Preece.

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 3, 1905.

GRAHAME and Commercial Mission fired at at Mehrabad near Aberguh on road from Yezd to Shiraz, and one sowar wounded. Village is stated to be in Zil-es-Sultan's jurisdiction. If this is so, ask his Highness from me to send a capable officer with about ten mounted men to join Mr. Grahame at Dehbid and procure arrest of aggressors.

No. 49.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 76.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 1, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith in continuation of my despatch No. 69, Confidential, a translation of telegrams received on the 28th ultimo by the chiefs of the clergy in Tehran from the great Ulama of Nejed, which have evidently been inspired by the Persian Government, probably through the agency of its Consul-General at Bagdad. The message is not signed by Aga Fazel Memakani, who since the death of Fazel Sharabiani has been the most influential Mujtehed in Persia or Mesopotamia, but the absence of his signature can be accounted for by the fact that he was seriously ill at the time the telegram was dispatched, and died at Nejed three days ago. The signatures of one or two other leading Mujteheds whose names would have carried weight, are wanting; but those of Mohammed Kazem Khorassani and of Bahr-ul-Uloom, both of whom, I may mention, are participants in the Oudh bequest, are sufficient to insure a respectful reception for the message, and I am not surprised to hear that it has already produced a calming effect here.

As regards the Anti-Armenian riots at Meshed, to which I had the honour to refer in my despatch above mentioned, I have so far only received the account contained in the inclosed copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General. It would appear from earlier written reports received from Colonel Minchin that they were expected during the Ashurah, so much so that the Russian Consul-General hinted at the dispatch of Cossacks from Askhabad for the protection of Russian interests, but that the sacred week passed quietly owing to the special precautions taken by the authorities, and the anticipated outbreak only occurred after its close. I have as yet no news whatever as to the trouble at Kuchan beyond a statement made to me by the Mushir-ed-Dowleh to the effect that it was directed not merely against the Armenians, but also against the Governor, the Shuja-ed-Dowleh, who, his Excellency informs me, has now been summoned to Meshed. The report mentioned in my telegram No. 44 of the 30th ultimo, that the Russians were sending Cossacks to Khorassan in connection with these incidents was derived from a confidential informant in the Persian Government who had seen the telegram from the Consul at Askhabad transmitting it. It may be based on incorrect information obtained by the latter officer, and at first sight seems unlikely to be true, but in view of the fact that on the occasion of disturbances at Askhabad in 1892 the present Russian Minister at Tehran, then a Chargé d'Affaires, obtained from General Kuropatkin, at the time Governor of Transcaucasia, the dispatch to Askhabad of a Cossack detachment which remained there for three weeks, it appeared to me worth telegraphing to your Lordship. The Russian Legation is, I know, greatly irritated at the present situation in Persia, and it is just conceivable that M. Speyer may have persuaded his Government that a military demonstration at this juncture might do something towards retrieving its lost prestige.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 49.

Nejef Ulama to Chiefs of the Clergy in Tehran.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

[Received March 28, 1905.]

To all the protectors of Islam and great priests in Tehran, and all parts of Persia.

IT is incumbent on all the protectors of the true faith, whether residing at the holy thresholds or in Persia, who are desirous of the progress of the faith and State, and of the prosperity of the people, to pray for the continued prosperity of the kingdom of His Imperial Majesty the shadow of God whose kingdom and Crown be everlasting.

From the day His Imperial Majesty was graciously pleased to confer the "Mushed" of Premiership upon His Highness Prince Ain-ed-Dowleh it is reported that, praise be to God, many beneficial reforms and changes have been undertaken through the assistance and support of the twelfth Imam (Mehdi), and the abuses of the past are about to be corrected. In short, justice and accord, an adjustment of the revenue and expenditure of Persia, and the hope of keeping to the engagements in respect to foreigners which will, with the help of God, keep the hand of aggression from Persia, are now apparent, and it is certain that the priesthood are in accord with this aim, but in accordance with reports received some thoughtless persons have, in the assemblies of the priesthood especially in Tehran, agitated with the object of giving trouble and bringing about ruin, whereas there can be no object except that of improving the State and faith, which will, by the help of God, be improved day by day, and if there is any defect it will be put right. Under these circumstances it is necessary that the priesthood of Islam should put a check upon those seekers of disorder, so that the thoughts and energy of His Imperial Majesty and his Ministers should be devoted to the pursuit of reform and improvement, and be permitted to devote their whole energy to important works.

(A practically identical telegram was sent by Mohammed Kâzem Khorassani, and Mohammed Kazem Tabatabai Yazdi).

Inclosure 2 in No. 49.

Consul-General Minchen to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Telegraphic.) P

Meshed, March 27, 1905.

DISTURBANCE broke out on the 22nd instant, and rioters sacked houses of three Russian Armenian merchants, about 15,000*l.* worth of property being destroyed. Armenians fled to Russian Consulate-General. British subjects suffered no damage. No steps taken by Governor-General to check riot till late in the afternoon, when it was reported that Russian Consulate-General was about to be attacked for giving Armenians shelter. Troops were then sent and riot was suppressed. One cannot explain his want of action which lends credence to impression current here that he instigated disturbance in order to obtain nomination as Governor-General for another year from the Government at Tehran. Though considerable tension still prevails, all is again quiet here.

I am informed that riots have again broken out at Kuchan, and that all Armenians there have fled to Ashkabad in Russian territory.

No. 50.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 77. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 3, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship the usual Monthly Summary of Events in Persia not reported on in separate despatches.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 50.

*Monthly Summary of Events in Persia not reported in Separate Despatches to the Foreign Office.**Tabreez.*

HIS Majesty's Consul-General reports a conversation he has had with the Imam Jume'h of Tabreez on the subject of the Valiahd's indebtedness to the Russian Bank. The Mujtehed said that the Valiahd's difficulties with the Imperial Bank had been largely due to the tactless and unconciliatory attitude of the local Manager, M. Fuchs. Now that the latter had left it would be a good opportunity to renew relations. He himself had been assured by His Imperial Highness that he had only gone to the Russians as a last resource, but he was in a position to bring such pressure to bear on His Imperial Highness as to induce him to break with the Russian Bank.

M. Rabino, while taking exception to the Imam Jume'h's account of the former negotiations with the Valiahd, says he would be quite ready to submit to his Directors any advances made to him by the Valiahd. But Mr. Wratishaw does not think His Imperial Highness would care to offend the Russians—popular though such a measure would just now be at Tabreez—unless the Imperial Bank were able to offer him better terms.

The agitation against the Tabreez Custom-house is reported to have subsided. The nature of the Azarbaijan merchants' complaints is dealt with in a separate despatch (No. 15, Commercial).

Urmia.

The Urmia Mollah, Mirza Hussein Agha, has been sent to Tehran. He started on the 23rd March.

*Ispahan.**Zil-es-Sultan and Military Reforms.*

The Ispahan troops are as follows:—

	Men.
Jellali Regiment	1,000
Peridun Regiment	800
Chahar Mahal Regiment	800
Cavalry	150
Artillery	150

Of these, the first and the last two have hitherto been paid by the State; of the Peridun and Chahar Mahal regiments only one is ever in commission at a time, and it is paid by the district which raises it.

In pursuit of their policy of military reform, the Government appointed Amir Bahadur Jang, Vazir Darbar, to the command of the Ispahan district, and it was stated that a Tehran official would be sent to Ispahan to take over the command from the Zil and his family. Needless to say, this rendered His Imperial Highness furious. He telegraphed at once to Tehran for permission to go to Europe on account of his health, and he sent Akbar Mirza, his son, to Tehran to negotiate. At one time he telegraphed to the Grand Vizier that, unless his terms regarding the troops were accepted, he would resign his post and go to Europe in ten days' time. The Zil was asked by the Ain-ed-Dowleh to be patient, and this advice was also given him by His Majesty's Minister, who did not consider it likely that the Grand Vizier would add a quarrel with the Zil to his already considerable difficulties.

Meanwhile the Government has offered the Zil that the Jellali Regiment shall be left him, and the other four units given to the Government. The Zil has not accepted these terms, and now declares his intention of going to Europe if his affairs

are settled favourably, and threatens if his troops are taken from him to resign his Governorship and come to Tehran. This would greatly embarrass the Government.

Meanwhile it is common talk in Ispahan that he has been dismissed, and there is consequently a good deal of uneasiness in Ispahan.

According to a telegram from Mr. Preece, three men, a day or two ago, entered a house and murdered a Babi. The men sent by the Zil-es-Sultan to take the murderers were prevented from doing so by a Seyed. The Zil then sent an officer with Cossacks, who brought them in. Whereupon Agha Nejefy, a turbulent priest of Ispahan, wrote to the Zil remonstrating with him for interfering with men who "had done nothing wrong." The Zil replied to Nejefy that a visit to Tehran might do him good, and the latter is now said to be working up an agitation against the Babis, who are consequently in a state of much trepidation.

Meshed.

Attack on Tárbat-i-Haidari Sowars.—As the Governor-General of Khorassan took no steps for breaking up the gangs of robbers guilty of these attacks, beyond informing Colonel Minchin that they had left Persian territory, which was untrue, a claim for 1,000 tomans compensation has been presented to the Persian Government.

As a consequence of the disturbances at Baku and of the general discontent and unrest at Meshed, there was considerable anxiety in the town lest a Mahomedan rising should take place on the "Ashureh." The "Ashureh" passed off quite quietly, and the outbreak occurred a few days later. The only news of it has been received telegraphically, and has been reported.

On the "Ashureh" the Governor-General made the chiefs of the clergy give security for the maintenance of the peace, and took effective measures for patrolling the city with strong detachments of troops.

His Majesty's Consul-General borrowed twenty rifles from the Afghan Agent, and kept a body of some forty trustworthy men, Afghans and British Indian subjects, besides the Consular sowars, in the grounds of the Consulate, to be ready in case of an emergency. The precautions on this particular day proved unnecessary, and the arms were never served out at all.

Seistan.

Reports from Seistan point to the gradual strengthening of the position of the Mustansir-ul-Mulk and the Yamin-i-Nizam in local politics. Their opponents, who are backed by the Russian Consulate, consist of the Karguzar, the Deputy Governor, and some local Khans and Seyeds, who consider their interests are likely to be influenced prejudicially by the Mustansir's reassessment of the revenue. This opposition is drawing together at the same time as the Mustansir is showing his hand.

The Karguzar lately organized a Petition against the boundary settlement, complaining that enormous tracts of territory had been handed over to the Afghans, and that Persian interests were betrayed. The report specified the names of these tracts, and some of them proved to be well on the Persian side of the line, and others so far inside Afghanistan that there could be no question of their ownership. The maliciousness and stupidity of the report were equally evident, and the Mushir-ul-Dowleh has treated it with contempt.

The Karguzar, who has been severely reprimanded, is almost certain to be recalled very soon. The two candidates for the post are both likely to work in our interests.

In any case the party of the Mustansir seems likely to get the upper hand. They have the confidence of the Central Government, and the Yamin has all the troops of Seistan in his hand. Both these officials are on friendly terms with the British Representatives.

Kerman.

With reference to the reports which reached the Persian Government that the Commercial Mission consisted of officers in disguise, who were studying the question of an invasion of Persia, Major Sykes, to whom the matter was referred, acquits the Governor-General and the Karguzar of originating them, and ascribes them to M. Cosari, a Belgian Customs official of Seistan fame. But he also mentions that

M. Miller, the Russian Consul, has got hold of the Mamur accompanying the mission, and has helped him to concoct reports on its proceedings. This is more likely as it is difficult to believe that any European but a Russian could write such nonsense.

M. van Roosbroeck, the Chief of the Customs, has died of pneumonia.

The Pukh-ed-Dowleh is said to have offered 70,000 tomans for renewal of his appointment as Governor-General (about 11,000*l.*). The Imperial Bank has refused to finance him as they do not consider his position sufficiently secure financially.

The Russian Consul is going to appoint one Mirza Kassim Khan, Agent at Bam, at 30 tomans per month. He is also said to be contemplating the appointment of an Agent at Sirjan.

Kermanshah.

The troops of the Ferman Ferman, destined for chastising the Direkwand Lurs, have been diverted to Arabistan. It is not clear for what purpose, but the Grand Vizier says they are to attack the Lurs from the south.

In view of the instructions from the Foreign Office to His Majesty's Minister to confine himself, in this matter, to diplomatic pressure only, and in view of the impossibility of the Luristan force at Burujird being able to carry out active operations for the next four or five months, Lieutenant Williams has been authorized to return to Kermanshah.

Captain Gough passed through Tehran on his way to Kermanshah from Ernia on the 30th ultimo.

Shiraz.

The Shua-es-Sultaneh, probably feeling nervous as to his prospects after the death of his father and the accession of the Valiabad, whom he hates, has sounded His Majesty's Consul as to the willingness of the Imperial Bank to take all his properties nominally in pledge, so as to place them in safety by a kind of fictitious mortgage.

The Bank, by its Charter, is precluded from taking landed property in Persia as a security without express authority from the Central Government. But M. Rabino thinks his Board would take the matter into consideration if the Grand Vizier would give such authority. The Prince has been advised to sound his Highness on the subject. It is quite possible that the authorization might be granted by the Ain-ed-Dowleh, who is friendly with the Shua, and, like him, has apprehensions as to his future on the accession of the Valiabad.

Tehran.

The departure of the Shah for Europe via Khorassan and the Orenburg-Tashkend Railway is now almost officially announced for the end of April, but doubts are still being freely expressed as to whether, by the time His Majesty reaches Meshed, at the end of May, it will be possible for him, in his present state of health, to continue the journey in the height of the hot weather, and along an ill-laid line through the burning steppes of Turkestan.

The Ain-ed-Dowleh long secretly resisted the journey, and resorted to his usual procrastinating tactics in order to delay it; then, when they failed, he began to oppose it openly, alleging the disturbed state of Russia, the unrest in Persia, and the unsettled financial and military situation. Upon this the Shah lost his temper, and asked the Grand Vizier openly, in the presence of a number of courtiers, where the Atabeg was, as he wanted to telegraph to him. His Highness bowed, and said he would make inquiries, and would send any message His Majesty commanded. "No," said the Shah, "ascertain at once, and write a telegram from me, saying that I particularly wish to know about the Atabeg's whereabouts and health." This hint, followed by a declaration made publicly by the Shah that he would regard any one who, no matter on what ground, opposed his European tour as a personal enemy to himself, put an end to the Ain-ed-Dowleh's resistance, and the Foreign Office announces that the programme of the tour will be officially communicated to the Legations next week.

The Ain-ed-Dowleh is trying to keep the suite which is to go with the Shah at the public expense as small as possible, and has insisted that any persons not actually

appointed on it shall travel at their own personal cost, but he is experiencing considerable difficulty with the courtiers. A week ago two Royal Chamberlains, the Motemid-ul-Khaghan and the Nizam-es-Sultan, both belonging to influential families, were severely bastinadoed and then expelled from Tehran for intriguing against the Grand Vizier, the flogging being administered in the presence of the Shah himself, of the Ain-ed-Dowleh, and of a large circle of courtiers and palace servants.

It is said that the Ain-ed-Dowleh will try to keep the Shah's expenses on the tour and in Europe within 60,000*l.*, of which 40,000*l.* will be drawn from the Shah's privy purse, or anderoon fund, and the remaining 20,000*l.* from ordinary revenues, *i.e.*, the sale of offices. The Asaf-ed-Dowleh, for instance, has just paid 30,000*l.* for the renewal of his Governor-Generalship of Khorassan. The cost of the Shah's first journey in Europe with the Atabeg is said to have been 800,000*l.*, including, of course, His Majesty's purchases and those of his courtiers.

The Naser-ul-Mulk, former Governor of Kurdistan, will, it is said, attend the Shah to Europe as interpreter.

His Royal Highness the Salar-ed-Dowleh, having been offered the Governorship of Yazd, took sanctuary in the Shah's anderoon as a protest against his appointment to that province, and eventually obtained the Governorship of Kurdistan with Gerus, with which, though he had hoped for Meshed or Kerman, he had had perforce to be content.

The following Ministerial and other changes have lately been announced:—

Egbal-ed-Dowleh, appointed Minister of Crown Domains, as a reward for his services in showing up the intrigues of Nizam-es-Sultan and Motemid-ul-Khaghan (who were bastinadoed).

Amin Khelwet (Vazir Makhsos), appointed Chief of the Arsenal, or Fireworks Department.

Jellal-ed-Dowleh, eldest son of the Zil-es-Sultan, appointed Chief of the Army Supply Department.

Sadik-ul-Mulk, appointed Minister to Holland, replacing Momfaz-es-Sultanch, transferred to Paris.

The anti-Belgian agitation is subsiding in Tehran, and Seyed Abdullah's house is being watched, and he himself has been warned that any attempt to recommence it will be visited by expulsion from the city. The person whom he mentioned as "having changed the Shah's mind" (see inclosure in Sir A. Hardinge's despatch, No. 69), turns out to have been the Amir Baladur Jang, Vazir Darbar.

The Grand Vizier has prohibited the "rozehkhaneh" usually celebrated this season at the Atabeg's house and continued notwithstanding his absence, but his own supporters amongst the clergy have advised him to reconsider this step, as likely to offend the entire clerical body.

Tehran, April 1, 1905.

No. 51.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 79. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 3, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a copy of a despatch I have received from Lieutenant Williams, at present accompanying the Luristan expedition of the Ferman Fermal, dealing with the difficulties put in his Highness' way by the Persian Government.

The "road" referred to is that mentioned to me in conversation by the Salar-ed-Dowleh, as mentioned in my despatch No. 12 of the 18th January last.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 51.

Lieutenant Williams to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 21.)

Sir,

Burujird, March 16, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt on the 15th March of your letter dated the 2nd February last, inclosing a letter dated the 1st February for his Highness the Ferman Fermal. I handed it to him to-day, and his Highness requested me to thank your Excellency for your very friendly letter. He again asked me to assure you of his friendship for the English and of his determination to do his best for them. He wished you to know that he was prepared to spend 20,000 tomans of his personal property on this "Direkwand" affair, but that, whichever way he moved, he found himself checked by some intrigue or other. He then gave me instances of two of the latest moves to increase his difficulties:—

1. He said that he had in his possession a secret copy of a telegram from the Sadr Azam to the Salar-i-Moazzem, ordering him on no account to venture into the Direkwand Mountains, but to stick to the main caravan route, and to let the Ferman Fermal with his personal following do the mountain work.

2. He showed me a secret copy of the reorganization of the Persian army consequent on the death of the Sepah Salar. It divides the army up into districts, each under a general of sorts, and the troops of Kermanshah are grouped with Hamadan under the Hassam-ul-Mulk of Hamadan. Ferman Fermal informs me that when the Kermanshah regiments realize that they have a new chief his position will be very difficult, as their Chief is a very powerful man, and cannot be ordered about in a way necessary to military efficiency. I had not mentioned the subject of the road to his Highness before, but following on the remarks in your letter we had a long talk over it. He is very keen on it, as at present he is engaged in buying up villages at very cheap prices in districts which, although now disturbed, must inevitably become more secure in a few years. He assured me, and some present, who seemed to know the routes, corroborated him, that there is another route west of the Kialan route, which, although 8 to 10 farsakhs longer, is much the better route, as it skirts the mountains and could be made into a carriage-road or railway. Also it possesses the advantage for charvadars that it passes up through cultivated country, and they could buy grain, &c., *en route*, instead of carrying it with them, as they would have to do by the Kialan route. His Highness said that if the Company would start on the road, he thought the tribe would recognize the road as inevitable, and would refrain from raiding it. He also promised to help it on as much as possible from this end.

I have, &c.

(Signed) T. S. B. WILLIAMS.

No. 52.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 81.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 8, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, in continuation of my despatch No. 76 of the 1st instant, an extract from the weekly confidential diary of His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed giving an account of the recent riots in that city.

I have, at the same time, the honour to transmit the paraphrase of a telegram from Captain Smythe, Military Attaché at Meshed, respecting the dispatch of Russian troops from Askaniabad in connection with these disturbances. It confirms, as your Lordship will observe, the information and impressions reported by me to your Lordship in my telegrams Nos. 46 of the 2nd instant and 47 of the 3rd instant.

The danger of serious complications resulting from the entry of a Russian force into a city occupying the special position of Meshed may now be regarded as past, but I should not have been altogether surprised if such a force entering Khorassan had met with resistance at the hands of the Persian authorities and troops. The military issue of the conflict would, of course, not be doubtful, even if the Persian troops opposing the Russians were numerically superior, but a political situation of some gravity would undoubtedly have been the result. The Russians will now go

doubt make a claim for pecuniary compensation on account of the losses suffered by their subjects, and to this the Persian Government will probably reply by again putting forward, as a counter-claim, its demand for an indemnity for Persian sufferers during the far more serious disturbances which the Russian authorities failed to suppress at Baku and elsewhere in Trans-Caucasia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 52.

Extracts from Meshed Diary of March 25, 1905.

A SERIOUS disturbance broke out in Meshed about 8 A.M. on the 22nd March. It appears that a Mahommedan woman was brought to the Governor-General early in the morning by her relations with a complaint that during the night she had been pulled into a caravanserai occupied by a Russian Jew named Albaum and by a Russian Tartar Mahommedan named Kazeem (who both are agents here of the Russian firm of L. Zalm, wool and skin merchants) and raped by one of his Armenian employés.

The Governor-General was in bed and told the people to go away. They then took the woman to the Shrine about the time of the early morning prayers, and publicly complained to the Mullahs. Some 10,000 people quickly collected and marched to the caravanserai of Albaum and Kazeem and destroyed and burnt it, together with skins, wool, and other property, valued (including cost of buildings) at about 8,000*l*.

On the first inkling of trouble the Armenians, with their women and children, took refuge in the Russian Consulate. All shops in the bazaar were promptly closed. From Albaum's the mob proceeded to the shop of Ossepiantz, an Armenian, also a Russian subject, and sacked it of its contents, valued at some 2,000*l*. Malikseth, an Armenian, the Russian Tajirbashi there, who lived next door to Ossepiantz, also had his house wrecked and plundered of property worth some 5,000*l*. It is said that the mob also unearthed thirty rifles and some 50,000 rounds of ammunition at Malikseth's house.

Luckily, all the Armenians were out of the way and none fell into the hands of mob and no lives at all were lost except two rioters, who, I hear, were severely injured by a falling beam and died.

It was reported that the mob, after they finished looting Malikseth's house, intended to go to the Russian Consulate and demand the surrender of the Armenian accused of raping the woman, and if his surrender was refused, to attack the Consulate and take him out by force.

About 4-50 P.M., however, the Governor-General began to bestir himself and, apparently realizing that the matter was getting serious, he, at the urgent personal request of the Russian Consul-General, sent a body of some 300 Persian troops with two guns to the Russian Consulate. A similar force with three guns was also sent into the town and the guns were posted in the Khaban, the main street of Meshed. After this all disturbances ceased. Disturbances were fully expected during the night, but it passed off quietly and nothing further occurred.

I am afraid that my encomiums of last week on the Asaf-ul-Dowleh will have to be cancelled with reference to his action or rather complete want of any action to-day. It was not till late in the afternoon that he took any steps whatever to check the riot. He simply sat in his ark and allowed the mob to do what they liked. It is said here, and there seem good grounds for it, that the whole riot was arranged by the Governor-General himself and his hanker, Muavin-ut-Tujjar.

The woman was, it is said, paid to invent the story about the rape. It is certainly inconceivable that any Armenian could have been so mad as to attempt anything of the sort just now. The Governor-General's object was, it is said, to force the Central Government at Tehran to nominate him for another term of office as Governor-General. I hear that, as soon as the riot started, he telegraphed to Tehran reporting the riot, and saying that, as he had not been nominated Governor-General for the new year, he had no authority in the place. He hoped that the Shah would reply nominating him and telling him to act with authority at once. His Majesty replied, however, that he was surprised to hear that Asaf-ul-Dowleh had such little authority

in the place and that he had taken him for a stronger man. Muavin-ut-Tujjar's motive was to pay off a personal grudge against Albaum and Malikseth.

Evidently towards evening the Asaf-ed-Dowleh realized that the riot had gone far enough and, if not checked, might get beyond his control. He thereupon stopped it.

The Russian Consulate was, I hear, full of panic-stricken women and children, weeping and wailing, and of Armenian and Russian refugees. The Russian Consul-General issued rifles and ammunition from a store-room to the men in the place. In the evening, when the riot had subsided, a thanksgiving service was held by the Russian Consul-General to return thanks for their lives having so far been spared.

British subjects were in no wise interfered with and no rioting took place near this Consulate. The Armenians in the Imperial Bank of Persia came to Mr. Senn's house, close to the Consulate, and remained there unmolested. The Afghan agent again sent me fourteen armed Afghans, who remained all day and night in this Consulate. A number of British Indian subjects (Mahommedans) also came here in case they should be wanted. Late in the afternoon the Beglar Begi sent me a guard of seven soldiers.

It is reported that as soon as the news of the rioting at Meshed reached Kuchan, the Armenians there fled to Askhabad. The Armenian clerks in the Imperial Bank of Persia have tendered their resignation. They consider Meshed too dangerous and wish to return to Tehran.

I am told that the Russians largely ascribe the riot to anti-Russian intrigues by me.

(Signed) C. F. MINCHIN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 52.

Captain Smythe to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Meshed, April 6, 1905.

A REPORT dated the 30th March, from a European correspondent at Askhabad, states that 100 Cossacks, two battalions of infantry, and one field battery have been detailed for Meshed.

On the 25th March newswriter at Askhabad reported that one infantry battalion started for frontier.

On the 1st April another newswriter reported from Askhabad that 300 infantry and Cossacks actually started for Meshed, but were recalled.

Up till now no soldiers have crossed, and I am not of opinion that any will cross the frontier.

Unless Shah sanctions entry of Russian troops into Persia, the Persians intend to oppose them.

No. 53.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 82.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 8, 1905.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 33 of the 28th February last, inclosing copy of a letter addressed to the Archbishop of Canterbury by the Rev. O. Parry, of Urmia.

I am sending this communication to Mr. Wratishaw in the despatch of which I have the honour to forward a copy herewith, and which, taken in connection with my despatch No. 41 of the 1st March to your Lordship, will, I hope, be deemed by your Lordship to constitute a sufficient comment on Mr. Parry's remarks to the Archbishop.

Mr. Parry evidently supposes that it is the duty of His Majesty's Government to coerce that of Persia into such a pacification of the Kurdish tribes in Western Azarbaijan as will insure the tranquillity and security of the district in which he carries on his missionary work; and there is little doubt that if the Persian Government possessed the necessary vigour, and were prepared to spend the necessary money on a properly equipped punitive expedition, the subjugation of the Kurds would not be difficult. But in Azarbaijan, as in Luristan, the lack of troops, of funds, and,

above all, of any real desire on the part of the Shah or his Ministers to establish order and a decent Government in those regions, combine to form an obstacle on which arguments and representations, however urgent, are expended in vain.

I have continued, as instructed in your Lordship's telegram No. 28 of the 23rd ultimo, to exert the diplomatic pressure which I reported in my telegram No. 32 of the 22nd, that I was bringing to bear on the Persian Government in connection with the Urumia incidents, and your Lordship will have learned that it has at length resulted in the removal from Urumia of the Mujtehed Mirza Hussein Aglia, which had long been demanded by the missionaries, but which the Persian Government, notwithstanding its promises, kept deferring.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 53.

Sir A. Hardinge to Consul-General Wratistaw.

(No. 12.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 7, 1905.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a letter from the Rev. O. Parry to the Archbishop of Canterbury, which has been forwarded to me without any remark or instruction by the Foreign Office.

This communication requires little comment from me beyond the observation that it conflicts with the view expressed by Mr. Parry in his letter to you of the 31st January, with which I dealt in my despatch No. 4 of the 28th February. In that letter Mr. Parry blamed His Majesty's Representatives in Persia for having interfered to obtain the arrest of Seyyed Ghaffar on the ground that our interference had been unsolicited by the missionaries, and had exposed them to ill-feeling on the part of the Kurds. In this one he urges the Archbishop, by a word to Lord Lansdowne, "to restore our energy," and implies that such steps as we took in the matter were due to the "electrifying influence" of his Grace's representations in May or June last, the real fact, of course, being that the action taken by Mr. Pearson and myself, which resulted in the arrest of the chief murderer, was anterior to, and independent of them.

Mr. Parry is, of course, free to indulge in such criticisms as he pleases on the efforts which I made at Tabreez to obtain the removal of the Mujtehed, and to ignore the fact that they were only temporarily defeated by the flight of the Valiahad to a distant part of Azarbaijan, owing to the unforeseen outbreak of cholera in the city. But his general tone is not calculated to encourage me to recommend to His Majesty's Secretary of State any further measures for pacifying the district of Urumia other than the continued diplomatic representations to the Persian Government, beyond which I am so far not authorized by his Lordship to go.

It is, however, satisfactory to note that the appreciative terms in which the American missionaries have referred, both verbally and in writing, to the exertions made by His Majesty's Representatives in this country on behalf of missionary interests in Urumia, are in marked contrast to the language used by Mr. Parry.

You are free to make such use as you may think fit of this despatch in any further communications which you may have with that gentleman on this and cognate subjects.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 54.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 27.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 18th April, relative to Persian loan proposals.

India Office, April 26, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 54.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, April 18, 1905.

HIS Majesty's Minister, Tehran, has been instructed that he may treat with Government of Shah in regard to Persian loan on the basis of your telegram of the 13th April.

No. 55.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 27.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 13th April, relative to Persian loan proposals.

India Office, April 26, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 55.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, April 13, 1905.

IN connection with the proposals for loan to Persia (*vide* my telegrams of the 1st and 10th instant), following general conclusion has been recorded by the Defence Committee, viz., that financial assistance to the Persian Government, though in certain cases it may be inevitable, is not desirable in principle, and that each proposal of this character should be considered on the merits of the case.

No. 56.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office.—(Received April 27.)

Sir,

23, Abchurch Lane, London, April 26, 1905.

I AM instructed by the Board of the Imperial Bank of Persia to inform you that they have to-day thoroughly discussed the question of the further proposed loan to the Persian Government with their legal adviser, Sir John Hollams. He is of opinion that the Imperial Bank is not competent to make this loan under the terms of their Concession and considering the amount of the loans already made by them to the Persian Government. With this opinion the Directors are compelled to agree, and can thus only leave the decision to the Secretary of State, who will best know how to secure British interests in the matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. NEWELL, *Manager.*

No. 57.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 27, 1905.

FOLLOWING repeated to India:—

Your Lordship's telegram No. 36 of 10th April.

Agreement, with your Lordship's second amendment, is accepted by Persian Government, but a Persian as well as an English office at Henjam is insisted upon by

the Shah, as distinct from his Ministers. When the Shah realizes that a Persian staff will absorb all his profits he may not persist, but if he does I propose to yield the point, and the Director of the Persian section here sees no objection. In practice the Shah will probably provide neither staff nor quarters, for his only motive is vanity and a desire to show that Henjam is under his sovereignty.

No. 58.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 28.)

WITH reference to Sir E. Gorst's letter of the 20th March, the Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a despatch to the Government of India, No. 8, Secret, dated 31st ultimo, and inclosures, relative to pearl fisheries in the Persian Gulf.

India Office, April 27, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 58.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Secret.)

Sir,

India Office, March 31, 1905.

ON receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 10th March, 1904, on the question of the pearl fisheries in the Persian Gulf, I entered into communication with the Foreign Office with a view to obtaining the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown upon the legal and international points raised by your Excellency's Government.

2. I inclose herewith, for the information and guidance of the Government of India, a copy of the correspondence.*

3. Your Excellency will see that the Law Officers of the Crown have no doubt as to the rights of the tribes in such waters as may justly be considered territorial. Outside territorial waters, they are inclined to hold that the exclusive rights of the tribes might be maintained to banks in regard to which their exclusive possession is capable of historical proof; but they consider that the point is not free from doubt. In regard to the deeper waters, they are of opinion that there would be no reasonable chance of asserting with success the right of the tribes to debar other nations from dredging.

4. In these circumstances, I agree with the general conclusion at which the Law Officers of the Crown have arrived, viz., that it is not expedient to raise the question internationally by forcibly preventing vessels of foreign nationalities from fishing on the banks. The object in view may probably be attainable by indirect methods.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ST. JOHN BRODRICK.

No. 59.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 42.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 28, 1905.

IN view of the terms of their Concession and the amount they have already advanced to the Persian Government, the Directors of the Imperial Bank, after discussing the question of the proposed loan to Persia in consultation with their legal adviser, have decided that the Bank is not competent to make the loan.

* To Foreign Office, June 30 (and inclosure); Foreign Office, July 16; to ditto, August 10 (and inclosure); Foreign Office, October 27, 1904 (and inclosure); ditto, February 25 (and inclosure); to ditto, March 8; Foreign Office, March 20, 1905.

No. 60.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 58.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 29, 1905.

PERSIAN loan.

M. Naus gives me to understand that the bank has so far not made any formal refusal to make the desired advance, which would be not so much a regular loan as a redemption of royalties, but that they are apparently trying to secure better terms, and that, in the event of liquidation, the Persian Government are prepared to guarantee repayment out of the general revenue of the customs.

I regret, in view of our own political interests, that, when a more elastic interpretation of the limitations imposed by its concession was open to the bank, it should have adopted the narrower view, and I am still of opinion that, under the present circumstances, negotiations for an English political loan may be attended with some risk. The Valiahd, who is pro-Russian for the moment and unfriendly to us, will be Regent after next week, and though political conditions are insisted upon by the Manager of the Russian Bank, the Russian Minister recommends a grant of 100,000*l.* on easy terms. He may obtain the consent of St. Petersburg if the Persians hint that we are competing.

(Repeated to India.)

No. 61.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 65.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 29, 1905.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 74, Confidential, of the 31st ultimo, reporting upon the difficulties which have arisen in connection with the retirement of Sir H. Adcock from the post of Chief Physician to the Shah.

Your action in the matter has my approval.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 62.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 1, 1905.

WITH reference to my letter of the 28th instant, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran relative to the proposed advance to Persia.*

It will be seen that Sir A. Hardinge is inclined to favour the idea of a loan by the Imperial Bank of Persia rather than a loan by His Majesty's Government on political conditions. As, however, the Directors of the Imperial Bank have categorically declared that they are not competent to make the loan, Lord Lansdowne considers that Sir A. Hardinge should endeavour to negotiate with the Persian Government on the basis of the conditions laid down in the Viceroy's telegram of the 13th April, which do not appear to his Lordship to be of an onerous nature.

I am to inclose copy of a telegram in the above sense,† which His Lordship proposes to address to Sir A. Hardinge in the event of Mr. Brodrick concurring in its terms.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GORST.

* No. 60.

† No. 68.

No. 63.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 25th April, relative to the Persian Loan proposals.

India Office, May 2, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 63.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, April 25, 1905.

PLEASE refer to the telegram, dated the 18th instant, from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, regarding the Persian Loan. Difficulty might arise in the way of loan from the funds of the Imperial Bank on account of the terms of their Charter, and the bank prefer that loan should be made by Government through their intermediary. Sir A. Hardinge has accordingly been informed that His Majesty's Government think it better to adhere to the instructions sent to him on the 17th instant.

No. 64.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 59.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 2, 1905.

FOLLOWING repeated to India:—

My telegram No. 53 of the 20th ultimo to your Lordship.

An annual export of 1,200 Tabreez khawars of grain to our frontier stations is offered by the Persian Government, and the Foreign Minister says that he could secure for us an increase to 1,500 khawars. I am still making efforts to have the embargo entirely removed, or at least to secure the 2,000 khawars that MacMahon asked for, but am I to accept the 1,500 if the Shah sticks to it, or should it be held that the proposal has fallen through, and that the Commission are to spend the summer on the frontier, and delimitate in Beluchistan next winter? The Shah leaves in five days, and I should be glad to receive your Lordship's reply as soon as possible.

I am informed by the Mushir ed-Dowleh that pledges have been given, both here and at St. Petersburg, by the Russians that their permanent Commission and guard at Gumbidi Kabsos will be withdrawn, and periodical special meetings between Russian and Persian Commissions on the frontier substituted on the lines of those between the authorities of Bampur and Mekram. He admitted that he had warned the Russians that MacMahon would not leave Seistan until they consented to this arrangement.

No. 65.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 3.)

Sir,

India Office, May 3, 1905.

IN reply to Sir E. Gorst's letter of the 1st May on the subject of the proposed advance to Persia, I am directed to inform you that Mr. Secretary Brodrick concurs in the terms of the telegram which the Marquess of Lansdowne proposes to address to Sir A. Hardinge, adhering to the instructions to endeavour to negotiate on the basis of the Viceroy's telegram of the 13th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 66.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 3.)

Sir,

India Office, May 3, 1905.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of Sir E. Gorst's letter of the 13th April, on the subject of the attitude of the Persian Customs authorities towards the British Post Offices in the Persian Gulf, and to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that Mr. Secretary Brodrick concurs in the Marquess of Lansdowne's proposal to approve the terms of the notes which Sir A. Hardinge has addressed to M. Naus on the subject, copies of which were inclosed in his Excellency's despatch No. 36 dated the 24th February last.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 67.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 3.)

Sir,

India Office, May 3, 1905.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of Sir E. Gorst's letter of the 13th ultimo, inclosing copy of a despatch from Sir A. Hardinge on the subject of the attack by Lar tribesmen on Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer, and to acquaint you, for the information of the Marquess of Lansdowne, that Mr. Secretary Brodrick concurs in his Lordship's proposal to approve the language used by Sir A. Hardinge to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, and the terms of the note which he addressed to his Excellency on this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 68.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 3, 1905.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 58 of the 29th ultimo, on the subject of the Persian Loan, as the Bank Directors have categorically declared their inability to make the loan, you should endeavour to negotiate on the basis of the Viceroy's telegram of 13th April. The conditions laid down in that telegram, viz.:—(1) Security for the advance to be the southern customs, and (2) the eventual control of the Karun project, do not appear to us to be onerous.

No. 69.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 3rd May, relative to the proposed withdrawal of the Seistan Mission.

India Office, May 3, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 69.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 3, 1905.

SEISTAN. My telegram of the 18th ultimo.

Telegram has been received from McMahon, in which he urges strongly that Mission may be withdrawn or relieved immediately. He recommends this mainly on

the ground of the state of tension which, in consequence of the long-deferred hope of early return, is now prevailing amongst all ranks, especially military. Questions relating to Seistan and Perso-Baluch boundary have now been practically settled (except as regards the export of grain, which, however, has been agreed to in principle by the Persian Government), and there is, in my opinion, no reason why McMahon should prolong his stay in connection with the Water Award. I propose, therefore, at once to withdraw the entire party. Every day's delay will make the return march more trying, and I shall be glad to receive orders of His Majesty's Government at very early date.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

No. 70.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 45.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 4, 1905.

YOU may settle the question of the export of grain from Seistan for the frontier stations on the basis of the Viceroy's telegram of to-day.

You should endeavour to obtain the best terms possible.

The above is with reference to your telegram No. 59 of the 2nd instant.

No. 71.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 3rd instant, and of his Excellency's reply, dated the 4th instant, relative to the export of grain from Seistan.

India Office, May 4, 1905.

Inclosure 1 in No. 71.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, May 3, 1905.

SEISTAN boundary. I shall be glad to receive, by telegraph, a statement of your views on the telegram of the 2nd instant from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

Inclosure 2 in No. 71.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 4, 1905.

SEISTAN. Please refer to the telegram of the 2nd instant from Sir A. Hardinge. The definite offer to permit unrestricted export of 1,500 Tabreez kharwars annually should, in my opinion, be accepted.

(Repeated to Sir A. Hardinge and Colonel McMahon.)

No. 72.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 61.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 5, 1905.

YOUR Lordship's telegram No. 43 of the 3rd instant.

I was received yesterday by the Grand Vizier, and immediately after my departure the Russian Minister and the head of the Russian Bank had an interview with him.

The condition about the Karun was objected to by the Grand Vizier, but he said that he would submit it to the Shah. In the opinion of M. Naus the Shah will probably oppose it, but he thinks that if the Karun condition were made the subject of an exchange of notes between the two Governments, or inserted in a separate Agreement, the Shah's opposition might be got over. The decision now rests with the Shah, but, in case we come to an Agreement, it might be well that the Directors of the Bank should authorize their Chief Manager to sign. My offer is of 100,000*l.* only, as I think it prudent to reserve the rest for some more favourable opportunity of obtaining further concessions of a political nature, and the sum mentioned is all that they really want just now. The Shah, who starts on Sunday, does not realize his financial necessities, and thinks of nothing but his tour, so that negotiation is rather difficult.

(Repeated to India.)

No. 73.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 69.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 5, 1905.

I HAVE had under my consideration, in communication with the Secretary of State for India, your despatch No. 36 of the 24th February last, respecting the British post-offices in the Persian Gulf.

The terms of the notes which you have addressed to the Persian Government on this subject are approved by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 74.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 70.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 5, 1905.

I HAVE had under my consideration, in communication with the Secretary of State for India, your despatch No. 38 of the 24th February last, respecting the attack by Lurs on Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer.

Your language to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, and the terms of the note which you have addressed to his Excellency on this subject, are approved by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 75.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 6, 1905.

WITH reference to my letter of the 3rd instant and to previous correspondence, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith, for any observations which the Secretary of State for India may desire to make, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,* relative to the negotiations for the proposed further advance to the Persian Government.

It will be observed that Sir A. Hardinge suggests that the Manager of the Imperial Bank at Tehran should be authorized to sign the loan contract, in the event of an agreement being reached. I am to inclose draft of a letter which, if Mr. Brodrick concurs in its terms, Lord Lansdowne proposes to address to the Directors of the Imperial Bank on this subject.†

At the same time his Lordship considers that it would be advisable to instruct Sir A. Hardinge that no Agreement should be signed until His Majesty's Government have had an opportunity of approving its provisions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GORST.

* No. 72.

[1552]

† No. 76.

No. 76.

Foreign Office to Imperial Bank of Persia.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 6, 1905.

With reference to your letter of the 20th ultimo, and to previous correspondence, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to state, for the confidential information of the Directors of the Imperial Bank of Persia, that negotiations are now in progress at Tehran between His Majesty's Legation and the Persian Government with regard to a further advance of 100,000*l.* which His Majesty's Government are prepared, on certain conditions, to make to that of Persia.

It is proposed that this advance should be made through the intermediary of the Imperial Bank, on the same terms as in the case of the loans of April 1903 and August 1904, and the conditions regarding security and payment of interest and capital would be substantially similar to those governing the two previous transactions.

Sir Arthur Hardinge has reported that it is desirable, in order to avoid undue delay, that the Manager of the Imperial Bank at Tehran should be furnished with the necessary authority to sign immediately, in the event of a satisfactory agreement resulting from the present negotiations.

I am therefore to request that, if the conditions of the advance, as stated above, are acceptable to your Directors, the Manager at Tehran, who has, it is understood, already been instructed to place himself in communication with Sir A. Hardinge in the matter, may be authorized by telegraph to sign the Agreement with the Persian Government on behalf of the Imperial Bank as soon as its terms are settled.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GORST.

No. 77.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne. (Received May 7.)

(No. 62.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 7, 1905.

MY telegram No. 61 of 5th May.

In case the principle should be accepted by the Persian Government I have drafted the following Article for submission to them:

"In the event of the realization of the scheme for a dam at Ahwaz, the Persian Government engage that only such agents as may be approved by the British Government will be intrusted with its execution." [I owe this phrase to the Viceroy himself.] "The British Government, on the other hand, engages to facilitate a further advance of 100,000*l.* from the Imperial Bank of Persia, interest at 5 per cent., guaranteed by Persian Gulf and Fars customs, part of this sum to be devoted to paying the cost of the preliminary surveys, &c., which the Persian Government have caused to be made."

Repayment by annuities, as in the last loan Agreement, would be provided for in a separate Article.

Since my interview of Thursday I have received no communication from the Persian Government, and the Shah apparently leaves the financial question unsettled, as he starts to-day.

(Repeated to India.)

No. 78.

India Office to Foreign Office. (Received May 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 4th May, relative to the proposed withdrawal of the Seistan Mission.

India Office, May 8, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 78.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 4, 1905.

SEISTAN. Your telegrams of yesterday and to-day. On the condition stated in the latter telegram, His Majesty's Government agree to the immediate withdrawal of the Mission. Instructions in this sense have been sent to Sir A. Hardinge, who, however, will try to secure more favourable terms, which he has indicated.

No. 79.

India Office to Foreign Office. (Received May 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 6th instant, relative to the Karun irrigation.

India Office, May 8, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 79.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 6, 1905.

KARUN irrigation. Your telegram of the 21st January last. Information has reached us that Dutch engineer, who is understood to be going to Holland, has left Ahwaz *en route* for Mohammerah. (Repeated to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.)

No. 80.

India Office to Foreign Office. (Received May 8.)

Sir,

India Office, May 8, 1905.

IN reply to your letter of the 8th instant, relating to the Persian loan, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to say that he concurs in Lord Lansdowne's proposal to approve the terms of the Article drafted by Sir A. Hardinge for submission to the Persian Government in the event of their accepting in principle the conditions as to the Karun irrigation scheme.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 81.

The Imperial Bank of Persia to Foreign Office. (Received May 8.)

Sir,

25, Abchurch Lane, London, May 8, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt this morning of your Secret letter dated the 6th instant. The conditions therein mentioned are quite acceptable to the Board of Directors of the bank, and the Chief Manager in Tehran has been instructed by telegram to place himself in communication with His Majesty's Minister in Tehran as requested.

I am, &c.

(Signed) G. NEWELL.

No. 82.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 47.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 8, 1905.

THE terms of the draft Article transmitted in your telegram No. 62 of yes on the subject of the proposed advance to Persia, are approved by His Majesty's Government.

No. 83.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 9.)

Sir,

India Office, May 6, 1905.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of Sir E. Gorst's letter of the 6th instant as to the negotiations for the proposed further advance to the Persian Government, and to state, in reply, that Mr. Secretary Brodrick concurs in the terms of the draft letter which the Marquess of Lansdowne proposes to address to the Directors of the Imperial Bank authorizing the Manager at Tehran to sign the loan contract, in the event of an agreement with the Persian Government being arrived at, on the same conditions as those governing the two previous advances.

Mr. Brodrick agrees that it would be advisable that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran should be instructed not to sign any Agreement till its terms have been considered by His Majesty's Government. There is no objection, in Mr. Brodrick's opinion, to the provision as to the Karun irrigation scheme being arranged by a separate Agreement or an exchange of notes, as suggested in Sir A. Hardinge's telegram of the 5th May, if its insertion in the Agreement as to the loan proves impracticable.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 84.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 9, 1905.

WITH reference to your letter of the 8th August, 1904, conveying the sanction of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury to half the cost of an Indian escort for His Majesty's Consulate at Isfahan, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to state that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran reports that it has been found indispensable to add two men to the guard. The additional men are a salutri and a farrier, the former with pay at 42 rupees a-month, and the latter at 34 rupees, with rations and clothing, the whole involving a further charge of about £30L a-year, of which one-half will be borne by the Government of India.

Lord Lansdowne trusts that their Lordships will sanction the payment from Imperial funds of one-half of the additional expenditure as well as of half the cost of the men's passages from India and back.

I am to add that it has been found necessary for the present to attach part of the guard to His Majesty's Legation at Tehran.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GORST.

No. 85.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 63.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 10, 1905.

PERSIAN loan. My telegram No. 61.

The Karun condition is declared by the Persian Government to be inadmissible, on the ground that while we give no pledge to provide the funds required for the

Ahwaz scheme we tie their hands. A suggestion was made by the Grand Vizier to the effect that it might possibly be inserted in a definite scheme for a large loan, say 400,000L, for the Karun works, and that this scheme might be discussed when the Shah returned, but I see clearly that now that the Court is travelling at daily increasing distances from Tehran, no advance with political conditions can be negotiated here.

An advance of 100,000L without conditions has been applied for from Russia by the Persian Government, but I have reason to think that the report current here, that this has been granted, is premature. As the sum is a small one, Russia may possibly grant it on the sole condition that the Austrian contracts be cancelled.

Grand Vizier professes to me to be very unwilling to increase the Persian debt to Russia, and has urged me to solicit your Lordship's influence with the Imperial Bank on behalf of the plan for the redemption of royalties, pleading that no breach of the Persian Government's concession is involved in this plan. The Bank mainly depends on the custom of the Persian Government, and it would certainly be politic on their part to stretch a point to oblige that Government. M. Naus suggests that the Directors might take further legal advice on the question, or that the sanction of a general meeting would remove all doubt. The possibility, too, of the Shah being exposed in Europe to a tempting Russian offer with no British Representative at hand makes me uneasy. The Russian Bank manager, who has agreed to the postponement of the repayment of the floating debt, left Tehran on the same day as the Shah, and I hear that throughout the tour he will keep in close touch with the Persian Court.

(Repeated to India.)

No. 86.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 11.)

Sir,

India Office, May 10, 1905.

IN reply to Sir E. Gorst's letter of the 3rd May relative to certain proposals made by His Majesty's Consul at Kerman for securing order and safety on the Kerman-Bander Abbas trade route, I am directed to request that you will inform the Marquess of Lansdowne that Mr. Secretary Brodrick appreciates the force of Sir A. Hardinge's objections to the proposals to form a body of mounted troops under British officers, and to construct a telegraph line from Kerman to Bander Abbas.

With regard to the appointment of Consular Agents or hospital assistants at Sirjan, Ralsinjan, and Bampur, if the possibility of inducing the Persian Government to recognize these appointments is conditional on the recognition by the Government of India of a Persian Consul at Quetta, Mr. Brodrick is not prepared to express any definite opinion without again consulting the Government of India, who, Lord Lansdowne will remember, have been strongly opposed to any relaxation in favour of the Persian Government of the rule which restricts the residence of foreign Consuls to the seaport towns.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 87.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 11.)

Sir,

India Office, May 10, 1905.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th April, and to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that Mr. Secretary Brodrick concurs in the Marquess of Lansdowne's proposal to approve the terms of the note addressed by Sir A. Hardinge to the Persian Government on the 20th March, on the subject of the Russian telegraphists in Khorassan.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

No. 88.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 11.)

Sir,

India Office, May 10, 1905.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 28th ultimo, relative to the Henjam-Bunder Abbas Telegraph line.

In reply, I am to say that Mr. Brodrick, while adhering to the view that it is undesirable to have a Persian telegraph office on Henjam, has, in the circumstances, no objection to Lord Lansdowne's proposal to approve Sir A. Hardinge's suggested course of action.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

No. 89.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 12.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 11th May, relative to the Persian loan proposals.

India Office, May 12, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 89

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P

India Office, May 11, 1905.

PERSIAN loan. Telegram from His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, dated 10th instant.

Change of attitude by Bank seems improbable. What is your opinion, from this point of view, as to advance without political conditions from Indian revenues?

No. 90.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 12, 1905.

HENJAM-BUNDER ABBAS telegraph line.

The course suggested by you in your telegram No. 57 of the 27th ultimo, is approved by His Majesty's Government.

No. 91.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 77.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 13, 1905.

I HAVE considered, in communication with the Secretary of State for India, your despatch No. 60 of 21st March last, relative to Russian telegraphists in Khorassan.

The note which you have addressed to the Moshir-ed-Dowleh on this subject is approved by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 92.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 65.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 13, 1905.

MY telegram No. 57 and your Lordship's No. 45 of the 4th May.

Agreements respecting grain export to Indian frontier and Bunder Abbas telegraph extension have just been signed by the Persian Foreign Minister and myself.

The former stipulates (1) right of our post at Padaha to obtain water from tank or wells at or near Mirjawar, and withdrawal of our claim to that place. (2) That both Governments abandon the proposed re-examination of the frontier line in that region, respecting which no further claim will be made, and which is declared to be definitely settled. (3) Unrestricted annual export from Seistan of 1,500 Tabreez kharwars of grain and 50 kharwars of ghi for the Robat post and Mushki Road, and permission to the people of Mirjawar, Duzdab, and Ladis, to sell to our frontier outposts supplies up to 700 Tabreez kharwars of grain annually, making a total of 2,200 kharwars a-year. Customs duty may be levied on these exports at most-favoured-nation rates. Provision applies to all normal years, but any locality which can be shown to be actually suffering from famine, the result of its crops having been destroyed by blight, locusts, or other exceptional visitation, will be exempt.

Persians had modified my original draft in several details, but as your Lordship had told me to get the best terms I could, and MacMahon was pressing to start on the 15th May, I signed without referring them to you. They have, however, put a reservation in the Agreement enabling His Majesty's Government to withhold their assent should they disapprove of these modifications.

The telegraph agreement is identical with that sent home in my despatch No. 64, with addition of provisions for an English telegraphist at Bunder Abbas for State messages and for a Persian office at Henjam.

(Repeated to India and to Seistan Boundary Commission.)

No. 93.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 83. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 14, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to my despatch No. 72 of the 29th ultimo, copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez, reporting on the departure and political views of the Valiahd.

There is, I think, little doubt that, since the Imperial Bank refused and the Russian Bank granted the loan for which His Imperial Highness applied, he has thrown in his lot with the Russian interest, and that his obstructive attitude in the Urumiah affair was largely, though of course not wholly, influenced by a desire to please the Russians. The atmosphere of Tabreez and the counsels of M. Chapchal, the Crimean Jew who teaches him French and Russian and who has found it to his advantage to work for the present with the Russian Consulate-General, have also probably strengthened the Heir-Apparent's pro-Russian proclivities. Persians are, however, changeable, and it is possible that the Valiahd's residence here as Regent may tend to modify the views he has formed in Tabreez, more especially as these, to judge from what I have heard of them from other informants, and notably from the Nizam-es-Sultaneh, are the outcome rather of passing considerations of self-interest than of settled political convictions.

Mr. Wratishaw reports, in a further despatch, that the price of bread fell considerably the day after the departure of the Valiahd, who had, in order to maintain it for the purposes of his ring, forbidden the villagers of the neighbourhood to bring in bread for sale in the city, and that there is now a relaxation of the tension among the Armenian population and less anxiety as to the possibility of disorders.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 93.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 13. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 31, 1905.

AS already reported to your Excellency by telegraph, the Valiahd left Tabreez for Tehran on the 27th instant. He took his whole establishment with him.

The expenses of his journey were defrayed by a small contribution from Tehran, sundry sums extorted from rich Persians who had displeased His Imperial Highness (amongst them Majid-es-Sultané), and a further advance from the Russian Bank, of which last item it is difficult to estimate the exact amount.

The belief seems general here that His Imperial Highness is unlikely to return to Tabreez, but I have not heard any very convincing reasons given for this opinion beyond the fact that the Prince did his best to avoid leaving and that he has taken much more luggage and incumbrances than usual with him. The wish is probably rather to the thought, as the Valiahd's system of government has rendered him intensely unpopular amongst all classes, and the relief generally experienced at his departure has been plainly manifested.

His Imperial Highness is understood to have countenanced and to have shared in the profits of the various rings which have artificially raised the price of bread, charcoal, and other necessities, to the great distress of the poorer classes of the population, and it is a fact that prices fell immediately he left the town.

The Imam Juma is trying to obtain signatures to a petition to the Shah that the Valiahd may soon be restored to his hereditary province.

It is, in my humble opinion, desirable that the heir to the Throne should not reside in Tabreez, where it seems inevitable that he should fall under Russian influence.

For some time past, since in fact he transferred his account to the Russian Bank, the Valiahd appears to have made up his mind that it is to his interest to throw in his lot with the Russians, and that Great Britain may be safely left out of his calculations, at least for the present. In a recent conversation, which has been reported to me by a trustworthy person who was present at the time, His Imperial Highness declared that this was his fixed policy; and on a member of his entourage venturing to observe that Russia's weight in other parts of Persia must not be gauged by the position in Azerbaijan and that it might be wiser to hold the balance more evenly and play off one Power against the other, the Valiahd declared, with some heat, that he knew what was best, and should do as he liked.

I am informed, by a relative of Imam Kuli Mirza, that the Valiahd's instructions to him on taking over the Governorship of Urmí were to do all he could to please the Russians, and that he might disregard the English. His Imperial Highness's obstructiveness in the matter of the ejection from Urmí of Mirza Hussein Agha was less due, I am convinced, to native obstinacy than to the influence of the Russians, who, for reasons best known to themselves, took that ecclesiastic under their protection.

In his interviews with me the Valiahd invariably professes friendship to Great Britain, and when driven into a corner does not hesitate to make appeals to the friendship of Great Britain towards Persia; but I am sure that, for the present at least, he has made his choice and thrown himself entirely on the Russian side.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. C. WRATISLAW.

No. 94.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 84.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 14, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, in continuation of my despatch No. 82 of the 8th instant, a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez, giving particulars of the circumstances under which the Mujtahed Mirza Hussein Agha was removed from Urmíah and a paraphrase of a telegram sent by me in answer to it.

A later despatch from Mr. Wratislaw just received reports the Mujtahed's arrival at Tabreez and his impending departure for Tehran.

Mr. Wratislaw's account of the attitude of the Russian Vice-Consul is a significant comment on the official communiqué which was recently published by the Russian Government respecting its own share in the peaceful adjustment of the late difficulties at Urmíah, and on which I had the honour to report to your Lordship in my despatch No. 54 of the 8th ultimo.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 94.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 12.)

Sir,

Tabreez, March 30, 1905.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 25th instant, announcing the departure of Mirza Hussein Agha from Urmí, I have the honour to report that this took place in spite of the energetic opposition of the Russian Vice-Consul, which the Governor of Urmí, strong in the possession of the Valiahd's orders, completely disregarded.

Mirza Hussein Agha himself threatened riots, but his rival the Bala Mujtahed assured the Governor that he could maintain the public peace, provided Mirza Hussein Agha was not to return.

Finding the game was up, Mirza Hussein Agha sent overtures to the English and American Missions, stating that he had found the Russian Vice-Consulate powerless to protect him, that the influence of the English had been amply proved, and that he was therefore ready to call at both Missions and beg them to intercede for him. The alternative would be disturbances.

After due consideration the missionaries returned the answer that the matter was in the hands of the British Consul-General, and they themselves had no power to interfere; but that if the Mujtahed wished to call they would be glad to receive him.

The matter then dropped, and Mirza Hussein Agha finally departed on the 23rd instant, reaching Tabreez yesterday. No disturbances of any kind took place, and the general feeling at Urmí seems to be that the town is well rid of a nuisance. The influence of the Bala Mujtahed has increased of late, and is likely to become paramount if only the return of his rival can be postponed for a sufficient period.

In the absence of the Valiahd and pending the arrival of his *locum tenens*, I have no means of ascertaining the intentions of the Persian Government towards the reverend exile. I do not think he ought to remain so near as Tabreez.

Mafakhir-ed-Dowleh, our Karguzar, begs me to inform your Excellency that he has seconded to the best of his ability my endeavours to induce the Valiahd to keep his promise. I can do so with perfect truth, and am, indeed, much indebted to the Karguzar for several hints as to the best way to represent the necessities of the situation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. C. WRATISLAW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 94.

Sir A. Hardinge to Consul-General Wratislaw.

(No. 18.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tabreez, April 13, 1905.

I UNDERSTAND, with reference to your despatch No. 18, that the Mollah is to go to Tehran and Meshed. On arrival of Nizam-es-Sultaneh you should request him to order his immediate departure. His Excellency will be amicably disposed.

Give the Karguzar my best thanks for his support.

No. 95.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 86. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 14, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 29 of the 28th ultimo and to my despatch No. 74 of the 31st ultimo, that I have succeeded in settling Sir Hugh Adcock's affairs in a manner satisfactory to that gentleman on the lines indicated in the above-mentioned despatch.

Sir Hugh leaves immediately for Europe with a Firman, appointing him Persian Consul-General at Florence, and assigning to him in that capacity the pay and pension to which he was entitled as Chief Physician to the Shah, and with the permanent rank of Honorary Chief Physician to His Imperial Majesty. The Shah, of whom he had a farewell audience yesterday, received him, he informs me, very graciously.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 96.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 87.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 15, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to previous correspondence, a copy of a despatch from Captain Williams respecting the punitive measures against the Direkward Lurs, and the reported share of the various tribal sections concerned in the attack on Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer.

I am inclined to think that the proposals made in this despatch by Captain Williams afford the best basis of a settlement of the affair, especially as the only other alternative, our compelling the Persian Government to send a force sufficient to subjugate the country, presents, in view of its financial embarrassments and of the Shah's impending journey, difficulties which can only be overcome by stronger measures than His Majesty's Government would be probably disposed to sanction. My personal knowledge, however, of Lur affairs is second-hand only, and it would, I think, be desirable, before a final decision is arrived at, that Colonel Douglas, now in England, should be consulted.

The removal of the Ferman Ferman is, in my opinion, unlikely at the present juncture. The Ainsed-Dowleh, who distrusts him, and indeed regards him as a dangerous enemy, will, I imagine, prefer that during his own absence in Europe the Ferman Ferman shall be kept busy in Luristan. Whether he will remain there for another three years, or even after the Shah's return, is more doubtful, and depends upon political developments in Tehran, which, in view of the present state of His Imperial Majesty's health, are more than ever uncertain and incalculable. I hear from a very well-informed source that, should the Ainsed-Dowleh fall, the Ferman Ferman might be summoned here to assume the Premiership. His sister, the Shah's chief wife, who is on bad terms with the present Grand Vizier, is working for this object, and it is conceivable that such an issue might be less unwelcome to His Majesty than the recall of the Ardeshir-Azam. This possibility is, in my opinion, a further reason for our falling in as far as is practicable in this Luristan business with the views of the Ferman Ferman, who appears for the present to be well-disposed towards us, and with whom I am endeavouring to maintain very friendly relations.

I have the honour to inclose herewith a paraphrase of a telegram which I have addressed to Captain Williams in reply to his despatch, and to request that your Lordship will, after the consultation which I have ventured to suggest with Colonel Douglas, communicate to me by telegraph your decisions as to the final instructions which I am to give Captain Williams on the subject of his proposals. As there seemed no prospect of serious operations against the Lurs being undertaken for some four months, I had directed Captain Williams to return for the present to Kermanshah. Your Lordship will observe that I am now keeping him for the present at Burujird.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 96.

Captain Williams to Sir A. Hardinge.

Sir,

Burujird, March 26, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to forward the following report on the present condition of affairs, in continuation of my cypher telegram No. 18 of to-day:—

1. His Highness Prince Ferman Ferman has been continuing his investigations into the Direkward affair, and below I present his conclusions, which, after comparing with facts I know and have never communicated to his Highness, I think are probably correct.

2. On the 24th March, Se Mahdi Khan, the senior Hassanwand Chief, paid me a visit. He assured me that Mehr Ali Khan Sagwand and the Beglar Begi were the chief instigators of the whole affair, and that the warnings of the latter as to the danger of the road were mere bluff. He further added that both Mehr Ali Khan and Beglar Begi had each received a share of the spoil. There are horses here now which are said to be part of the stolen property, and were found in Mehr Ali Khan's stables when he was arrested. Se Mahdi Khan also told me that Beglar Begi had received a telescope from the Direkwands, and seemed very anxious to have one himself.

I am well aware that one has to consider that these people are lying in every communication they make, but local gossip has steadily associated Mehr Ali Khan and Beglar Begi with the affair from the time it occurred till now. Colonel Douglas and Lieutenant Lorimer strongly suspected them, and asked me to look out for evidence against them.

3. The same day, after seeing Se Mahdi Khan, I saw Ferman Ferman, and he gave me some of his conclusions after seeing Se Mahdi Khan, Sarip Reza Khan (see paragraph 36, p. 34, of Memorandum No. 233, Boshire, the 20th July, 1904, from Major Cox to L. W. Dane, Esq., forwarding Lieutenant Lorimer's Report), Azam-ed-Dowleh, Governor of Khorembad, and various of his emissaries who have returned from Fazil Khan Sagwand, &c.

He said as follows:—

At the time Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer were in Khorembad Mozaffer-ul-Mulk had just been dismissed, and his partizans were creating disorder to call attention to the loss sustained by his dismissal. His great friends were the Fath-es-Sultan, Mehr Ali Khan Sagwand, and the Beglar Begi. (I may say here that the Ferman Ferman states that it was owing to his firm conviction of their complicity in the Direkward affair that he caused the arrest of Mehr Ali Khan and Beglar Begi.) Further, it is known that Mozaffer-ul-Mulk spent the first three nights after he became "mazal" (i.e., recalled) with Fath-es-Sultan in Alishtar, and, further, it is a known fact that Mehr Ali Khan was there also for one night. Mozaffer-ul-Mulk gave Mehr Ali Khan and Fath-es-Sultan receipts for large amounts of unpaid taxes, and Ferman Ferman affirms that the robbery was planned during this meeting in order to throw discredit on the incoming Governor, namely, the Ferman Ferman. Continuing, he said it is a known fact that there are two parties in the Direkwands, one friendly with Fazil Khan Sagwand, and the other with Mehr Ali Khan Sagwand, and whenever either of these men is friendly with the Governor his party amongst the Direkward help the Governor, or at any rate abstain from molesting him. This finished the interview for the 21st, but to-day his Highness again sent for me, saying that he had very important news which had just come in from Azam-ed-Dowleh of Khorembad.

It was really a statement from Mir Haji through Fazil Khan of his sons' part in the affair. Mir Haji is the Chief of the Fazil Khan side of the Direkwands. His version is that Lieutenant Lorimer made the agreement for the double journey, through the intermediary of Khanjan Khan, with Mir Rustam Khan, son of Mir Haji, and he was brought up in safety to Khorembad. With Mir Rustam Khan were his brother, Mir Nazar Ali Khan, Mir Barkhordar Khan, and the brother of Mir Haji, Mir Mehr Ali Khan. All these men belong to the section which is friendly with Fazil Khan, and consequently they are enemies of Mehr Ali Khan Sagwand.

After Mr. Lorimer had arrived at Khorembad, Mehr Ali Khan Sagwand wrote to the son of Mir Namdar (Mir Namdar was the other big Chief of Direkwands, and was friendly to Mehr Ali Khan. Mir Namdar is reported to have died just at this time. Ferman Ferman has not got the name of his son), Mir Tata, and Mir Saridar, saying something to the following effect: "Look here; here is Mir Rustam Khan and his lot going to take the English Minister down to Disful, for which they will receive much

money and presents, while you, my friends, are quite out of it. You must go and insist on having your share, or you will lose all honour as men," &c.

As a result of this letter the son of Mir Namdar collected a strong following, among them being Mir Tata and Mir Sardar, and probably others whose names I have not got now, and, setting out, joined Mir Rustam with Colonel Douglas and Lieutenant Lorimer after Shah-in-Shah, or at any rate after they had commenced the journey under the protection of Mir Rustam Khan and Co. The arrival of the son of Mir Namdar and Co. was quite a surprise to Mir Rustam, so it is affirmed. The son of Mir Namdar told Mir Rustam that they were going to loot the Englishmen and kill them so as to leave no trace of the affair. To this Mir Rustam strongly objected, as he had sworn on the Koran to take them in safety. That night the two parties had a consultation, and matters became very heated, so much so that at last Mir Rustam was told that unless he and his party agreed they would be attacked also. Then Mir Rustam, seeing that he could do nothing, as the son of Mir Namdar had brought a much stronger force, consented to stand in with them, on the understanding that neither of the Englishmen was killed or wounded in any way, and also that they be given a horse apiece and enough food to reach Khorezabad. To this the other side consented, and wanted to start looting at once; but Mir Rustam refused, as he was afraid the Englishmen might be accidentally killed in the darkness. Next morning, when loading up, they started looting, and, owing to Lieutenant Lorimer and Colonel Douglas drawing pistols, they were wounded, not with the intention of killing them, but simply to prevent them making use of their firearms. The Direkwards also say that one of their Mirs was wounded in the leg by Mr. Lorimer, and afterwards died.

I believe there is a good deal of truth in the above, for the following reasons:-

(1.) From what I remember, Colonel Douglas and Lieutenant Lorimer said there was one Mir (presumably Mir Rustam) who seemed friendly, but said he could not help them, and advised them to give up their things quietly.

(2.) Also, from what Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer said, the accompanying escort was much increased just before the outrage, and they wondered where they had come from. (These were probably the followings of the son of Mir Namdar, Mir Tata, Mir Sardar, and Co.)

(3.) Also I believe, from Ferman Fernal's manner (and I have some experience of him now), that he was giving me what he believed to be the truth just as he had received it.

(4.) All the accounts from the time of the outrage to the present day agree in saying that Mohr Ali Khan Sagwand was the cause of the whole affair.

(5.) The engagement for escort having been made through Khanjan Khan with the section friendly to him, they would not be likely to break their oath except under pressure, as that would put Fazil Khan against them, and he is too strong a man to do that lightly.

(6.) To my mind the most important points are (1) the attitude of the son of Mir Haji before and after the outrage, and (2) it is true that after starting they were joined by a second party of Direkwards larger than the first party. For this it is necessary that Colonel Douglas or Lieutenant Lorimer should read the above and see how it fits in with the facts. If it does fit, then it is probably true, for I have never given Ferman Fernal any facts which would have enabled him to fabricate it. I have been most reticent for this very reason.

4. If after perusal of the above with Colonel Douglas you think the statement of the old escort is true, then it becomes necessary to determine how we shall deal with the two sections.

I propose the following, after talking it over with the Ferman Fernal: We should assure Mir Haji, the Chief of the Fazil Khan section, that we would not press the punishment against his son and the Mirs associated with him if -

(1.) They will give up the son of Mir Namdar and all the Mirs who were associated with him. (I should assume that these were all the Mirs whose names we have, with the exceptions of Mir Rustam Khan, Mir Nazar Ali Khan, Mir Barkhordar Khan, and Mir Mohr Ali Khan.)

(2.) And will pay a fine not to exceed 500 tomans (Ferman Fernal says that, if put at more, they would absolutely refuse. He says that this in cash is a big sum for them.)

It is quite on the cards that the two sections may in this way be set against each other, and as Mir Haji would have the help of Fazil Khan, he would probably succeed. In any case a large force will be necessary in Khorezabad to overcome Fazil Khan and Mir Haji and make them see that it will be to their interest to deliver up the other side quickly.

5. If you come to the conclusion that the whole thing is probably made up and does not fit in with the facts, I am afraid that unless the Persian Government is forced along in some drastic manner we must be prepared for this matter to drag on indefinitely. Personally, I do not think that an army of 20,000 Persian soldiers can subdue the Direkwards.

If, on the other hand, you incline to the view that there are grounds for believing that Mir Haji and his son are speaking the truth and consent to the course I have proposed above, there are strong grounds for believing that the affair will be finished in four or five months, always supposing that the Persian Government is forced to send a force of at least 8,000 men with adequate supplies.

6. If the affair is finished in the way I have indicated, conditions would be quite favourable in Khorezabad at the end of five months to conclude terms for guarding the road, as both Fazil Khan and Mir Haji would be either in the town or neighbourhood, and Ferman Fernal will give all the assistance he can. He is quite keen on it, and says he is willing to become a shareholder if it is possible. Of course, all this depends on whether it has been settled what Government are prepared to spend, and on whether Messrs. Lynch are prepared to show some energy.

7. Ferman Fernal is most emphatic that there is a better alignment for a road west of the Direkward country and quite outside their range. He has promised to send me down this road with an escort of his own personal cavalry, if you will consent to my going. If so, would you wire consent, as I should have to take my opportunity when he can spare his escort? He says he will send his cousin and 100 sowars.

8. His Highness is really working very hard at this affair at present, making friends with all the Chiefs by granting remission from taxation and refusing presents; all is, however, part of his "diplomacy" to develop confidence and bring off a grand coup by treachery in the end. His own personal escort is mainly composed of all the brigands from Kernanshah, whom he is keeping very contented at present by regular pay and promise of loot. If, however, he becomes dismissed there will be quite a lively time. It is quite as essential that he should not become "mazel" from Kernanshah as from Laristan. Owing to his being Governor of both, he is on both sides of the nomads, and there is no province into which they can retreat with good assurance of asylum.

For this reason Fath-es-Sultan is quite quiet, and all his tribes have sent in their Chiefs to swear allegiance. Ferman Fernal is very proud that these Chiefs have trusted him to the extent of venturing into the city, as he says they will generally only come within a farsakh or so. I may point out that it would be most damaging to our prospects of finishing the affair if Mozaffar-ul-Mulk were reappointed. I think if Ferman Fernal were left Governor of the two provinces for three years or so there would be no difficulty about getting the road into good working order.

9. If you decide not to press punishment against Mir Rustam and Co. his Highness does not want you to let the Persian Government know anything about it, but to continue your demands for all the Mirs, as before, and to leave this matter between his Highness and myself, to be acted on if he cannot do anything else.

10. I am quite aware that the evidence I have given is not very strong, but when it is read by Colonel Douglas he will be able either to squash or confirm it. I think also the attitude of the Mir Rustam and Co. escort on the road up is of some importance. As far as I can remember, Lieutenant Lorimer said that he had no trouble at all on the road up, and, as the Ferman Fernal says, they are the sort of people who think only of "to-day," and if they had intended robbery would have made certain of Mr. Lorimer without waiting for Colonel Douglas.

I have, &c.

(Signed) T. S. B. WILLIAMS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 96.

Sir A. Hardinge to Captain Williams.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 15, 1905.

I AM sending copy of your despatch to Foreign Office and suggesting that Douglas, who is now in London, should be consulted as to your proposals: they seem to me, subject to any criticisms he may have to make, to afford the best practicable basis for a settlement.

[1552]

T

I am asking for a telegraphic reply, and you had better remain at Burujird pending its receipt, which I expect in about three weeks.

Your inspection of the new route suggested by the Prince had better be deferred for the present. I do not think his removal likely in the immediate future, but there are certain influences at work for his appointment to the Premiership in the event of the Ain-ed-Dowleh's falling. Your attitude towards him should be especially friendly in view of this possibility.

No. 97.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 89. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 18, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copy of a note which I have addressed to the Grand Vizier in accordance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 25 of the 11th ultimo, respecting the Seistan and Mirjavar frontier questions.

His Highness informed Abbas Kuli Khan, who handed this note to him, that he would discuss it with the Shah to-day and take His Majesty's commands respecting it; but as my messenger leaves to-morrow, I am sending it without awaiting the reply of the Persian Government.

The Ain-ed-Dowleh went on to state that, in accordance with the pledge which he had given me, as reported in my despatch No. 62 of the 22nd March, he had offered to reappoint the Hashmat-ul-Mulk to the Governorship of Seistan, but that the Hashmat was not satisfied with this and was pressing to be given Kain as well.

From other sources I hear that he is confident of obtaining it, and has proposed to the Grand Vizier that they should both join in plundering the estate of the late Amir of Kain, the Shaukat-ul-Mulk, at the expense of Mohammed Ibrahim Khan, the younger brother of the deceased Chief, who is also a half-brother of the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, but whom, the latter suggests, might be plausibly deprived of his inheritance on the ground that he is the son of a concubine.

This scheme is not unlikely to succeed, unless Mohammed Ibrahim can outbribe the Hashmat-ul-Mulk. The latter has given or promised large sums to the Vazir Darbar, to Sheikh Fazlollah, a Mujtehed, who has considerable influence with the Grand Vizier, and to other minor personages in the Royal Household; and these substantial arguments, combined with the effects of the pressure exercised by me on the Hashmat's behalf, up to the receipt of your Lordship's telegram No. 28 of the 23rd ultimo, have procured his reinstatement in Seistan, and may possibly get Kain for him as well.

I understand that he is offering to various exalted recipients—including, of course, the Shah and the Grand Vizier, who will secure lion's shares—a total sum of about 20,000*l.*, which, if the annual "maliat" of Seistan is, as estimated by the Mustansir-ul-Mulk roughly 25,000*l.* a-year (150,000 tomans) is not really an unreasonable price.

The present attitude, real or simulated, of the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, in his intercourse with the Persian Court and Ministers is anti-English, partly because he wishes to disprove the charges made against him by the Russians and his other opponents of having sold Persian rights for English gold, and partly because he desires to discredit the boundary settlement made with Colonel MacMahon by the Yamin-i-Nizam, whom he regards as his chief enemy and rival.

In pursuance of this policy he has represented the boundary settlement to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh as most injurious to Persia, and if he returns to Seistan he will perhaps intrigue as much as he dares with the Russians, so long as the Yamin-i-Nizam remains on friendly terms with our officers. Should the Yamin for any reason develop Russian proclivities, the Hashmat-ul-Mulk will once more become strongly pro-English.

On the whole, however, I venture to reiterate the expression of my belief that it will be best in our interests, as we have so far energetically supported him, in deference to the views of the Government of India, that the Hashmat should return to Seistan. He will probably now do so anyhow, whether we give him further help or not, and we may as well get the credit of his restoration. It is for this reason that

I have recommended in my telegram No. 52 of yesterday's date our guaranteeing the further loan which he requires for the purposes of corruption in high places, so as to prevent his obtaining the money from the Russians, and going back under their patronage and protection.

As your Lordship is aware, I have never much believed in him, and the support which I have given him under your Lordship's instructions, has been mainly due to the opinion impressed on the Government of India by successive British Consuls in Seistan that his deposition would be prejudicial to British interests. He has no real following in the country, no effective means of resisting, without active help from us, any anti-British measures which may be inspired from Tehran, and is treacherous, weak, and besotted by excessive indulgence in opium. When he does go back, the Mustansir-ul-Mulk and the Yamin-i-Nizam will, I expect, intrigue against him, and take much of his old power out of his hands; but for all this it will, I think, be to our advantage that we should be supposed to have assisted him, in recompense for his past services, such as they were, since the knowledge that we have done so may keep him—less from gratitude than from fear of altogether losing our good will—from taking an active part in Russian plots. If he shows signs of turning against us, we can, with the assistance of his powerful local enemies, who will, for reasons of their own, be only too ready to denounce him to the Shah, paralyze much of his ability for mischief.

I have warned him that his son has been acting very unwisely in working with the Karguzar against us. The Karguzar's somewhat clumsy efforts have so far produced no effect here. He recently sent a long telegram to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, which, to prevent, as he supposed, Captain Macpherson from knowing it, he requested M. Molitor to transmit in Flemish through M. Nans, accusing the Yamin-i-Nizam of having betrayed his country's interest to Colonel Maemahon, and imploring the Persian Government to withhold its assent from the latter's settlement. The Mushir-ed-Dowleh treated this communication with contempt, and the Shah wrote a Minute on it to the effect that it was inspired by the Karguzar's personal enmity to the Yamin-i-Nizam, and was the outcome of "fuzuli" (meddlesome intrigues). The Karguzar, of whose unfriendliness I have made repeated complaints, is now to be dismissed by the Persian Government, but his successor has not yet been selected out of several candidates for the post.

I shall probably have to enter into some discussions and explanations with the Persian Ministers about Colonel Maemahon's water award, to certain features of which the Yamin-i-Nizam has, as was only to be expected, raised objections. I do not trouble your Lordship with any remarks on this subject, as Colonel Maemahon's very full telegrams to the Government of India respecting it will be in your possession before you receive this despatch. But I suspect the Shah will be so relieved at the termination of Colonel Maemahon's Mission, and at the prospect of his early departure from Persian territory, that he will not be disposed to be unduly critical, or to protract by reopening the discussion, the Commissioner's sojourn in Seistan, more especially as the attention of the Court is now entirely absorbed in the plans for His Majesty's impending European tour. At an interview which I had on the 15th instant with the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, his Excellency expressed to me the Shah's warm appreciation of the labours of Colonel Maemahon and of the services which that officer had rendered to Persia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 97.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Grand Vizier.

Your Highness,

April 8, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to address you on certain points with reference to the relations between our respective Governments on the Indian frontier, which formed the subject of our interview of the 21st March last.

Your Highness will recollect that the two principal questions which we discussed on that occasion were—

1. The Governorship of Seistan; and
2. The disputed boundary in the neighbourhood of Mirjavar.

These questions, affecting as they do the relations of Persia with India, are connected with one another, and may therefore be treated together.

As regards the first of them, the Governorship of Seistan, I impressed on you the importance which His Majesty's Government has long attached to the maintenance in that office of the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, both because his local influence appeared to them a guarantee for the tranquillity of a frontier district in which India has special interests and because his removal, threatened by the Russian Consulate owing to the action taken by him to suppress the anti-British disturbances of the summer of 1902, might be interpreted by the ignorant local population as implying an unfriendly feeling on the part of the Persian Government towards ourselves.

Your Highness assured me, and I lost no time in transmitting this assurance to Lord Lansdowne, that any such interpretation of the action of the Persian Government in the matter of the Hashmat-ul-Mulk was entirely mistaken. You added that His Majesty the Shah was contemplating certain new arrangements for the administration of Seistan which would prove entirely satisfactory to British interests, but that there were certain objections to the continued government of that province by the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, whose capacities were not regarded as equal to such a position. On my suggesting that a solution might possibly be found by bestowing on the Hashmat-ul-Mulk the government of Kain, where foreign political rivalries were less acute, and thus showing that it was not intended to punish him for the assistance rendered at a critical moment to British interests, you observed that it was contemplated to separate both Kain and Seistan from Khorassan, and to place them under a Governor in direct dependence on Tehran, leaving the brother of the late Shaukat-ul-Mulk as Deputy Governor of Birjand, and the son of the Hashmat-ul-Mulk as Deputy Governor at Nasratabad. You assured me, however, that another Governorship would be bestowed on the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, so as to remove all idea that he had been deprived of his late post because of his friendliness to the British Consulate, and that if he was not given Seistan he would be appointed to Tabas, which has long been held by members of his family. I might, you said, regard it as a promise that he would get either Tabas or Seistan.

Lord Lansdowne to whom I telegraphed these assurances, and who is, as your Highness is aware, deeply desirous of meeting as far as possible the views and wishes of the Persian Government, has now authorized me to state that he will for the present desist from further intervention in the matter of the Governorship of Seistan. The representations which I was directed to make to you on this subject were largely dictated by concern for the tranquillity of this important province, which apart from its proximity to India, borders on Afghanistan, and in which any new troubles arising with the Afghans may involve us under Article VI of the Treaty of 1857 with the late Shah. It must therefore be clearly understood by the Persian Government which has decided, notwithstanding our friendly representations, to introduce important administrative changes in Seistan, that the entire responsibility must rest with it for any untoward consequences which may result from these new arrangements, and that no share in it can be assumed by His Majesty's Government.

With respect to the Mirjavar boundary, it may perhaps be useful that I should recapitulate as briefly as possible the main facts, with which your Highness told me at our interview that you were unfamiliar, dating back, as they do, to a period anterior to your Premiership.

The frontier between Persia and India was fixed in 1896 by an Agreement, of which, for convenience, I append a copy herewith. In 1901, Persian Customs posts were established at various points along that line, and M. Cesari, an officer of the Customs Department, was sent to open one at Mirjavar. The British district officer on our side of the frontier contended that the spot selected by M. Cesari was within Indian, not Persian territory, on the ground that the latter had mistaken the streams, or rather nullahs, called the Talab and Mirjavar Rivers, and on the strength of this contention, proceeded to occupy the point in dispute himself. His action was unauthorized by the Government of India, and in deference to complaints made to me hereby the Persian Government, he was ordered to withdraw to the opposite side of the stream, which was claimed by Persia as the boundary, until such time as an investigation on the spot should have shown whether his interpretation of the Boundary Agreement was in conformity, as he contended it to be, with the intentions of the Commission by which the boundary was settled in 1896, and it was subsequently agreed that the question should be examined after the conclusion of his Seistan Arbitration by Colonel Maemahon and a Persian Representative, who would proceed for the purpose to Mirjavar. Meanwhile, the Persian Government have established a Customs post on the disputed ground without waiting for the inquiry agreed upon.

Mirjavar is in itself a position of no importance to either Government. It

consists, I believe, of a small settlement of Beluch huts, often shifted by their owners; is not traversed by any important road, and has no trade. Its only value is that the villagers who cultivate its fields produce a yearly harvest, which, although it would be considered scanty in more favoured regions, makes it, like other small villages on the Persian side of the frontier, a centre from whence supplies can be drawn. The surrounding country on both sides of the frontier line up to Kuh Malik Siah, where it terminates, is a torrid desert, so much so that at the time of the Agreement of 1896 it was found both a useless labour and expense, in view of the physical difficulties of demarcation, to mark it out on the ground itself, with the result that the correctness of the map annexed to the Agreement is now doubtful, and that a fresh survey and map may be necessary in order to bring it in harmony with the intentions of the two Governments. The reopening of the question of the ownership of Mirjavar, which is about 10 farsakhs south of Seistan, would most likely necessitate the postponement till next cold weather of the despatch of Colonel Maemahon to the spot, as the heat and want of water and supplies would render surveying operations there most difficult in the Beluch summer which is now close upon us, and might thus oblige the British Boundary Commission, which has already spent two years in Seistan, to remain there for a further period. This postponement of the Commissioner's departure from the Persian frontier would cause additional expense to the Government of India, and would probably not be agreeable to His Majesty the Shah, who has several times intimated to me through your Highness his desire that Colonel Maemahon and the force accompanying him should return to India as soon as their arbitration work was complete. It becomes, therefore, a matter for consideration whether a further inquiry on the spot into the ownership of the contested land at Mirjavar is worth all the trouble and expenditure of money which it would entail on both the Governments concerned.

A solution of the question had occurred to me which I submitted to your Highness at our interview on the 22nd ultimo, but which I could not then propose to you formally, as I could not say how far it would be agreed to by my Government. It was to the effect that we should abandon any further discussion as to the ownership of Mirjavar, and that the land there now occupied by the Persians should be recognized as within Persian territory, whilst the Persian Government should enter into an Agreement with us for enabling our few outposts on the English side of the frontier to draw without restrictions, the supplies needed by them from the nearest Persian villages, and in the case of our post at Robat Killeh, which, as situated on the Quetta trade route, is a somewhat important one, from Seistan itself.

Your Highness appeared to view this proposal with favour, or at least to deem it worthy of consideration, but asked for details as to the amount of supplies which we proposed to export from Seistan and Beluchistan for our outposts. These details I promised to procure for you as soon as I was able to ascertain from His Majesty's Government that they were prepared in principle to treat on this basis.

Lord Lansdowne, having now given me the necessary authority to do so, I write to inform your Highness that I should propose, in lieu of any reopening of the question of the frontier-line—

1. The grant of permission by the Persian Government for the officer commanding the frontier post at Padaha on the English side of the so-called Mirjavar River, to obtain water on the Persian side, and for the outposts at Padaha, Sindak, and other places on our side of the line, to obtain freely and without restriction such supplies of grain and other necessities as they can procure from the Persian villages of Ladis, Mirjavar, Duzdab, and other small places between Ladis and Kuh Malik Siah.

2. The removal of the embargo on the export of grain from Seistan. The minimum amount of supplies which is required every year for the wants of the garrison and posts along the Quetta trade route, so long as Quetta is not connected by railway with the Persian frontier, is 2,000 Tabreez kharwars of grain per annum, and 80 or 100 kharwars of ghi, but the total abolition of the restriction would be preferable to the fixing of any definite amount. The only objection which could be made to this reform, namely, that it might, if the harvest were not as good as usual, be a strain on the resources of Seistan, is sufficiently refuted by the fact that the local Government alone have 14,000 kharwars of revenue grain per annum to dispose of, and often experience considerable difficulty in disposing of it. The Persian officials in Seistan have frequently admitted to our officers the advisability of removing this prohibition, which, by limiting the amount of grain which can be sold, limits the amount grown, and thus diminishes cultivation, and with it also commerce and the revenues of the State. If, in connection with the settlement of Seistan and frontier

affairs your Highness could relieve the people of Seistan from these restrictions on their agriculture and trade, restrictions which, as you are aware, exist in no civilized country except Persia, you would, besides encouraging commercial relations with India, confer upon these subjects of the Shah a boon of the greatest value.

A third point which it would be desirable to adjust as part of a general settlement of frontier affairs before the departure of His Majesty the Shah from Persia for Europe, is that of the right of foreigners to acquire real property in Seistan in the same way as in other provinces of Persia. This right has been restricted by a recent proclamation of which we have reasonable grounds to complain. It appears to us that whatever rights are allowed to Russian or Turkish subjects in the provinces bordering upon their respective countries, for instance, Ghilan, Azarbaijan, Kurdistan, and Arabistan, should be equally allowed to British subjects in Seistan and Beluchistan which border upon India, and that any attempt to deprive them of the equality of treatment which they enjoy under our Commercial Treaty, on the ground that the land in Seistan, most of which is desert, belongs to the State, and not to private owners, may be justly objected to by His Majesty's Government as unfriendly. The Persian Government, which three years ago gave a Russian Road Company the right to expropriate the owners of lands of all description in Azarbaijan all along the Julfa-Tabreez-Tehran road, and this notwithstanding the fact that such a procedure is not authorized by the religious law, cannot justly refuse to Indian traders the right of acquiring house property in Seistan for their business there. The one is a border province as well as the other.

As it appears very desirable that an understanding on all these questions should be come to before the Shah's departure, which I learn unofficially is to take place in the course of the present month, so that His Majesty may not be troubled during his journey in Europe by complications and difficulties on the Indian frontier, I would ask your Highness to give me in writing a reply to these various suggestions and proposals at your earliest convenience, so that the necessary instructions may be dispatched as soon as possible to the Representatives on the spot of our respective Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 98.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 91.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 18, 1905.

It will be within your Lordship's recollection that the Persian Government protested last summer to the British and Russian Legations against the occupation by Turkish troops of Saumar in the debatable zone between the Province of Kermanshah and the Vilayet of Baghdad, and that joint representations on the subject were made to the Sublime Porte by the British and Russian Embassies at Constantinople.

A person, who has just arrived from Kasri Shirin, informs me that Daoud Khan, Hkani of the Kathors, whose action in depriving Mendeli of water, owing to the discontinuance of the presents formerly received by him from the Turkish authorities, provoked this incident, has announced that he means this spring to eject from Saumar the tribesmen from the Turkish side of the frontier, who settled there after the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, and once more to seize the water and prevent it from reaching Mendeli. When the Turks entered Saumar last year Daoud Khan was at Kermanshah, and in his absence his son was unable, without orders from him, to resist them; but if Daoud Khan, who can put some 1,000 mounted tribesmen into the field, carries out his threat, there will be a fresh conflict, which will lead to a renewed demand by the Persian Government for our intervention, and it is as well therefore that your Lordship should be forewarned.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Resident at Baghdad.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 99.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 92.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 18, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to previous despatches respecting the Ahwaz Isfahan road, a copy of a letter which I have just received from Mr. Parry, Messrs. Lynch Brothers' agent at Tehran. I am awaiting, before taking any further action in the matter, the despatch from your Lordship of the 29th March, referred to in your telegram, No. 31 of the 30th ultimo, which, owing to the length of time taken by the messenger since the Constantinople route has been resumed, has not yet reached me.

I am sending a copy of Mr. Parry's letter for his information to His Majesty's Consul-General at Isfahan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 99.

Mr. Parry to Sir A. Hardinge.

Sir,

Tehran, April 17, 1905.

MY immediate departure for the road being necessary, I take the liberty to write you the points I desired verbally to explain relating to the Bakhtiari Road and the reports made by Mr. Preece.

1. The need of more caravanserais on the road to accommodate the traffic has recently been demonstrated by frequent complaints from muleteers and by the condition in which goods arrive at Isfahan; and at an interview I had a day or two ago with Haji-Ali-Khuli-Khan I obtained a firm promise from that gentleman that he would have them built.

I refrained from alluding to the arrangement made by Mr. Preece for the repairs and upkeep of the road, merely stating that I would endeavour to get my principals to accept it, in order not to interfere with any discussion between the Legation and the Chiefs on the subject, but I venture to hope that you will be able to get them to confirm the promise made regarding the erection of more caravanserais, when advising him of the conditional acceptance of the arrangement by Messrs. Lynch Brothers.

2. I desire to point out a slight omission made in Mr. Preece's letter, No. 57 of the 30th December, referring to the heavy expenditure incurred in 1904 for the work of painting the bridges.

In 1904 the engineer remained some months in the Bakhtiari country over the time necessary to paint the bridges in the hope that he could induce the Chiefs to commence the repairs to the road.

The impression conveyed to you by the omission of any explanation of the cause of the extra expenditure incurred in 1904, and the sense in which it has been employed, reflects so seriously on the Eastern staff of Messrs. Lynch Brothers that I take the liberty to place this point before you in its correct light.

I remain, &c.
(Signed) F. PARRY.

No. 100.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 93.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 18, 1905.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 61 of the 21st ultimo, inclosing a translation of a note from the Mushir-ul-Dowleh as to the strength of the force available

for the Ferman Feroz's Laristan expedition, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from Captain Williams on the same subject, and of my reply.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 100.

Captain Williams to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 24.)
Sir,

Burujird, April 4, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch dated the 21st March, with one inclosure.

I presume the Mushir-ed-Dowleh means Khoremsabad when he says "the garrison of that place consists of two regiments and 500 cavalry." The facts are, that in Khoremsabad there are (1) the Kerind Regiment; (2) a part of the Khamseh Regiment; (3) and perhaps 300 cavalry.

2. As for Salar-i-Moazzem, he has vanished in the direction of Arabistan, but although he had two regiments, 600 cavalry, and two guns, he was afraid to go through the Direkward country, and went by a route further west.

3. Ferman Feroz's camp consists of his personal servants and odd batches of sowars from Kermanshah, making in all perhaps 300 men.

4. If you consider that the Persian Government cannot be forced to send even 5,000 men to overawe the section who are inclined to save themselves, it might be advisable to get the Prime Minister to order the Ferman Feroz to move against the Lurs immediately, and the inevitable defeat would bring it home to the Persian Government that the force here is insufficient.

Of course, this involves sacrificing the Ferman Feroz, as he would doubtless be dismissed after a defeat. On the other hand, although the Prime Minister would make no difficulty about ordering him to attack at once (he is doing so now) I doubt whether his Highness would obey him. The enmity between these two is the great stumbling block. Ferman Feroz himself says that the present object is to give him insufficient force so that he may suffer defeat, and then they will send someone with sufficient force to finish the business. When the other man has succeeded, His Majesty the Shah will be informed of the incapability of the Ferman Feroz, and the latter will then probably lose everything. I do not think the present Prime Minister will send sufficient force as long as Ferman Feroz is Governor-General, unless he is forced to do so.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. S. B. WILLIAMS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 100.

Sir A. Hardinge to Captain Williams

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 18, 1905.

I WILL ask the Persian Government to send the 500 men you mention in your despatch No. 24, but their lack of funds will make this very difficult unless we are able to get the Salar-i-Moazzem back. I am averse to any policy which could injure the Ferman Feroz.

No. 101.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne, (Received May 16.)

(No. 26. Confidential.)
My Lord,

Tehran, April 18, 1905.

THE Valiabad arrived here yesterday to assume the functions of Regent after the Shah's departure for Europe, which is at present by way of being fixed for the 2nd of

next month. The journey via Meshed, Askhabad, Bokhara, and Tashkend has been definitely abandoned as likely to be injurious to His Majesty's health, and he now proposes to proceed to Contrexéville direct, via Resht, Baku, Volochinsk, and Austria. It is, however, thought doubtful, for a variety of reasons, with which I need not weary your Lordship, whether he will in the end go to Europe at all, and the Grand Vizier is still striving by all the means at his disposal to prevent the journey from taking place, alleging the disturbed state of Russia and the reported prevalence of cholera in that country. The Mushir-ed-Dowleh told me on the 15th instant that an official programme of the tour would be communicated in a day or two to the Legations, but it still hangs fire, and the Russian Minister complained to me to-day that, although he had been semi-officially assured that the Shah would reach Russian territory next month, he was not yet in a position to make any authoritative statement to his Government, a state of things which, in view of the arrangements to be made for His Majesty's reception, was extremely inconvenient.

The Shah is absolutely bent on going, talks of nothing else, and will not listen to the objections of the Grand Vizier, who is now in a state of intense irritation, and who realizes that if His Majesty is disappointed of his tour he will turn on and dismiss him, whilst, if he goes, he will see the Atabeg in Europe, where his enemies in the Royal entourage may restore the fallen statesman to favour. The Ain-ed-Dowleh dislikes the idea of leaving the Valiabad as Regent, and, in order to protect himself, is taking with him on the journey a number of persons whom he distrusts, and who will, he fears, if they remain in Persia, intrigue against him with His Imperial Highness in his absence. Even so, however, he remains exposed to the danger of their working for his overthrow in Europe, while the additional expense which their presence will entail is a further cause for anxiety. The suite which is to accompany the Shah already numbers fifty persons, inclusive of servants, and new names are being constantly added by His Majesty.

The Shah has collected in money presents and by drawing on his privy purse about 50,000*l.* for the tour, and the Grand Vizier has set apart for the purpose another 40,000*l.* of his own, if necessary, as a kind of insurance against dismissal. But, owing to causes with which your Lordship is already familiar, the Budget of the State still shows a deficit of nearly 200,000*l.* M. Naas has had to warn the Grand Vizier that, unless he can find fresh funds somewhere, he may have to stop payments, and for his Highness to take the Sovereign out of the country, leaving behind him an unfriendly Regent, unpaid troops, and public functionaries, and a discontented priesthood and people, is a risk from which he naturally shrinks. Hence the efforts which he is making to obtain before the Shah's departure enough money for the Government to be carried on during his absence, and which have formed the subject of recent telegrams addressed by me to your Lordship and to the Government of India.

The best solution would probably be the acceptance by the Imperial Bank of Persia of his offer to discount its annual royalties for the next thirty-seven years in return for an advance of 150,000*l.* (he originally asked for 100,000*l.*, but he has now suggested 150,000*l.*) at an interest of 8 per cent. The arrangement would be, financially, very much to the advantage of the Imperial Bank, which possesses the requisite capital, but the intangible character of the security might prove inconvenient if unforeseen events should lead the bank to liquidate before the expiration of the term, and I have suggested to M. Naas the advisability of anticipating this contingency, highly improbable though it be, by a clause providing in its event for repayment of the advance out of Customs or some other tangible source of revenue. From one point of view it may suit us better to take advantage of the Ain-ed-Dowleh's present distress in order to drive a good political bargain with him, but there is always the danger of Russian competition, if the Russians get to know of our negotiations, and of Russia's buying him at the last moment by an offer of easier terms. I am, therefore, inclined to think that it might be more prudent to assist him in obtaining the advance which he has applied for on the lines of his proposals to the Imperial Bank. He will come to us again, if he remains in office, for his Karun loan, and if he falls, his successor will almost certainly want money. It is, however, perhaps superfluous for me to discuss at length the pros and cons of a question which will most likely have been decided before your Lordship receives this despatch, and if I touch on them briefly here it is chiefly as a slightly fuller explanation of the view which I had the honour to submit in my telegram No. 52 of to-day's date.

The doctors tell me that the waters are a real necessity for the Shah, and may keep him alive a few years longer. Disastrous as his reign has been, I am not sure that his death at this juncture and the accession of the Valiabad in that Prince's present

Russophil mood might not constitute a greater danger to British interests than the continuance of the present régime, which is, on the whole, not unfavourable to us.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 102.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 17.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 16th May, relative to the Seistan Water Award.

India Office, May 17, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 102.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 16, 1905.

SEISTAN. McMahon's Water Award has been accepted by the Ameer, with the exception of clause 5, which provides for the appointment of an irrigation officer. Ameer asks for further details with regard to this point. I hope he may be induced to agree to the clause when he receives the particulars with which I am furnishing him in reply to his report.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.)

No. 103.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 17.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 16th instant, relative to the Persian loan proposals.

India Office, May 17, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 103.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 16, 1905.

PERSIAN loan. Your telegram of the 11th instant.

Government of India are opposed to any further advance to the Persian Government from Indian revenues without political conditions being attached thereto.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.)

No. 104.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 66.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 17, 1905.

I TRUST your Lordship understands that advances without political conditions are not advocated by me. I merely regret that at the present juncture, when it is impossible to negotiate political conditions, the Bank should have refused, on technical grounds, to undertake an operation which at first it seemed to regard with favourable eyes.

(Repeated to India.)

No. 105.

Persian Transport Company to Foreign Office.—(Received May 19.)

Sir,

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, May 17, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 13th ultimo and the 2nd instant on the subject of a new route between Dizful and Sultanabad by way of the upper course of the Diz River.

I regret the delay in replying to these communications due to Easter coming in and the necessity of conferring both with General Sir Thomas Gordon and with Mr. H. F. B. Lynch. Neither of these gentlemen know the route which forms the subject of your communications. When Sir Thomas Gordon travelled from Burujird to Dizful in 1890 in the company of the late Mr. MacQueen, engineer-in-chief of the Transport Company started by the Imperial Bank of Persia, inquiry was made regarding all possible communications, but no mention was ever made of this route. *Prima facie*, one would suppose that the Diz River, which is followed by this route, cuts transversely the north-west-south-east ridges of the Zagros Mountains by a succession of "tangs" or gorges, as is also the case with the Upper Karun. The tendency of the Zagros is to dip along a line drawn south-westwards from Khoremad, and this circumstance would account for the fact that the ancient communications from the plains of Susiana to the Persian Tableland passed in that direction. But eastwards of this line it has always been supposed that the mountains are very high and almost impassable, in which case it would scarcely be possible to find an easy track.

We are, however, sending copies of your most interesting communications to our local agents at Tehran and Ahwaz, and instructing them to make all possible inquiries concerning this route. We are also asking them to endeavour, when circumstances shall permit of his departure, to send one of our engineers, if possible accompanied by our road administrator, Mr. Charters, to a place called Razan, near the spot marked on your sketch map Chalanchelan. There he will be able to form a good idea of the nature of the country; and, should it look encouraging, he would make a plane-table survey of the route. Both Mr. Charters and our engineer are at present busily engaged, and we scarcely know when they would have an occasion to make the journey. Our object in sending Mr. Charters would be that, should the route prove impracticable, he and the engineer might travel over the Khoremad route, and endeavour to arrive at an arrangement with the Lar tribes for the construction of a track across their country. Mr. Charters ought, from his long knowledge of the people, to be able to initiate friendly relations with these Chiefs on the basis that they should receive an annual subsidy in return for the policing of the road. Should this seem feasible, perhaps His Majesty's Legation could kindly arrange for the party to be accompanied by one or two of their gholams. The road via Khoremad would possess this advantage, that we should not be entirely dependent for both our roads upon the Bakhtiari; we should have two strings to our bow. As a through communication between the Karun and the cities on the Persian Tableland, the Dizful-Sultanabad route, whether you take it via Khoremad or by the Diz River, does not offer many advantages over the Ahwaz-Isfahan route already constructed. The distance by the former route to Tehran is not much less than by the latter. Its principal merits are expected to be—

1. That it might prove an easier route in respect of physical difficulties;
2. That it would open up the fertile regions about Burujird and north-westwards; and
3. That it would enlist the Feili Lurs in the service of commerce and render us not entirely dependent upon the Bakhtiari.

I beg to return the sketch map which you so kindly sent us, of which I have taken the liberty of sending copies to our local agents.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRANK BOTTOMLEY,
Secretary.

No. 106.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 20.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 19th instant, relative to the return to India of the Seistan Mission.

India Office, May 19, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 106.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

SEISTAN Mission started back for India the 15th instant

May 19, 1905.

No. 107.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 68. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 22, 1905.

FOLLOWING sent to India, No. 95, and repeated to Meshed and Seistan:—

I am told in confidence by the Foreign Minister that the Shah, on the eve of his departure, under renewed Russian pressure, consented to allow "provisional" access to the Seistan line officers for Russian telegraphists. This, of course, means an unconditional surrender on his part, made with a view to insuring that he will be well received in Russia. It was admitted by the Foreign Minister that the Persian Government could not, under these circumstances, refuse us equal rights, and the decision rests with you as to whether English telegraphists should be sent, and, if so, how many and how soon. The best information on this last point can be obtained from Meshed and Seistan.

No. 108.

Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas, dated May 26, 1905.

THE explanation of the outrage on Lieutenant Lorimer and myself as given by the Persian Forman to Captain Williams will hardly bear investigation.

1. I should doubt the Fath-es-Sultan being concerned in the attack. I do not know him personally, but he had been very friendly to Lieutenant Lorimer, had given him an escort through his territory in the spring of last year, and was, I believe, anxious to be on friendly terms with us. It is very probable that Melir Ali Khan, Sagwand, and the Begler Begi were implicated in the affair.

2. Several of the men mentioned by Captain Williams as being of the party who instigated the attack were with us from the commencement of the journey, and I am almost certain that at least one or two of them accompanied Lieutenant Lorimer on his way northwards.

From all I have heard since the event, my impression is that all the Mirs were unanimous as to the advisability of extracting more money from us, and were only divided as to the method of extraction and the amount which would satisfy them. The more moderate among them were, I think, disposed to accept the sum of 200 tomans, which, after much negotiation, I offered them, but the other party was the stronger, and eventually got the upper hand. I understand that His Majesty's Government recognises the desirability of increasing and maintaining British influence in the south-west corner of Persia, and nothing can be done towards the attainment of this object among the unruly tribes of Laristan until they are convinced that outrages, such as that perpetrated on Lieutenant Lorimer and myself, will be followed by severe

punishment to those concerned. If it had been possible to take advantage of the incident to induce the Persian Government or, in their default, the Bakhtiari or the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh, to thoroughly subjugate the strip of country which separates the territory of the two latter, we might then have been able to take some definite steps towards opening up the important trade road between Khuramabad and Dizful, and establishing some system of road guards along it. As it is, the incident has shown the impossibility of entering in to any engagements with these tribes so long as the country remains in its present state.

I do not therefore consider the arrangement proposed by Captain Williams at all satisfactory, but under the circumstances, and in consideration of the views put forward by Sir A. Hardinge in his despatch, it will probably be better to accept it. It should, I think, take the form of promising immunity from punishment to the men mentioned by Captain Williams, only on condition that the remainder of the fourteen men, whose names he has, are given up. I would, however, urge that if these men are brought in their punishment should be exemplary, and that the principal offenders at least should be put to death. Nothing short of this will, in my opinion, restore our prestige in Laristan, which has suffered severely from the perpetrators of the outrage being allowed to go for so long unpunished. As regards the fine proposed, 500 tomans seems an absurdly small sum, and is about a tenth of the value of the things they took. A fine in rifles would be far more effective. It is probable, however, that the Persian authorities may be trusted to extract from the tribe all that it is possible for them to get, and it is hardly necessary for us to make any stipulations on this point so long as we hold the Central Government responsible for the repayment of the sum advanced by His Majesty's Government as compensation for losses incurred by us.

(Signed) J. A. DOUGLAS, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Military Attaché, Tehran.

May 26, 1905.

No. 109.

*Post Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 27.)**General Post Office, May 26, 1905.*

Sir,

WITH reference to your letters of the 20th March last and the 13th ultimo, concerning the difficulties which have arisen with the Persian Customs authorities with regard to the parcel mails for the agencies maintained in and near the Persian Gulf by the Indian Post Office, I am directed by the Postmaster-General to send herewith a copy of a Report which, in accordance with the suggestion of the Secretary of State, the British Postmaster at Constantinople has been called upon to furnish relative to the treatment of parcel mails from the United Kingdom.

It will be seen that parcels addressed to His Majesty's ships and to members of the British Embassy and Consulate at Constantinople do not pass through the Turkish custom-house, but are delivered directly to the addressees. This practice was adopted with the knowledge of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whose concurrence was conveyed to the Postmaster-General in a letter dated the 1st May, 1897.

I am to add that the question of the treatment of parcel mails at Constantinople was brought again under the notice of the Secretary of State in 1901, in connection with the proposals which were then under consideration for negotiating a Commercial Treaty with Turkey, and in the Post Office letter of the 27th August, 1901, the Foreign Office was asked to acquaint the Postmaster-General of the result of the negotiations then in progress, so that steps might be taken accordingly. To this letter no reply seems to have been received other than the Foreign Office letter of the 29th July, 1902, which contained an amended draft of the Commercial Treaty with Turkey, showing Article XII of the Treaty as reserving the rights already enjoyed by British Diplomatic and Consular Agents and by British ships of war stationed at Constantinople.

I am, &c.

(Signed) H. BUXTON FORMAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 109.

British Post Office, Constantinople, to General Post Office, London.

Sir,

Constantinople, April 15, 1905.

I BEG leave to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 7th instant, and to submit, for the information of the Postmaster-General, the following particulars respecting the delivery to the British Post Office, Constantinople, of parcel mails from the United Kingdom:—

The sealed receptacles (boxes or baskets) containing a parcel mail are invariably brought direct from the steamer to this Office, without being submitted to any check or control by the Ottoman custom-house. After each parcel has been marked with its consecutive number, a form, similar to the inclosed "Modèle" 4, is addressed to the custom-house, and a Customs officer thereupon attends at the Office and transfers the parcels to his Administration.

The dockets (Specimen A) are then issued to the public, and the responsibility of the Post Office ceases with the delivery of the custom-house orders ("Modèle" 3) to the addressees.

A parcel remains unopened until applied for at the custom-house by the addressee. The Customs examination never takes place in the presence of an officer of this Office.

The procedure followed at the British Post Office with regard to the delivery of parcels to the Ottoman custom-house is based upon the Parcel Post Agreement between Austria-Hungary and Turkey, which appears to have come into operation on the 1st (13th) August, 1870. A copy of that document, to which I have added a few explanatory notes in the margin,* will be found annexed.

In February of 1897 the late Mr. Gold raised the question of having the parcels addressed to Her Majesty's ship "Melita," then stationed at Constantinople, delivered without the intervention of the custom-house. After inquiries made of the Foreign Office, the Postmaster-General, on the 5th May, 1897, gave his sanction to an arrangement whereby parcels addressed to Her Majesty's ships and to members of Her Majesty's Embassy and Consulate at Constantinople should be delivered without passing through the Turkish custom-house. Such "privileged" parcels are entered by the Office of Dispatch on a separate sheet of the parcel bill, in order that they may not come under the notice of the Customs officials.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. FERGUSON, *Postmaster.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 109.

Règlement pour les Objets passibles de Droits de Douane arrivant par la Poste Impériale Royale Austro-Hongroise

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

TOUS colis (paquets) seront remis à leur arrivée au Préposé de la Douane désigné par écrit par cette Administration, de la manière prescrite ci-bas.† Les groupes arrivés par la même voie seront retenus à la poste, et ne pourront être remis aux destinataires qu'après que les formalités prescrites par l'Article 7 de ce Règlement auront été remplies.

ARTICLE 2.

Les lettres contenant des correspondances, documents, papiers de commerce, papiers-monnaie, fonds publics, seront distribuées sans l'intervention du Préposé de la Douane.‡ Si, toutefois, une lettre ou dépêche paraissait contenir quelque objet de

* Printed as footnotes.

† The British Post Office, Constantinople, does not undertake the transmission of articles of value by means of "groupes" (bags).

‡ This procedure is followed at the British Post Office, with the difference that the addressee of a letter packet containing articles of value is given the option of having it returned to the sender if he objects to its dispatch to the Custom-house.

valeur quelconque, l'office de la Poste la retiendrait, en donnant avis au destinataire. Celui-ci, pour la retirer, devrait se soumettre aux formalités prescrites par l'Article 7 du présent Règlement relatif aux groupes.

ARTICLE 3.

A l'arrivée du courrier, soit par voie de terre, soit par voie de mer, le Directeur de la Poste fera dresser, en double copie, une liste de consignation (Modèle No. 1) pour les colis et paquets qui, d'après l'Article 1^{er}, doivent être remis au Préposé de la Douane. Pour les groupes, une note spéciale (Modèle No. 2)* sera dressée et remise au Préposé.

ARTICLE 4.

Le Directeur de la Poste, après avoir signé les deux copies de la liste de consignation, en remettra l'une au Préposé de la Douane, accompagnée des objets y désignés, et gardera l'autre contresignée par ce dernier comme reçu constatant la consignation de ces objets à la Douane, qui en assumera la responsabilité.

ARTICLE 5.

Les colis (paquets) ainsi remis et transportés à la Douane ne seront délivrés aux destinataires que sur l'ordre écrit (Modèle No. 3) au Directeur de la Poste, ou qui pour lui sera.

ARTICLE 6.

Le destinataire d'un colis ou paquet, avant de pouvoir l'emporter, sera tenu de l'ouvrir lui-même devant l'Administration de la Douane, soit pour payer les frais de Douane sur les objets qui s'y trouveraient, soit pour prouver qu'il ne contient aucun objet passible de ces droits.

ARTICLE 7.

Le destinataire d'un groupe, pour pouvoir retirer de la Poste, devra se présenter à la Douane avec le reçu de la Poste. La Douane, après y avoir apposé son cachet, le fera accompagner d'un de ses employés à l'office de la Poste, en présence duquel le dit groupe sera ouvert.* Dans le cas où il ne contiendrait aucun objet passible des droits de douane, le destinataire sera autorisé à l'emporter; dans le cas contraire, il devra, accompagné de l'employé, apporter les objets qui s'y trouveraient à la Douane, pour y acquitter les droits.


ARTICLE 8.

Le Directeur de la Poste avisera par écrit (Modèle No. 4) de l'arrivée du courrier le Directeur de la Douane. Ce dernier, ou qui pour lui sera, mettra son visa sur le susdit avis, pour constater l'heure à laquelle il lui aurait été présenté.

La distribution des correspondances, sauf les paquets (colis) aura lieu sans attendre l'arrivée du Préposé de la Douane. Celui-ci devra se trouver à la Poste, au plus tard, quatre heures après la présentation de l'avis de la Poste au Directeur de la Douane, ou qui pour lui sera, s'il a été présenté avant midi, ou le lendemain, jusqu'à 10 heures du matin (heures Françaises) s'il a été présenté à la Douane l'après-midi. Passé ce temps, la Poste, sans plus attendre le Préposé, procédera à la distribution des colis (paquets), en donnant immédiatement avis par écrit (Modèle No. 5) à la Douane de l'absence de son Préposé.

* Not applicable to the British Service (see note [*] on previous page).

Specimen (A).

E.  R.		No. of List _____
PARCEL POST.		Date of Dispatch _____
<p>Date Stamp of Receiving Office.</p> <p>Received of the British Post Office an order on the Imperial Ottoman Custom House for the delivery of Parcel bearing the number, marks, and address as below.</p>		
Number.	Marks.	Address.
<p>Signature of the Addressee _____</p> <p>Date _____</p>		
<p>[N.B.—This Form is to be signed and returned to the British Post Office.]</p>		
<p>G. & S. 8676 [6291] 5000 16/04 S.V.</p>		

No. 110.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 31.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 29th May, relative to the reported sale of Seistan Crown lands.

India Office, May 30, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 110.

Government of India to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 29, 1905.

PLEASE refer to the telegram of the 22nd May from Sykes, as to reported sale to Amin Izarb and Rais-i-Tajr of Seistan Crown lands.

I should be glad to know if you have any confirmation of the report. Such transaction would practically be tantamount to the whole of Seistan lands passing into hands of Russians, and would actually be so if the purchase money is obtained on loan from the Russian Bank. In either event, such a violation of the spirit of the Atabeg Azam's assurance of the 5th December, 1901, would call for the strongest possible protest.

I would invite your attention also to your telegram of the 20th April last, and to your despatch dated the 15th October, 1901.

(Repeated to Secretary of State.)

No. 111.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 31, 1905.

FOLLOWING sent to India, No. 96, and repeated to Meshed:—
Seistan Crown lands.

Your telegram of the 29th May.

All knowledge of the transaction is denied by Mushir-ed-Dowleh, who is convinced that there is no truth in the report, as the consent of the Persian Government would have had to be obtained to render such a sale valid. The Governor-General of Khorassan will be asked by telegraph whether any plan of the kind has been mooted.

No. 112.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 71.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, June 2, 1905.

I AM informed by the Hashmet-ul-Mulk that the Seistan Governorship has been given to him, but that he has hopes of getting Kain, and prefers to await the Shah's return here. Kain, meanwhile, has been given to the late Chief's heir and younger brother, Mahomed Ibrahim. As far as the Hashmet-ul-Mulk is concerned, we may regard future developments with comparative indifference, as we have discharged every obligation to him by obtaining for him the appointment to Seistan.

No. 113.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 72.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, June 3, 1905.

FOLLOWING repeated to India:—

Serious bloodshed between Armenians and Moslems has taken place at Nakhichevan, and has spread to Julfa, which lies just across the Russian frontier. Alarmist telegrams from Tabreez have reached the Valiabad, from which it would seem probable that that city may become involved in the disturbances.

No. 114.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 3, 1905.

WITH reference to my letter of the 11th ultimo, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,* relative to the punishment of the Direkward lurs for the recent attack on Colonel Douglas and Lieutenant Lorimer.

It will be observed that Sir A. Hardinge recommends a settlement on the lines proposed by Captain Williams, viz., that Mir Haji, the Chief of the Fazil Khan section of the tribe, should be assured that His Majesty's Government will not press for the punishment of his son and of the Mirs associated with him if (1) they will surrender Mir Nandar and certain other Mirs; and (2) will pay a fine not exceeding 500 tomans.

As suggested by Sir A. Hardinge, an opportunity has been taken of consulting Colonel Douglas on the matter, and a copy of that officer's observations is also inclosed.†

Lord Lansdowne proposes, if Mr. Brodrick concurs, to authorize Sir A. Hardinge—

* No. 96.

† No. 108.

to agree to the arrangement suggested by Captain Williams, on the understanding that the son of Mir Namdar and the other principal culprits shall, when surrendered, be subjected to exemplary punishment.

His Lordship would, at the same time, inform Sir A. Hardinge of Colonel Douglas' suggestion regarding a fine in rifles instead of in money.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GORST.

No. 115.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 3, 1905.

WITH reference to my letters of the 20th March and 13th April last, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from the General Post Office on the subject of the treatment, of the mail bags of the British Post Office at Bushire by the Persian Customs authorities.*

Lord Lansdowne would propose, if the Secretary of State for India concurs, to authorize Sir A. Hardinge to conclude an arrangement with the Persian Government on the lines of the procedure followed in regard to parcel mails from the United Kingdom arriving at Constantinople.

As regards the question of pressing for an apology from the Persian Customs officials (referred to in Sir A. Hardinge's despatch No. 21 of the 4th February), his Lordship would suggest, for Mr. Brodrick's consideration, that Sir A. Hardinge might be allowed to use his discretion in the matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GORST.

No. 116.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 97.)

My Lord,

Tehran, April 27, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Nasr-ul-Mulk arrived here on the 24th instant from Kurdistan and proceeded direct to the Shah's presence. He was very graciously received by His Majesty, who informed him that he wished him to attend him to Europe, and would, on his return to Persia, bestow on him an important office.

I called yesterday on the Nasr-ul-Mulk, whom I had known well when we were both undergraduates at Oxford, a circumstance which I imagine had something to do with his exile to Kurdistan simultaneously with my first arrival here as His Majesty's Minister, the Atabeg-i-Azam probably suspecting that our intercourse might influence me against himself. His Excellency spoke very openly about the general situation and the intrigues, which unhappily make up the life of this Court, but his own arrival in Tehran was too recent, and he had as yet seen too few people for him to form any opinion worth reporting.

It is generally believed here that on the Shah's return he will be given the Ministry either of Finance or of Foreign Affairs, and his appointment to an influential position in the Government would be advantageous both to Persian and British interests. He is one of the few surviving representatives of the progressive and enlightened views of the late Amin-ed-Dowleh, and like the latter, possesses the rare qualities of integrity and genuine patriotism. M. Naus, though he considered him timid, lacking in initiative, and not a practical politician, once observed to me that he was the only Persian statesman of his acquaintance who could be fairly described as honest.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

* No. 109

No. 117.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 99.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 10, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, in continuation of my despatch No. 96 of the 18th ultimo—

1. A translation of a Circular addressed by the Persian Government to the foreign Legations, in which it notifies to them the Shah's impending departure for Europe; and
2. A list of the suite accompanying His Imperial Majesty.*

This latter, as your Lordship will observe, is very large, the Ain-ed-Dowleh having taken with him several persons, unfriendly to his Government, of whose intrigues in his absence from Tehran he is afraid, and whom he wishes to keep under his own immediate supervision. The result is somewhat like that which would be produced if an European Premier, obliged to attend his Sovereign abroad, were to insist on also attaching to the party the chief leaders of the Parliamentary Opposition.

With a view to reducing the expenses of the tour the Grand Vizier has, by M. Naus' advice, entered into negotiations with Messrs. Cook and Sons. On previous Royal journeys, managed by the Atabeg-i-Azam, the public Treasury suffered more from the unscrupulous depredations of the courtiers than from the Shah's own personal extravagance. They were quick to discover that in Europe a hotel proprietor would pay, or allow his porter to pay, cash for parcels delivered or left at the hotel "caisse." Instead, therefore, of paying for their own purchases, whether of clothes, jewellery, wines, or other articles, they got the proprietor or hotel porter to do this for them, and then induced him to enter the amounts so paid on the Shah's bill under the head of "objets payés pour le compte de Sa Majesté." Messrs. Cook's agent, who is, I hear, to meet the Court at Baku, will now be intrusted with the duty of protecting the Persian Exchequer against these dishonest manoeuvres, and of denouncing any dignitaries attempting them to the vengeance of the Ain-ed-Dowleh. But with so large and unmanageable a suite as the Shah is taking, it will be impossible, notwithstanding the utmost vigilance, to prevent a good deal of robbery, or to keep the expenditure on the journey within the limits which due regard for the present critical state of the national finances should prescribe.

About 100,000*l.* have been collected for the tour. Of this amount 60,000*l.* have, I understand, been drawn from the Anderoon fund, or privy purse, as a loan from the Shah to the Treasury, repayable out of customs receipts, whilst the remaining 40,000*l.* are provided as a kind of insurance against dismissal by the Grand Vizier himself, in the form of an advance nominally made by Persian merchants at 15 per cent., and guaranteed by various public revenues. A wealthy Persian man of business, the Amin-es Zarb, has also been commanded to accompany the Court, and the command is said to have been followed by an ominous hint that his father robbed the State to the tune of about 200,000*l.*, and that a "benevolence," to use the euphemism employed by our own mediæval kings, is now expected of him. It is thought that he may pay a large sum down in order to escape the greater dangers to which the honour of attending his Sovereign to Europe may, before the tour is over, expose his purse. These various ingenious expedients have enabled the Shah to make a start, and His Majesty quitted Tehran at 9 A.M. on Sunday, the 7th instant, travelling overland by slow stages via Resht to Baku.

On the previous Tuesday, the 2nd instant, the Shah held a farewell *terde* at Bagh-i-Shah, a garden just outside the city gates, at which the Diplomatic Body had the honour of bidding him good-bye. An absurd incident, which could only happen in this country, marked the ceremony. The French Chargé d'Affaires had presented a claim for long overdue arrears of pay to certain French "chauffeurs" employed on His Majesty's motor cars, but the claim encountered the same passive resistance as is constantly opposed to those preferred by all other foreign Legations on behalf of their countrymen in Persia. Count d'Apehier therefore informed the Mushir-ed-Dowleh that unless it was settled before the *terde* he would publicly demand justice of the Shah in the presence of the assembled foreign Ministers. The

* Not printed.

threat proved effective, and before His Majesty entered the tent in which we were awaiting him the French Chargé d'Affaires was summoned to a private audience, and a pledge was given him that the money would be paid at once.

After the *levée* the Shah was graciously pleased to receive me in a separate pavilion, and I had the honour of some private conversation with His Imperial Majesty. I had not seen him to speak to for some time, and I thought him looking very aged and haggard (he was unshaven, and has of late lost most of his teeth), but his spirits were excellent; he replied to my Persian compliments in French, a sure sign of good humour, and chatted very cheerily about his journey, which is now his one absorbing preoccupation. He told me that he should probably visit Denmark and Sweden, not, however, officially (though I have since heard that there is a question of his being invited by those Courts), but that the details of his programme were not as yet absolutely settled. He is to have an official reception in Russia, my Russian colleague being most anxious to gain influence here for his Government by having him welcomed on Russian territory with much *éclat*, and is to be the guest for three days at Vienna of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria. This last arrangement I suspect to be due to the efforts of the Persian Minister at the Austrian Court, who lately married the daughter of the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, and probably sees in it a means of obtaining high Austrian decorations for his father-in-law and himself. He is to pay a second official visit to The Hague, and has been asked to be the guest at Paris of the French Government, whose invitation, however, he has not yet accepted. There is also talk of his going to the Liège Exhibition, and to the Regatta ("Semaine Nautique") to be held at the end of July at Havre.

The Valiahd, who arrived here on the 17th ultimo, and to whom the Foreign Ministers had the honour of paying their respects a few days later, has now formally assumed the Regency, and has already, by a few acts of vigour, inspired a wholesome terror in the minds of the population of Tehran. He began by sending for a list of all the convicts in the gaol, and finding among them a murderer who had some time ago killed a priest in the Province of Irak, had his throat cut in the principal public square. A threat that he would deal in the same drastic manner with the butchers and bakers of the metropolis has produced an immediate fall in the price of bread and meat, and several more executions of criminals have been ordered, to show that the Regent will stand no nonsense. A Cossack in the employ of the Russian Bank, who committed a murder when drunk in a brothel, but who, although believed to be a native of Trans-Caucasia, was abandoned by the Russian Legation to Persian justice, is, I hear, to be blown from a gun.

The day before the Shah's departure from Tehran, the Valiahd gave a luncheon in His Majesty's honour, of which over 1,000 guests partook, the etiquette here being that on such occasions all persons belonging to the Persian aristocracy, or who are, as the Germans would say, "Hoffähig," may attend without an invitation. The Shah made a public declaration that he had for this journey not contracted any foreign loan. M. Naus, who was one of the Ministers present, received from His Majesty a sword of honour studded with diamonds, a mark of favour which appears to have given much offence to the leaders of the recent agitation against him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 117.

Memorandum.

(Translation.)

I HAVE the honour to state, for the information of His Majesty's Legation, that the Imperial Court will leave Tehran on the 7th May, and will cross the Persian frontier at Astara about the 4th June, and a list of His Majesty's suite will be subsequently forwarded to you. His Majesty will proceed through Russia and Austria direct to Contrexeville.

Foreign Office, Tehran, April 27, 1905.

(Signed) Mushir-ed Dowleh.

No. 118.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 100. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 12, 1905.

IT may be convenient that I should submit to your Lordship as briefly as possible a connected account of the recent efforts made by the Persian Government to obtain further financial assistance from British and Russian sources.

After the rejection by your Lordship of the proposals made to you in December last through Mr. Grant Duff for an advance, really intended to cover the expenses incidental on the Shah's journey, and the subsequent failure of the Arfa-ed-Dowleh to obtain a loan from Russia, save on unacceptable political conditions, the Ain-ed-Dowleh seems to have realized that he must provide funds for the Royal tour out of internal resources, and he has done so in the manner described in my despatch No. 99 of the 10th instant. But the diminution of the customs receipts owing to the effect of the war on Russian trade—a contingency on which he had not counted—left him still face to face with a deficit on this year's Budget of about 200,000*l.*, representing the debts "on account current" contracted by his predecessor, and M. Naus pointed out to him that he ought to leave the Regent at least half this sum in hand, in order to provide for the needs of the Administration, not to speak of unforeseen eventualities, during the absence of the Shah in Europe. M. Naus proposed to procure this sum by a discount of the annual royalty of 4,000*l.* a-year due to the Persian Government by the Imperial Bank, and the Directors were invited on the 9th ultimo to sanction this operation, which the Persian Government contended was not an advance or loan in the ordinary sense of the term, and was therefore not barred by the concession. The sum asked for was 150,000*l.* at 8 per cent., an arrangement which, from a financial point of view, was an advantageous one to the Imperial Bank of Persia, since the advance was really a gold loan and the Bank had the money at its disposal.

The first reply of the Directors was encouraging. They said that they were considering the proposal favourably, and they dropped no hint of legal difficulties. Their next message, a few days later, was: "Look up undesirable, but we are consulting the Foreign Office." These replies were communicated to me under the seal of the strictest confidence by the chief manager here, who was aware that his principals were discussing the matter with your Lordship. He, however, merely told M. Naus that his proposal was under consideration, and that he hoped for an early decision. Soon afterwards, under instructions of a private and confidential character from his Board, he sounded M. Naus as to the possibility of a somewhat higher rate of interest, and of the assignation of a tangible ulterior guarantee. M. Naus demurred to the former suggestion, but offered to meet the latter by an undertaking to repay the advance out of customs revenue, should the Bank liquidate, owing to any unforeseen causes, before the expiration of the term over which repayment was to be spread. It was not until the 1st instant that the Directors first informed the Persian Government that they were precluded by the terms of their concession from accepting the proposal made to them.

It would obviously have been very imprudent of me, while these negotiations were in progress, to have volunteered an offer of a Government advance, subject to conditions as to the Ahwaz dam or preferential rights in Southern Persia. Such a step would have suggested the idea, which has, notwithstanding my reserved attitude, already entered the suspicious minds of the Persian Ministers, that your Lordship was discouraging the Bank from accepting their proposal with a view to forcing on them a political loan. Accordingly, when I saw the Grand Vizier on the 4th instant, and he complained to me of the unfriendly attitude of the Imperial Bank, I observed that I much regretted that the negotiation had been shipwrecked on a legal rock, and added with perfect truth that I had spontaneously reported to your Lordship, though you were not concerned in the affair, that the arrangement would in my opinion be a very advantageous one, if only the undoubted legal obstacles could in some way or other be turned. I went on to say that, as soon as I had learnt that this was impossible, I had requested authority from you to place a part or the whole of the money asked for by him for the Ahwaz dam at the disposal of the Persian Government, and that I was now empowered to offer him 100,000*l.*, which could probably be increased, on the sole condition that the proposed irrigation works on the Karun should be placed under British control. His Highness said this was a very stiff

condition; that if a large sum such as 400,000*l.* or 500,000*l.* were advanced by us for these works, it might be reasonable to insert a clause stipulating that they should be executed with our approval or in such a manner as to give satisfaction to the British Government ("bé rizayati doulali inglis"), though he cautiously remarked that in making this suggestion he was speaking unofficially, so that I must not attach too much weight to it. But both such a stipulation or one based on another suggestion I had thrown out on an earlier occasion—namely, an engagement to prohibit all foreign concessions in Southern Persia—would require very careful treatment, and whilst both might be usefully discussed with a view to a larger loan after the Shah's return from Europe, they could hardly be embodied in an agreement for a small advance, to be concluded within the next two days. I had always, he reminded me, been careful to impress on him that your Lordship could give no pledge that we should provide funds for the Ahwaz dam or should view the project with favour. All he now wanted was quite a small sum—between 50,000*l.* and 100,000*l.*—to keep the Government going during his absence. Could not your Lordship prove your friendship by persuading the Imperial Bank to oblige him to this trifling extent?

To this I answered that, with the best will in the world, the British Government could not prevail on a private bank to agree to a transaction which they had been warned was one of doubtful legality, and that the condition I was asking was more nominal than real, since in practice the Ahwaz dam could only be constructed with our approval. No Dutch or Belgian Syndicate would invest money in such an enterprise with the knowledge that the natives might be hostile and that the foreign Power whose influence and interests were paramount in Southern Persia was opposed to it. This last remark seemed to impress him; after a few minutes' silence he parried it with the rejoinder that, if the condition was more nominal than real, we need not lay much stress upon it, but he ended by saying that he would submit the proposal to the Shah. He added that his "other friend" (my Russian colleague) was prepared to find him money on easier terms, but he would prefer not to add, if he could help it, to the amount of Persia's debt to Russia. In this he was perhaps not entirely insincere, as he doubtless understands what a handle a fresh Russian loan would give his enemies.

After seeing his Highness I had some talk with M. Naus on the same subject. I need not repeat our conversation, which traversed similar ground. M. Naus was, however, more favourably disposed than the Ain-ed-Dowleh; discussed the best method for overcoming the objections which the Shah was sure to make to any apparent limitation of his sovereign rights, and frankly admitted that the approval of Great Britain was indispensable to the success of any Karun scheme. He told me that he believed the funds could be found in Belgium; that a financier with whom he was acquainted—a M. van Kerkhoven—had sounded him when he was last at Brussels about railways and public works in Persia; that they had talked over the Ahwaz dam project, and had both agreed that British co-operation would be essential. I have very little doubt that a Dutch-Belgian project is in the air, as the result of Herr van Roggen's suggestions, and that this was what the Ain-ed-Dowleh had in mind when he told me some time ago that "others, not Russians," would furnish the funds required if we should refuse to do so.

With regard to a loan from Russia, M. Naus confirmed the information already in my possession that M. de Speyer had recommended to his Government that a small advance, say, 200,000*l.*, should be made without conditions to the Persian Government, as a means of recovering the ground which Russia had lately lost by an investment which would be both safe and politically judicious, but his Excellency seemed rather to doubt this view being shared by the Director of the Russian Bank or his superiors in the Russian Ministry of Finance. Only very indirect overtures had, he said, of late been made to the Russians by the Ain-ed-Dowleh. His Highness had sent his Private Secretary to suggest to M. Grube that the offer of an advance without political conditions would greatly strengthen the friendship between the Persian and Russian Governments, but when M. Grube inquired whether this message was to be regarded as an official communication from the Grand Vizier, the Secretary beat a hasty retreat and said he had no instructions to make it. The Russian Bank Manager drily remarked that he could not treat this gentleman's private opinions as the basis for a negotiation between his Government and that of Persia. M. Naus mentioned that M. Grube had just seen the Grand Vizier and was to call on himself the next day. The object of his visit was, I suspect, the settlement of the floating debt, which the Russians have agreed to defer.

No further communications were received by me from the Persian Government

between the interviews above recorded and the Shah's departure on the 7th instant, and on the 8th instant a rumour reached me from various quarters that His Majesty had obtained an advance from Russia. I accordingly dispatched Abbas Kuli Khan to the Royal camp at Kerej, 24 miles out of Tehran, with the letter to the Grand Vizier, of which I transmit a copy, and to which I have received the inclosed reply. His Highness added verbal assurances that he would order M. Naus to negotiate with me, before going to the Russians; that he would greatly prefer to obtain the trifling sum he wanted from English sources, and that he begged me once more to appeal to your Lordship to help him with the Imperial Bank. M. Naus, who called on me on the 9th instant, and who had also been to Kerej, spoke to much the same effect. He said the Shah was strongly against the Karun condition, and he has told another person, from whom I heard it, that His Majesty suspects your Lordship or myself of having, in order to oblige him to accept it, blocked the scheme for redeeming the Bank royalties. The Persians are very sore with the Imperial Bank; they ask why, if there were legal objections, the Directors did not say so at once, instead of haggling for a month about the rate of interest and additional guarantees; and they evidently doubt their sincerity. In the meanwhile (so M. Naus informs me) they have asked the Russian Bank for an advance, on account current, of 500,000 tomans (100,000*l.*), but have so far received no reply. I inclose, for your Lordship's information, copies of private notes which have passed between myself and M. Naus on the subject of the Karun scheme.

It is perhaps a pity, if the Bank was not disposed to meet their views, that it did not say so plainly a month or three weeks ago. The ground would then have been cleared for an application to me by the Grand Vizier, and the necessary time secured for a negotiation. But now that the Shah and Ain-ed-Dowleh are half way to Resht, and can only be communicated with, in the absence of telegraphic facilities, with great difficulty, any such negotiation, which, in order to succeed, must in the earlier stages be verbal and confidential, is scarcely feasible. I cannot but fear that the net result will be that both the Bank loan and ours will fall through, and that some arrangement may be come to in Europe with the Russians, which I shall not be able to check, and which, though perhaps not immediately or actually dangerous, may entail regrettable consequences.

M. Grube, as I telegraphed to your Lordship on the 10th instant, left for Europe on the same day as the Shah. He gives out that he is going not to Russia, but for a complete rest to Austria, and thence to waters in Western Europe. I have very little doubt, from what I hear, that he will practically keep close to the Persian Court. In 1902 he was always with them; he was stopping at the same hotel as the Shah at Ostend, when I went there by your Lordship's orders to arrange the details of His Majesty's reception in England, and he crossed to London a few hours after the Persians, remaining there throughout their visit. Though the Ain-ed-Dowleh, whose policy, as M. Naus observes, is that of the ostrich, has told his Excellency to find money as best he can, it is almost certain that before the tour is over there will be need for the immediate provision of 100,000*l.* or 150,000*l.* to meet urgent requirements here, and should such an emergency arise, M. Grube may, by being close at hand, secure a position of some advantage. If the Shah were wise he would foresee this and try and settle the matter beforehand; but, as usual, he and his Ministers go on living from hand to mouth, and trusting to the chapter of accidents. They will not realise the danger of a succession of apparently small Russian advances "on account current," which have eventually to be consolidated, as in 1902, into a regular political loan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE

Inclosure 1 in No. 118.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Ain-ed-Dowleh.

(Private.)

Tehran, May 8, 1905.

It is rumoured that during the last two or three days the Persian Government have made a loan from Russia, and although I do not believe it, and have not as yet informed my Government of the report, I am sending Abbas Kuli Khan to your Highness to make inquiries on the subject, and I have the honour to request that

your Highness would be good enough to give me both a written and verbal reply on the point, in order that I should know to what extent the rumour is founded.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 118.

The Ain-ed-Dowleh to Sir A. Hardinge.

(Private.)

Kerej, May 9, 1905.

I HAVE received your Excellency's note through Abbas Kuli Khan, who also delivered your verbal messages to me. As you are aware, the rumours in question have no foundation, and no such steps have been taken. Your Excellency tells me that you do not believe the reports, and I myself am surprised that such unfounded rumours should have got about.

In saying good-bye to your Excellency I request that you will always inform me of your good health.

I avail, &c.

(Sealed) Ain-ed-Dowleh.

Inclosure 3 in No. 118.

Sir A. Hardinge to M. Naus.

(Confidentielle.)

Mon cher Ministre,

Téhéran, le 5 Mai, 1905.

ME référant à notre conversation d'hier soir, au cours de laquelle vous avez exprimé l'avis que la proposition de confier le projet du barrage d'Ahwaz à des personnes approuvées par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique vous semblait raide et de nature à rencontrer de l'opposition de la part du Schah, je m'empresse de vous rappeler que cette proposition, loin d'être nouvelle, nous a été faite, ou en tout cas suggérée, par vous-même lors des pourparlers du mois d'Août dernier. Je n'étais point sûr, hier soir, si mon souvenir à ce sujet était exact, mais je viens de réexaminer le dossier, et j'y trouve que, dans une lettre officielle du 19 Août, vous me proposiez comme condition de l'avance que l'emploi des fonds serait placé sous notre contrôle. Je vous cite textuellement ce que vous m'écrivîtes à ce sujet :—

“Ensuite il pourrait être négocié séparément pour une avance destinée aux travaux d'Ahwaz. Pour autant que, comme je le pense, l'Imperial Bank et son bailleur de fonds apprécieraient qu'il est de leur intérêt de voir aboutir cette entreprise, qui aurait pour résultat de placer un grenier d'abondance dans le voisinage immédiat de l'Inde Anglaise. Peut-être se contenterait-on pour garantie de l'avance que l'emploi des fonds avancés serait placé sous le contrôle d'un ingénieur de la Banque et que cette dernière aurait privilège sur le produit net des récoltes, jusqu'au complet remboursement de ses avances.”

J'ai envoyé copie de cette lettre à mon Gouvernement, et celui-ci sera, je crois, assez surpris d'apprendre qu'une proposition faite par lui dans cet ordre d'idées soit trouvée excessive par le Gouvernement Persan.

Je vous serais fort reconnaissant si vous vouliez bien parler au Sadr Azam cet après-midi de la question d'exportation des grains. Vous étiez, si je vous ai bien compris, d'accord avec moi pour penser que le chiffre de 2,000 kharwars par an ne pouvait certainement point être considéré comme dangereux pour l'alimentation publique, et que la vente des céréales par les habitants des villages-frontières du Béloutchistan, lesquels n'exportent pas de grains aux autres provinces de la Perse, aux quelques postes-frontières du côté Indien de la ligne, pouvait être autorisée sans danger.

Agréé, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 118.

M. Naus to Sir A. Hardinge.

Mon cher Ministre,

Téhéran, le Mai, 1905.

JE m'excuse de ne pas avoir répondu plus tôt à votre note du 5 de ce mois. La cause en est l'excès de mes occupations à l'occasion du départ de Sa Majesté.

Je tiens à acter que notre conversation était absolument particulière et que, comme je l'ai dit, je n'avais pas mission de traiter de l'affaire d'Ahwaz.

D'autre part, si mes souvenirs sont exacts, votre proposition consistait à réserver au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique l'agrément des entrepreneurs ou des concessionnaires auxquels les travaux du barrage seront éventuellement confiés. C'est sur ce point que, dans notre conversation particulière, j'ai émis l'opinion, toute personnelle d'ailleurs, que vraisemblablement Sa Majesté le Schah trouverait la condition excessive, puisqu'en somme cela revient finalement à lui enlever le choix du concessionnaire pour le réserver indirectement au Gouvernement Britannique.

Je m'étonne que vous trouviez dans ces paroles une contradiction avec ce que j'ai écrit antérieurement. Dans l'hypothèse de ma lettre officielle du 19 Août dernier, il s'agissait de réserver en effet au commanditaire éventuel le contrôle de l'emploi des fonds avancés par lui et d'en garantir le remboursement. Autre chose serait de renoncer en faveur de ce commanditaire au choix du concessionnaire.

Tout ceci est d'ailleurs prématuré, et si j'insiste, c'est que je ne désire pas rester sous l'appréciation qui tend à me mettre en contradiction avec moi-même.

Je n'ai pas manqué d'entretenir Son Altesse le Sadr Azam de la question des exportations de grains du Seistan, et j'ai vivement insisté pour qu'il vous soit donné satisfaction.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signed) J. NAUS.

No. 119.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 101. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 12, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report, in continuation of my despatch No. 40, Confidential, of the 28th February, that during the last week of April the principal merchants of Tehran closed their offices and shops and proceeded in a body to the Shrine of Shahabulazim as a protest against the vexations and unjust manner in which they declared they were treated by M. Naus' Customs Administration. Their complaints appeared to be very similar to those of the Tabreez merchants, who, as reported in my despatch No. 6, Commercial, of the 1st February, made a demonstration of the same nature against the Customs Department about three months ago.

Following so closely upon the clerical agitation against M. Naus, the movement was attributed by many well-informed persons to the political antagonists of the Grand Vizier, who, it was thought, by embarrassing his Highness with so difficult a question on the eve of the Shah's proposed departure for Europe, intended to bring about his fall, and there seems no doubt that the merchants were encouraged to a great extent by the Opposition parties. M. Naus has himself no doubt whatever that the prime mover in the agitation was the Sadr-ed-Dowleh, and that Minister was actually reproached with being the cause of the trouble by the Shah. He replied that if His Majesty did not desire a Minister of Commerce who would tell him the truth, or represent the real grievances of the Persian merchants to him, he would be willing to resign his post.

The merchants remained in sanctuary for nearly a fortnight, and demanded the removal of M. Naus and his Belgian employés from the Customs, accusing them, as the priesthood had done, of peculation on a very large scale, and asserting that they could bring documentary proof of the enormous profits which M. Naus personally derived from the customs. They sent a representative to His Majesty's Legation asking me to allow telegrams, reporting the steps taken by them, to be dispatched over the Indo-European telegraph wires to Isfahan, Shiraz, and Bushire, and to present to the Shah, on their behalf, the Petition against M. Naus, of which I have the honour to inclose a translation herewith. I need hardly add that I declined to discuss either proposal.

The Shah, fearing that his intended journey to Europe might be indefinitely

postponed if an understanding was not speedily come to with the merchants, who had obliged all the drapers to close their shops in the bazaars, deputed a number of courtiers, and subsequently the Grand Vizier himself, to negotiate with them, but their endeavours were unsuccessful, and it was only after the Valiahd had guaranteed that justice would be done to their cause that they consented to attend an inquiry which was held a few days ago by the Sand-ed-Dowleh as Minister of Commerce. It was decided at this meeting that any overcharge of customs duty which could be proved by the merchants would be refunded to them, and in order to avoid the recurrence of similar incidents, it was agreed that Delegates should be appointed by the Government to all the frontier customs stations in order to supervise the application of the Customs Regulations, and to act as mediators between the Belgian officials and the Persian merchants. It will be observed that this is practically the scheme outlined to me three months ago by the Minister of Commerce, as reported in my despatch No. 6, Commercial, of the 1st February. M. Naus, however, informs me that he himself at the time expressed his willingness to accept the intervention on behalf of the traders, in controversies with the local Customs authorities, of an independent Representative of the Government, much as the foreign Consuls intervened on behalf of their own countrymen's commercial interests, but I cannot think, knowing his somewhat imperious temper as I do, that he would have submitted to such a limitation of the powers vested in his Department unless he had felt obliged to do so.

The merchants profess themselves satisfied with the arrangement as a temporary measure, but they add, I do not know with what measure of truth, that the Valiahd made them a formal assurance that M. Naus would be dismissed on His Majesty's return from Europe.

It is thought that the promises made by the Government were not seriously meant and were only made to tide over the crisis and to allow the Shah to start for Europe. M. Naus has, however, told me in confidence that he contemplates retiring from the Persian service soon after the Shah's return, his idea being to obtain some high financial or administrative post in Belgium, and it is no doubt in his interests to withdraw voluntarily rather than to be forced to leave the country as a result of public demonstrations against him. He was, he said, weary of the continual and ungrateful labours which his present position imposed upon him, and of the intrigues and misrepresentations of which he was the object. His idea was to advise the Persian Government to appoint the Naser-ul-Mulk Minister of Finance and place the Customs Department under him. He would remain for a few months in Persia to assist the Naser-ul-Mulk in mastering the details and routine of the Customs administration, and would then ask permission to resign. His Excellency adverted in a very pessimistic tone to the outlook in Persia, and said the only chance for the country's salvation was an understanding between the British and Russian Governments with a view to the re-establishment of its financial equilibrium. I said I entirely agreed, but whilst we had always been ready to welcome such an understanding and discuss its conditions, the Russian Government, in its desire for a monopoly of political control in Persia and for the extension of all foreign influence, had, whenever such suggestions had been made to it, evaded any frank exchange of views. I added that both I, and I thought all my colleagues here, would see M. Naus' retirement with sincere regret, as we were indebted to him for the constant and speedy settlement of many matters, which if left in the hands of the Persian Ministers would be allowed to drag on indefinitely.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 119.

Petition from the Merchants of Tehran to the Shah.

(Translation.)

THE degree of our obedience to your Majesty is well known, and for the last six months we have been humbly petitioning your Majesty concerning the oppression we have suffered at the hands of the greatest traitor of the State, M. Naus. His oppression to us increases day by day, until it has become intolerable. As our Petitions apparently have not reached your Majesty, and if they reached, our intentions were misrepresented, it is our duty to submit to your Majesty, in view of our patriotism, the treachery of this person. As we were unable to bear his oppression any longer, and we had lost all hope of our Petition being submitted to your Majesty, we closed our offices

and shops five days ago and took refuge at the tomb of His late Majesty. We feel confident that if our Petition had reached your Majesty, you would not allow the mercantile classes, which are the most important of the State, to suffer so much cruelty and humiliation at the hands of a Belgian Jew. If your Majesty had known what would have been the result of giving so much power to this European Jew with which to oppress Moslem merchants, you would never have done so, and your Majesty would have taken severe measures against him as soon as you heard of it. It is our Petition that your Majesty will appoint some one to inquire into our complaints, and to report upon them in detail to your Majesty, for such action as you may deem just.

No. 120.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 102.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 15, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, in continuation of my telegram No. 65 of the 13th instant, a copy of the Agreement which I signed that day with the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, respecting the frontier at Mirjawar and the supply of provisions from Mirjawar, Ladis, and Seistan to the British outposts in North-Western Baluchistan.

The Article about the frontier is very brief. I had, in my original draft, inserted a clause defining the position of Padaha as "situated on the Indian side of the boundary claimed by Persia," but, as the Mushir-ed-Dowleh said the Shah did not know exactly where Padaha was, and had made no claim in relation to it, I thought it advisable, in view of the uncertainty of our own right to it, not to draw too much attention to this point. I contented myself, therefore, with a recognition of our possession of it, and with the insertion of the provision—on which stress is laid in the Viceroy's telegram of the 27th February—that the question of the frontier in that region should now be deemed settled, and no further claim be made respecting it.

The clause about our garrison at Padaha using "buckets or waterskins" to draw water from the tank at Mirjawar is, I need hardly say, of Persian origin. The object of the Persian Government seems to have been to prevent our trying to claim a right to bring water by means of a "kanal," or artificial channel, from Mirjawar to Padaha. I accepted it to please the Persians, though it reads rather grotesquely in a solemn diplomatic instrument.

The total annual amount of gain obtained by me for our Indian frontier stations is, as your Lordship will observe, 2,260 Tabreez "kharwars," or 260 more than the figure suggested by Colonel MacMahon if it should prove impossible to persuade the Persian Government to remove the embargo altogether. I made great efforts in this direction, and induced M. Naus to speak very strongly to the Ain-ed-Dowleh in support of my representations, but his Highness, though he relented a little and admitted that M. Naus was right in principle, said the embargo was an asset in the hands of the Persian Government, and should not be lightly given away. The concluding passage about customs duties and the non-export of grain from localities actually suffering from famine was insisted on by the Persians, but I insisted, on my side, on its being made clear that the harvest must be shown not merely to be threatened by inadequate rain, but to have been actually destroyed by locusts, blight, or some other exceptional visitation (such as a raid, a flood, or some such abnormal phenomenon), since otherwise the Governors would always pretend that there was a scarcity, so as to get the embargo put on and make money out of bribes paid to them by smugglers.

I pointed out, and the Mushir-ed-Dowleh quite agreed, that these illicit gains by the local Governors were of no benefit to the Persian Government, and that it was high time to put a stop to them. I told his Excellency, at the same time, that the additions proposed by him in consequence of orders received from the Shah's camp about customs and destruction of the crops, had not been submitted to your Lordship, and that though I thought you would accept them, I must make a formal reservation which would enable you, should you not approve of them, to withhold your assent to the arrangement in its present form, and I handed to him, before signing the Agreement, the note of which I have the honour to inclose a copy herewith.

I should mention that we had arrived at a complete understanding on the

7th instant, the day on which the Shah left Tehran, and I was ready to sign next day, but the Mushir-ed-Dowleh insisted on sending the text of the Agreement to the Royal camp at Kerej for the Shah's approval, and as the Court was on the move, it was not till the 13th instant that his Excellency was able to obtain an answer to a telegram which I had pressed him to dispatch on the subject.

Meanwhile, Colonel MacMahon had telegraphed that he wanted to start not later than the 15th instant, and I therefore thought myself justified, in view of your Lordship's orders to me, to make the best terms I could on the lines of the Viceroy's proposals, to close with the Persian offers without further delay, especially as I had succeeded in obtaining a much larger export than was originally agreed to. I trust that, under these circumstances, my action will be approved of by your Lordship.

The Persian Government have asked me to supply them with a map illustrating the Mirjavar frontier as at present settled, and showing Mirjavar, Padaba, and the watering-places mentioned in the Agreement. I have telegraphed for one to Colonel MacMahon.

The Mushir-ed-Dowleh also inquired whether a formal exchange of ratifications of the Agreement between the Shah and King-Emperor was in my opinion necessary. I have replied that as it was merely supplementary to the Haldich Agreement, I thought that this formality would probably not be essential, but that I would refer the point to your Lordship. I should be grateful for your instructions on the subject.

I have been desirous of incorporating in some form or other as part of a general settlement of outstanding questions on the Seistan and Baluchistan frontiers, a provision cancelling the prohibition of the acquisition of "Kholasajat" or State land in Seistan by British subjects, which was discussed in Mr. Grant Duff's despatch to the Government of India on the 15th October last, and respecting which the Government of India had desired me to make representations. I had accordingly raised the question in the note to the Persian Government of the 5th ultimo, of which I had the honour to forward a copy in my despatch to your Lordship of the 15th ultimo. The Mushir-ed-Dowleh, however, asked me not to press the point at the present juncture. He said that a similar prohibition had been enforced in the Province of Astrabad, and that the Persian Government were now trying, in connection with the presence of our Boundary Commission in Seistan, to induce the Russian Government to withdraw the Russian Commission and escort from Gumbad-i-Kaboo, and to substitute for the permanent residence there of a Russian Commissioner a system of meetings at stated intervals between the Russian and Persian frontier authorities, similar to those which have been instituted during the last few years for the settlement of border questions between the Nazim of British Beluchistan and the Governor of Persian Baluchistan. He added, somewhat to my surprise, that the Russian Minister has shown a disposition to fall in with the proposal, and that the Persian Government hoped to arrange for buying back the buildings erected by the Russians at Gumbad-i-Kaboo, and was in the meantime trying to stop any fresh acquisition of land or site by the Russians in that district. I rather doubt any early agreement being arrived at on this subject, especially now that Colonel MacMahon is leaving Seistan, but I think it quite likely that the hints which I have sometimes dropped to the effect that we might reasonably ask for a Frontier Commission in Persian Baluchistan similar to the one at Gumbad-i-Kaboo, have been used by the Persians as a lever for obtaining the withdrawal of the latter. I have, therefore, said that I would await the result of these negotiations before raising the question of our right under our Treaties to claim permission for our subjects in Seistan to acquire State lands for building sites or shops.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE

P.S.—I have omitted in the above despatch to mention the fact that the Persian Government have neglected to do the amount of ghee to be supplied from Mirjavar and Padaba, and have merely pointed to the wells in the Seistan. The matter was too unimportant to mention in this reply, but I have included the Agreement as there is not, I believe, usually any restriction on the export of ghee, and this article was only mentioned because Colonel MacMahon had specified a total of 80 kharwars as requisite for our post at the Baluchistan frontier. If it should be necessary to provide for a definite supply of ghee from the Mirjavar district, this can be easily arranged by an exchange of notes.

A. H. H.

Inclosure 1 in No. 120.

Agreement respecting Mirjavar Frontier, &c.

AGREEMENT between the Governments of His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India; and His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah of Persia, for the settlement of certain outstanding questions on the frontier of Persia and India.

HIS Excellency the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the Shah of Persia, and Sir A. Hardinge, K.C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Tehran, duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have concluded the following Agreement:—

1. His Britannic Majesty's Government withdraw the claim to the ownership of Mirjavar, put forward on its behalf in the year 1902, when a Persian custom-house was first established at that place. The Persian Government on its side undertakes to permit the British outpost at Padaba to procure (using buckets or waterskins for the purpose) the supply of water which may be necessary for it from the wells or tank situated at or near Mirjavar.

2. The two Governments agree by common consent to abandon the further examination by a Special Commission of their frontier line in this region which was proposed on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government in Sir A. Hardinge's note to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, dated the 6th April, 1902, and accepted by his Excellency in his note to Sir A. Hardinge of the 14th May, 1902. This frontier shall be definitely settled in accordance with the Agreement of 1896, and no further claim shall be made in respect of it.

3. With a view to the increase of friendly relations the Persian Government will permit the inhabitants of the frontier villages of Mirjavar, Ladis, and Duzdab to sell supplies, should they be willing to do so (to the annual amount of 700 Tabreez kharwars of grain), to the neighbouring British outposts on the Indian side of the frontier, and will also allow the unrestricted export of 1,500 Tabreez kharwars of grain and 50 Tabreez kharwars of ghee annually from Seistan for the use of the British frontier station of Rohat Kilah and other stations along the Nashki route. All the exports of grain and ghee will be liable to the payment of the customs duty levied on those of the most favoured nation. It is understood that this provision applies to normal years, and that the British Government will not demand the specified export of grain from one of the localities mentioned when such locality can be clearly shown to be suffering from actual famine owing to destruction of its crops by locusts, blight, or other exceptional visitation.

Done at Tehran on the 13th day of May, in the year 1905.

(Seal.) (Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

(Seal.) Signature of the Mushir-ed-Dowleh.

The Undersigned, His Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, hereby declares that in signing the Mirjavar Agreement of the 13th May without reference to His Majesty's Government of the alterations in the original text introduced in compliance with the orders from His Majesty the Shah of the 12th May in order not to cause further delay in the withdrawal of the Boundary Commission from Persian territory he reserves the right of His Majesty's Government, should it not accept the amendments in question, to withhold its assent to the Agreement.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 103.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 15, 1905.

THE Mushir-ed-Dowleh has adverted in conversation with me to Colonel MacMahon's Seistan water award. His Excellency first informed me, about a fortnight ago, that he had received a telegram from the Yemin-i-Nizam criticizing the award somewhat unfavourably, but professed inability to judge of this criticism until the text of the document was before him. As Colonel MacMahon had not wished me to betray the fact that I was aware of the terms of the award before its delivery I abstained from expressing any opinion on the subject, but said I would telegraph to that officer. A few days later, by which time I could have had a reply from Seistan, I gave his Excellency a brief summary of its main points, with a view to eliciting the impression produced by it before the receipt by the Persian Government of the Yemin's comments. The clause laying down that Persia could not alienate the water rights secured to her without the consent of Afghanistan, which the Yemin-i-Nizam had told Colonel MacMahon would give offence at Tehran, was not only not objected to, but at first sight approved by the Mushir-ed-Dowleh as both reasonable in itself and as strengthening Persia's position in relation to other Powers. The stipulation that Persia should be entitled to one-third of the Helmand water, and not, as his Excellency seemed to think she ought to be, to at least one-half, appeared to him open to some objection; but I pointed out that the whole of the Upper Helmand belonged to the Afghans, whilst it only formed the boundary between Persian and Afghan territory for a short distance, and this argument silenced if it did not convince him.

The full text of the award, with the Yemin's observations on it, has now reached the Persian Government, and the Mushir-ed-Dowleh has informed me that it has been submitted to the Shah. I asked him if he did not think it very just and satisfactory to Persia, and it appeared to me, from the rather guarded terms in which he expressed himself, that the only point which had so far occasioned any heart-searching to the Persian Government was the clause about the Persians being entitled to only a third of the water, as to which he said he would talk with me again after receiving the Shah's commands. In the meantime His Majesty's departure for Europe has for the time stopped further discussion of the subject.

The Heshmet-ul-Mulk, in the course of a recent visit which he paid me, referred to the Seistan water question. He knew nothing, of course, about the award, but he said that what the Persians feared was the construction by the Afghans of a canal from a point near Bander-i-Komal Khan through the now desert Tharakan tract. It is probable that the omission of any reference to this contingency in the award, especially when its terms were known to the Russians, may give rise to some criticism here. On the whole, however, the decision seems so far to have been received at Tehran less unfavourably than the Yemin-i-Nizam had told Colonel MacMahon to expect.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 104.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 15, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 48 of the 12th instant, a copy of the Agreement which, as reported in my telegram No. 65 of the 13th instant, I signed on that day with the Mushir-ed-Dowleh for the construction of a telegraph line from Henjam to Bunder Abbas.

When my draft was first submitted by his Excellency to the Shah, His Majesty objected—

1. To the Henjam end of the line being worked by the English office;
2. To the formal insertion of the provision that no foreign subjects, except those in the service of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, should be employed on the line, against which he wrote, "No, we must be free"; and
3. To the English telegraphist at Bunder Abbas.

I succeeded, with the help of the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, in overcoming the two latter objections, but the Shah was obstinate about the first, and although I pointed out in the note, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy herewith, that he would be merely throwing money into the sea by keeping up a Persian office at Henjam side by side with the English one, only to do the same work twice over, he said he would provide it out of Persian funds and had given orders that M. Naus should erect the building. M. Naus, I may observe, says that no such order has been received by him and that he would be very much embarrassed as to how to execute it.

After discussing the matter with Mr. New, chief of the Persian section Indo-European Telegraph Department, who was of opinion that the existence of a Persian office side by side with ours would make no difference whatever, I decided, subject to your Lordship's approval, to accept the Persian amendment. It is, as your Lordship will observe, clumsily worded; the Persian expression "rajé be kharejeh," is untranslatable, as its literal meaning is "relating (or belonging) to foreign," but my Oriental experts say that what it really means is, "messages for or from abroad"; messages for or from abroad, from, but apparently not to, Bunder Abbas, having to pass through the Persian office. I thought it, however, wiser to let it pass as it stood, without attempting to render it more lucid or precise. The point would never have been raised had I not been instructed by your Lordship to specially stipulate for the Henjam end of the line being worked in the English office, for this followed by implication from Article 1 of the Agreement which provides for a line "connecting the Indo-European station at Henjam" with Bunder Abbas, a provision which will enable us to terminate the line in our own office, letting it pass through, or effect a junction with, the Persian office, and to some extent to control the latter. A few other verbal alterations were introduced in compliance with the Shah's wishes, i.e., in Article 1 the word "temporarily," and "after which they shall return," which were evidently dictated by the intense Persian suspicion of our political designs and to guard against a permanent occupation of Kishm by British signallers or telegraph ships.

Whether the Persian office or staff will be provided, at least in the near future, seems to me problematical. I have repeatedly asked permission from the Persian Government to erect or repair (i.e., in Seistan) canvaserais, or to execute other public works for the convenience of our traders, and the answer has always been that "the Persian Government will do the work at its own expense." Months have passed, however, in spite of repeated reminders from the Legation, without anything being attempted to give effect to these promises, or, if an attempt is made, the Persian official sent to carry it out drives the labourers obtainable away, as actually happened in the case of a kanat for our telegraph station at Nasratabad Sipeh (Keriman), by robbing them of their wages, or pretending that he has been sent to extort an extra tax from their village. The Ain-ed-Dowleh has, I imagine, no wish to waste money in the present critical state of the finances on useless luxuries, and if when the line is opened next autumn—it cannot now be begun till after the hot weather—the Shah asks him about the Persian office, he will probably content himself with replying that "the necessary orders have been issued," and we may hear no more about the matter. The practical difficulties will be considerable as the Arab villages of Henjam already resent the presence of the Persian customs Mirza, and I have been in correspondence with the Government of India as to the effect which may be produced on their relations with our telegraph station by our protection of this representative of Persian authority. Of course, the situation will be greatly modified if Henjam should become, as Dr. Schneider is urging the Shah to make it, an international sanitary station under the protection of the Persian flag.

It may also be anticipated that the new Russian Consul at Bunder Abbas will make an attempt, notwithstanding Article 4 of the Agreement, to introduce a Russian signaller into the office there. My Russian colleague tells me that the opening of the Bunder Abbas Consulate is not likely to take place immediately and that it is not yet decided who will be appointed to it, though M. Orsenko, now Russian Consul in Seistan, is mentioned as a likely candidate.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 122.

Agreement respecting Construction of Telegraph Line from Henjam to Bunder Abbas.

HIS Excellency the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia and Sir Arthur Hardinge, K.C.B., His Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Tehran, representing the Indo-European Telegraph Department of the Government of India, on the other part duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, has concluded the following Agreement:—

1. The Persian Government having resolved to construct a line of telegraph to connect the Indo-European Telegraph station at Henjam with Bunder Abbas across Kishun, and His Majesty's Government having authorized the Indo-European Telegraph Department to provide the engineers and materials necessary for the construction, it is agreed that two European engineers with the necessary employés and labourers shall be temporarily placed by the Department for the purpose at the disposal of the Persian Government, and that the telegraph ship belonging to the Department shall, as soon as the season permits, lay the two submarine ends between Henjam and Bunder Abbas respectively, and after completing the work they shall return.

2. As soon as the line is complete and the cost of materials and charges of the engineers and telegraph ship have been paid, the line shall be handed over to the Persian Ministry of Telegraphs. The Persian Government shall also have a telegraph office built at Henjam at their own cost, and appoint Persian telegraphists. The Bunder Abbas line shall be connected with the Persian telegraph office at Henjam, and all messages for abroad which are received from Bunder Abbas, and which are to be communicated by the English telegraph office at Henjam, shall be received by the Persian telegraph office and immediately transmitted to the English telegraph office.

3. The charges to be made by the Indo-European Department for the services of the engineers and telegraph ship shall not exceed 75,000 rupees, and the payment of the above sum is guaranteed by the Persian Government.

4. The declaration of the Persian Government that it will not employ foreign, *i.e.*, non-Persian, subjects in the working of the line shall be held to preclude it from employing at the usual charges such subjects in the service of the Indo-European Telegraph Department for any repairs to the submarine cables or other works which may be necessary in connection with the maintenance and upkeep of the line, nor from allowing at the Bunder Abbas office a British signaller to deal with State messages sent on behalf of the British Government to and from its Consulate at Bunder Abbas, should the British Government desire it.

Done in duplicate at Tehran on the 13th day of May in the year 1905 equivalent to the 8th day of Rebbi-ul-Avvel in the year 1323 A.H.

(Seal.) (Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.
(Seal.) Signature of Mushir-ed-Dowleh.

Inclosure 2 in No. 122.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh.

Your Excellency,

Tehran, April 29, 1905.

WITH reference to our recent conversations, I have the honour to inform you that I accept the insertion in Article 1 of the Bunder Abbas Telegraph Agreement of the word "movaggaftan" which you were ordered by His Majesty the Shah to introduce into it.

The other alteration desired by His Majesty, namely, the provision that there should be a Persian Government office at Henjam side by side with the Indo-European telegraph office, is less easy to give effect to, as the estimates made by the British Government did not contemplate two offices on Henjam, and will therefore have to be revised.

From our point of view, the chief inconvenience of two offices will moreover be, firstly, that every message going to or coming from Bunder Abbas will be delayed by the necessity of transmission from the Persian to the Indo-European office; and,

secondly, that there is only barely enough water in the tanks at Henjam excavated by the Telegraph Department, when it established its station in the time of the late Shah, to suffice, especially in summer, for the necessities of that station itself.

The Customs mirza, as your Excellency is aware, has now asked to use the telegraph tanks, and, in accordance with M. Naus' wish, the telegraph officials are supplying him with water wherever possible, but the water difficulty will be a good deal increased if a second telegraph station has to be supplied as well.

I am inquiring as to the extra cost which the establishment of such a station will entail on the Persian Government. The estimate for the Bunder Abbas station was 8,500 rupees (or 3,400 tomans). It may be presumed that, allowing for the expense of bringing materials and labourers from Bunder Abbas to Henjam, a similar station could be built on that island for a little more, say, at most, 4,000 tomans, which would have to be added to the estimate of 75,000 rupees. This does not, however, provide for the necessity of digging fresh wells or bringing water from elsewhere, or condensing it, all of which may involve additional—and at present uncertain—charges.

A greater objection from the Persian point of view seems to me to be that this additional station is likely to absorb for a good many years all the profits accruing from the line to the Persian Treasury, and will oblige me to reconsider the statement which I made in an official note last summer that it would prove financially advantageous. Assuming the upkeep of the station to be the same as that allowed for at Bunder Abbas, we get an annual charge of 6,400 rupees, or about 2,560 tomans for each place, or a total of 5,120 tomans a-year, plus 600 tomans for upkeep and repairs, say, a total of 5,720 tomans a-year. The line ought to earn this in order that the Persian Treasury should not lose by it, and it may be hoped that at some future date it will do so, but for the next few years this is hardly possible. It is very difficult to calculate what it really will earn at first, and it is only by a further reference to India that I can get the figures necessary to arrive at an approximate calculation. But Mr. New, in a note of which I enclose a translation, tells me that the Persian office at Bushire earns about 120% a month, but that the whole earnings are probably a little greater. We may, therefore, put them at 135% a month, or 9,720 tomans a-year. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the two stations at Bunder Abbas and Henjam earn together one-third of this amount, we get a yearly revenue of 3,240 tomans, and deducting 600 tomans for annual recurring charges, we get a yearly revenue of 2,640 tomans a-year. This, however, will only just pay for the single station at Bunder Abbas, together with the upkeep of the line, whereas if to it is added a second station at Henjam, the loss to the Persian Treasury will be 2,560 tomans a-year, or a little more than half the total revenue, and in view of the difficulty of getting Persian employés acquainted with foreign languages to reside, except for high pay, on an unwholesome and desert island like Henjam, probably more. It is therefore worth considering whether any advantage whatever beyond the doubtful one of causing half an hour's delay for each telegram, will be gained by the throwing away of some 3,000 tomans a-year in order that two sets of men should do twice over the work which one set of them could do in half the time. It will be remembered that Henjam can never be a real terminal station, as it has no traffic or population of its own, and every message which passes into the Persian station there from or to any other part of Persia must also pass over the Indo-European line and through the Indo-European station, since between Henjam and Bushire there is no Persian telegraph line as there is between Bushire and Tehran, but only the English submarine cable; further, the indirect increase of revenue which the Persian Government will derive as time goes on owing to Bunder Abbas becoming a telegraph station and thus an increased centre of trade, will not be helped by a second station on Henjam, which can never be more productive than it is at present. To establish such a second station would be almost like paying an expensive staff to intercept all telegrams passing between Bushire and Tehran or Tehran and Resht at Kushik-i-Nasrat, Chappar Khanah, or at Kerej or Yengi Imam. I cannot therefore but think that your Excellency has not adequately explained to His Majesty the object and nature of my Government's proposal, and that it has been suspected that it was not merely intended to secure rapidity of telegraphic communication, but either to acquire for political purposes a knowledge not otherwise obtainable, by the Indo-European Telegraph Department, of all messages which might pass to and from Bunder Abbas, or else to deprive the Persian Government for the benefit of the Indo-European Telegraph Department of a portion of the profits of the new line. But His Majesty in his wisdom and sagacity will see at once, if he will deign to look more

closely into the question, that this supposed first object will not be made easier by having one station at Henjam, since all messages must eventually come into the Indo-European Telegraph Department's office there, even if there is a second Persian office, whilst the other object will anyhow not be obtained, inasmuch as under the earlier Convention all the receipts from local traffic on the Indian lines within Persia itself are handed over to the Persian Government. The creation of the two offices side by side on Henjam can therefore produce no effect except to diminish the receipts of the Persian Government, delay telegraphic communications, and perhaps furnish occasions for disputes.

If, however, notwithstanding all these inconveniences, the Persian Government still prefers a second station of its own at Henjam, I am prepared, subject to reference to His Majesty's Government, to strike out the clause proposed by them to which I understand that His Majesty takes exception, and to conclude the agreement without further delay and without waiting for the information necessary in order to alter the present estimates for the cost of the work to be done by our engineers. When I ascertain exactly what the additional cost of such a station with the necessary wells and water supply will be, the charges for the works might be added to the amount guaranteed by the Persian Treasury for the construction of the entire line. It might, for instance, be possible to reduce the expenses by uniting both offices in a single building, or else, as has been suggested by Mr. New, by a division between the Persian and English staffs at Henjam of the hours of the day during which each shall have the use of the line, and the final settlement of these details might be reserved for further discussion. You will remember that Bunder Abbas will communicate through Henjam, not merely with Persia, but also with Europe, India, and Muscat.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 123.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 105. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 15, 1905.

IN my despatch No. 3 of the 2nd January last, informing your Lordship of the arrival of the new Russian Minister, I had the honour to report that he seemed disposed, from such slight indications as could then be noted, to substitute more conciliatory methods for the somewhat harsh and dictatorial ones which had marked his predecessor's relations with the Persian Government.

My observation of his attitude during the four or five months which have elapsed since he entered on his duties tends to show that this forecast was correct. In his discussions with the Persian Ministers respecting the Russian telegraphists in Khorassan and Seistan, the Russian position at Gumbad-i-Kaboos, and the conditions of a fresh Russian loan or advance to Persia, M. de Speyer, who is as suave and gentle as M. Vlassoff was the reverse, would appear to have done his utmost to meet the views of the Persian Government, and to enjoin and flatter where his predecessor preferred to menace. In the matter of the Meshed and Kuchan riots, he has discouraged, greatly to the disgust of the Russian Consul-General in Khorassan, proposals for a vigorous insistence on compensation or for the dispatch of a Cossack force to Meshed. Whilst not concealing his dissatisfaction with the obstructive and unfriendly attitude of the Grand Vizier towards Russia and Russian, as, indeed, towards all foreign interests, he has ministered to the vanity of the Mushir-ed-Dowleh by inducing Count Lamsdorff to let him deliver to his Excellency an autograph letter, expressing the appreciation felt by the Russian Government of his sympathetic dealings in the various questions treated between them. I have not seen this letter, but have obtained the inclosed copy of the reply written by, or rather for, the Mushir (who knows no French) in acknowledgment of it, which is couched in most meddlesome terms. He has laboured to arrange for the Shah a very brilliant reception during his passage through Russian territory, and has forwarded a suggestion from His Majesty for an interview with the Emperor of Russia. The Emperor's reply to this overture, which was sent yesterday to the Shah's camp, was to the effect that he could not meet His Majesty on his way to Western Europe, but hoped he might be able to arrange to do so on his return journey through Russia to Persia.

M. de Speyer has striven to cultivate, since the arrival of the Valiahd, very friendly relations with that Prince. He is helped in this by M. Chapchal, His Imperial Highness' Russian teacher, who goes daily to the Russian Legation, and keeps him fully informed of whatever passes at the Palace. In the Valiahd's present Russophile temper, all this serves to strengthen the position which my Russian colleague is endeavouring, with much patience and tact, to re-establish.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 123.

Mushir-ed-Dowleh to Count Lamsdorff.

M. le Ministre,

J'AI eu le plaisir de recevoir des mains de M. le Conseiller Speyer la lettre par laquelle votre Excellence s'exprime en termes si amiables sur les efforts que je me plais d'apporter dans les négociations en cours entre nos deux Gouvernements.

Cette appréciation de votre Excellence est non seulement une reconnaissance de mes vœux intimes, celle est encore—et je suis heureux de le constater—une nouvelle preuve de sa ferme intention de contribuer avec mon Gouvernement à l'heureuse entente qui est si parfaitement profitable à nos deux pays. Et j'ai d'autant plus lieu d'espérer dans ce sens que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale l'Empereur de Russie vient de donner un nouveau témoignage de son désir dans le choix d'un fonctionnaire aussi éprouvé que M. Speyer, dont l'exquise amabilité et la parfaite distinction lui ont gagné la bienveillance de Sa Majesté Impériale le Schah et la sympathie de tous.

C'est aussi avec un sentiment agréable que je constate que le Ministre de Perse à Saint-Petersbourg a mérité votre amiable appréciation, ce qui ne manquera pas, je suis sûr, de lui attirer les faveurs de son auguste Souverain.

Je dois ajouter que Mouchir-ul-Mulk, en me signalant les dispositions de votre Excellence, m'a plus que jamais encouragé à persister dans la voie que j'ai adoptée.

Je saisis, &c.
(Signé) MOUCHIR-ED-DOWLEH.

* No 124.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 106.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 17, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of despatches from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez, proposing (1) that he should take advantage of the present situation at Urumiah to arrange a friendly settlement between the Dasht Kurds, on the one hand, and the Christians and their missionaries, and (2) suggesting certain steps for the protection of the Majid-es-Saltaneh against the vengeance of the Valiahd, whose displeasure he has incurred owing to services rendered by him to British and American interests.

I transmit herewith copy of a telegram which I have just dispatched on both these points to Mr. Wratiskaw. I think, and the American Minister agrees with me, in view of the difficulties attendant on the exemplary punishment of the Kurds by the Persian Government, that there is a good deal to be said in favour of the proposal that they should be encouraged to make peace with the Christians. But such a peace may involve a modification of some of the terms on which the American Government has insisted, and it is obviously advisable before negotiations are opened by Mr. Wratiskaw that we should know to what extent the basis on which they are to be conducted is likely to be approved at Washington.

I have received a letter from the Rev. O. Parry, head of the Archbishop of Canterbury's Mission at Urumiah, fully admitting that the strictures in which he had indulged on the action of His Majesty's Government and representatives were based on imperfect information, and expressing appreciation for the services rendered by them both to the British and American missionaries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 124.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 20. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tabreez, April 15, 1905.

WITH reference to previous correspondence concerning the Dasht Kurds I have the honour to report that the new Governor of Urmī, Inam Kuli Mirza, states that he has received no orders whatever to take any steps to punish them. The only instructions he has are to protect the missionaries. In this respect he appears to be doing his best, but the situation at Urmī continues very unsatisfactory.

According to apparently reliable information which reached the missionaries the Kurds of Dasht are exasperated by the capture of their friends who were sent to Tehran, and hope to seize a European as a hostage for their safety. This menace prevents both Englishmen and Americans from venturing into the country to the west of Urmī, where their work mainly lies, and will, as was the case last year, render it impossible for them to pass the summer in their country quarters, which are situated in the same direction. There is, in addition, the constant danger of a night attack on the American College, which is over a mile from the town, and which the Governor's patrol cannot be relied on to protect efficiently for ever. An attempt has already been made to scale the college walls by night, presumably by the Kurds.

There appear to me to be two alternatives in order to put an end to a situation which is almost unbearable for our fellow-countrymen and the United States' citizens at Urmī.

The first is that a punitive expedition should be sent to give the Dasht Kurds such a lesson as will cow them into good behaviour for the future. Inam Kuli Mirza declares that on receipt of the requisite instructions and funds he can do this with his local resources, and I have no doubt that this alternative is by far the best. On the other hand in at most four weeks' time it will be too late, and operations would have to be postponed till next winter. It is possible though not probable that Nizam-es-Saltanah is empowered to take energetic action against the Kurds, and I will ascertain whether this is the case as soon as he arrives. If not, it is hardly likely that the Valiahd as Regent will order an expedition, judging from his Imperial Highness' behaviour hitherto. He would certainly prefer to pay the 20,000 dollars still claimed conditionally by the United States' Legation (which he could extort from Majid-es-Saltanah and other persons obnoxious to himself), and he has in any case another year before this payment would fall due.

The other alternative is to make peace with the Kurds. At present they are impressed by the capture of their friends, and still more so, perhaps, by the downfall of their protector, Mirza Hussein Agha, and we could pose as generous victors ready to grant terms to the vanquished. After another year's impunity they and the world in general would naturally look on matters in a different light, to say nothing of the danger to which the missionaries are exposed meanwhile. By the offer of our good offices to effect the release of the captives at Tehran it should be possible to persuade them to allow one or more of their leading men to reside permanently in Tabreez or Tehran as a guarantee for their good behaviour, and it would also be most desirable at the same time to effect a reconciliation between the Kurds and their Christian neighbours, who have for some time past been in a state of abject misery on account of the constant hostilities to which they are exposed.

Should you approve of this latter course it would be desirable for you to revisit Urmī, and consult the government itself, as the Kurds have naturally a trust whatever in the Persian authorities.

I have consulted Dr. Chamberlain, who arrived here last night and find that, though anxious to abstain from the punishment of all Mr. Tabreez's murderers, he would prefer settlement on the above lines to another year's suspense and danger with uncertain success at the end of it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. C. WRATISLAW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 124.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 21.)

Sir,

Tabreez, May 1, 1905.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 19 of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to state that, if authorized by your Excellency, I propose to have an interview with the Dasht Chiefs as soon as possible after reaching Urmī. It is probable that on hearing of my arrival they will again write to me protesting their innocence, which would afford a good excuse for entering into communication with them. Otherwise I should have to let them have a hint that I am willing to meet them. There may be some difficulty about the place of meeting, as it would perhaps be rash on my part to enter their district at present, while on the other hand they are nervous about their own safety, since their friends were treacherously captured in the winter. I hear from Urmī that they have declined the Governor's invitation to a friendly meeting for this reason, but I have little doubt that they will accept my assurances, and meet me on a neutral ground.

I should then tell them that the missionaries had interceded with your Excellency for the lives and liberty of the prisoners at Tehran, and that you had instructed me to report on the situation and ascertain whether it was absolutely necessary for the safety of the English and Americans at Urmī that a stern example should be made, or whether mercy could be shown, if the Kurds gave satisfactory assurances of good behaviour in the future. This would lead up to the question of a leading Kurd residing in Tabreez or Tehran, for a time at least, as a guarantee for the Europeans at Urmī. The difficulty here would be that the Kurds could not be sure that the Persian Government would not use such a hostage as the means of putting on the screw in other questions, and it might be awkward for us to guarantee that this would not happen.

I am confident that the Kurds themselves will be anxious to come to terms, and that they already regret bitterly the misdeeds which led to the present situation. It is hard, however, to predict what the attitude of the Valiahd will be. It would seem natural for him to welcome any solution of so troublesome a question, but on the other hand he likes to fish in troubled waters, and might resent the matter being settled over his head. On the whole I venture to suggest that it would be better not to consult him for the present, but to submit a *fait accompli* to him subsequently.

The question of a reconciliation between the Kurds and the Christians of Mawana is, of course, a subsidiary one, and I can only urge it in a friendly and unofficial way.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. C. WRATISLAW.

Inclosure 3 in No. 124.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 22.)

Sir,

Tabreez, May 1, 1905.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 20 and the portion of your telegram No. 19 concerning it, I have the honour to report that my proposal to transfer or mortgage Majid-es-Saltanah's property to Mr. Stevens would and commit His Majesty's Legation to any pecuniary responsibility towards Mr. Stevens, who would advance nothing out of his own pocket to Majid-es-Saltanah. The idea is that such a transfer would be only formal, and merely entered in order to preserve the property from possible depredation on the part of the Valiahd when the owner leaves the country. The present stewards would administer the estates, under Mr. Stevens' control, and pay the revenues (estimated at 15,000 toman per annum) to him, and he would remit them to Majid-es-Saltanah charging a commission for his services.

A difference of opinion might arise at the beginning with the Valiahd or the Governor-General and necessitate a reference to Tehran, and all Mr. Stevens asks is that the Legation should support his claim and warn the Persian authorities off.

With regard to Majid-es-Saltanah's desire to leave the country, it is possible that, if, as I hope, the Urmī question is wound up in the near future, the Valiahd will

take his knife out of this gentleman and he may be in no further need of assistance, nor even wish to leave Persia. Otherwise with your permission I could appoint him honorary Mirza to this Consulate-General, give him a temporary passport as a British protégé, and see him safe into Turkey, after which he could look after himself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. C. WRATISLAW.

Inclosure 4 in No. 124.

Sir A. Hardinge to Consul-General Wratislaw.

(No. 21.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 17, 1905.

NEGOTIATIONS with Kurds respecting affairs in Urumiah.

Your despatches No. 21 of the 1st instant and No. 22 of the 1st.

Proposals for making peace with the Kurds have been submitted by United States' Minister to Washington, and we are of opinion that it is advisable to await answer of United States' Government before entering into any engagements which State Department might not be prepared to implement. Until therefore you hear further from me, you had better delay your departure for Urumiah.

I have been indirectly sounded by Valiahd with regard to the Urmi question; he may perhaps have come to the conclusion that the wisest course for him would be to effect a friendly settlement.

With regard to Majid-es-Saltaneh, would fictitious transfer of his property to Stevens be consistent with inability of foreign subjects to hold real estate in Persia?

No. 125.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 108. Secret.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 17, 1905.

I RECENTLY asked the Mushir-ed-Dowleh if he could give me an official reply to the note I had addressed to him respecting the terms in which the Railway Agreement had been renewed in 1899.

His Excellency said that he believed the Agreement had been ultimately renewed for five years, and not, as was sometimes alleged, for ten, but that there had been no formal Convention or even exchange of notes, the Shah having merely minuted in the above-described sense a note or Memorandum which was now in the possession of the Russian Government. The mode of renewal, though not the term for which the Agreement was renewed, as described by the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, is thus identical with that which I had the honour to report to your Lordship in my despatch No. 238 of the 31st December, 1904. The Persian Government, added his Excellency, could not verify the fact as to the term of years without referring to the Russian Legation, and they thought it undesirable by doing this to draw Russian attention to the question. He regarded it as certain that when the Agreement expired, as he believed it would at the close of the present year, the Shah would decline to renew it.

I asked if his Excellency really meant to say that no accessible record of the terms of so important an understanding existed in the archives of the Persian Foreign Office. He said the Atabeg-i-Azam might have such a record among his private papers, but that, as far as he knew, it was not among those in his own Department. Incredible as such a statement may at first sight appear, I am not prepared to say for certain that the Mushir-ed-Dowleh was lying, or that the Memorandum which I sent home to your Lordship in my despatch referred to above represents the Agreement in its final form, as several changes were made after signature in the loan contracts with Russia at the instance of the Shah and on the advice of certain Ministers unfriendly to the Grand Vizier. The Persian Foreign Office was obliged, for example, to apply to us for certain original documents in connection with the Mirjavar controversy, and only a few days ago the Grand Vizier's Private Secretary asked me for copies of the Persian Government's Loan Agreements with Russia, alleging that they were wanted at once and could only be procured with a good deal of delay and difficulty from the Mushir-ed-Dowleh.

I said I should be glad if the Mushir could give me an assurance in writing, either officially or in the form of a private letter, that the Agreement whenever it expired

would not be renewed. His Excellency answered that he had suggested to the Shah doing this, but that His Majesty deprecated any official correspondence on the subject, as he did not want it to get to the knowledge of the Russians, of which there was always a risk owing to possible leakages in the Foreign Office, whilst a mere private note from himself as Foreign Minister would, in order to carry any authority, require the Royal approval. My own personal opinion is that the Agreement is for a longer period than five years, that this shorter term was given out at the time as the one which had been accepted in order to render the transaction less odious, but that scarcely any Persian except the Shah and the Atabeg-i-Azam really knows the exact truth, and that the Shah has not sufficient confidence in the discretion of his Secretaries and is too afraid of the discussion to which a correspondence on the subject might lead to authorize the issue of any written statement, however unofficial, on so secret and delicate a point. I think it probable that His Majesty, though by no means anxious to see railways in Persia, will be reluctant to assent to a formal renewal of an undertaking unpopular with his subjects and inconsistent with his own independence, but that he shrinks from saying as much at the present juncture in writing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 126.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 109.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 17, 1905.

IN my despatch No. 87 of the 15th ultimo I had the honour to transmit to your Lordship a despatch from Captain Williams, respecting the complicity of the various Direkwend tribal sections in the attack on Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer, and I stated that I was inclined to think that Captain Williams' proposals afforded the best basis under the circumstances for a settlement of the affair. Since then, however, I have received telegrams from Captain Williams reporting that the situation has entirely changed. He states that when it was found that no real force was being produced against the tribes, Fazil Khan Sagwand, hitherto in opposition to Mehr Ali Khan, whom Captain Williams suspects to be the real instigator of the outrage, has altered his attitude, while the Biranawand tribe have also broken out into rebellion against the Government. He estimates the total number of tribesmen now arrayed against the Shah's authority at 15,000, and he adds that there is no chance of the Ferman Fermalah's getting back the Salar-i-Moazzem, who with the greater part of the Government troops has gone off in the direction of Arabistan, in order, so it is said, to coerce the Beni Truf Arabs, though the Grand Vizier has informed me that he is to attack the Lurs from the south. It would, however, have been necessary, even to bring about the settlement proposed by Captain Williams, that a strong Persian force should be stationed at Khoramabad to keep the various tribal sections in order; and as, owing to the exhaustion of the Persian Exchequer and the Shah's journey to Europe, it will be extremely difficult to get any troops sent down to Luristan, I considered Captain Williams' continued presence at Burujird to be no longer useful, and on the 24th ultimo authorized him to return to Kermanshah.

Captain Williams informs me that when the Ferman Fermalah resumes operations after the crops have been gathered, it will, in his opinion, be essential to revert to the plan indicated in my despatch No. 87, as he believes the effectual subjugation of the Direkwends to be beyond the power of any force which the Persian Government could under existing conditions put into the field.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 127.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 110.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 17, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship the usual monthly Summary of Events in Persia not reported on in separate despatches.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 127.

*Monthly Summary of Events not reported on in separate Despatches.**Tehran.*

REPORTS are current that M. Naus will shortly leave for Europe, to join the Shah's suite at Contréxéville, or, according to others, to try and raise a loan for the Persian Government, and that in this way the promise given to the merchants and to the clergy that he will eventually be removed will have the appearance of being kept. M. Lavers, his second in command, who has been almost as violently attacked as M. Naus himself, starts within the next few days for Belgium on six months' leave, and his place will be taken by M. Priem, former Director-General of Customs in Azerbaijan.

The Cossack whose condemnation to death by the Valiahd was incidentally mentioned in Sir Arthur Hardinge's despatch No. 99 of the 10th May, has not yet been executed, and it is generally alleged that His Imperial Highness, on receipt of a bribe of 9,000 tomans from the Russian Bank to spare his life, has discovered that the man is a Russian subject and should be sent for punishment to Russia.

The remains of the Shah's mother, who died fourteen years ago, were removed yesterday from the shrine of Shahabdulazim, to be transferred for interment at Kerbela. The suite accompanying the relics of the deceased Princess, and the other incidental expenses connected with their conveyance to the sacred city, will, it is estimated, cost 70,000 tomans (about 12,000*l.*), an expenditure which the Persian Treasury at the present juncture cannot well afford to spare.

The Prince-Governor of Shiraz, the Shoa-es-Sultaneh, telegraphed for permission to come up and see his Royal father at Enzelli before His Majesty's departure, which was, however, refused. His Imperial Highness is very uneasy at the prospect of the Valiahd's administration, and has been sounding His Majesty's Consul as to the possibility of transferring his property by a mortgage, or some other such transaction, to the Imperial Bank of Persia.

Tabreez.

The anxiety and tension felt in Tabreez as to a Mahomedan rising against the Christians was relaxed as soon as the Valiahd left for Tehran. It is said that his Highness, not being at all anxious to go to Tehran, himself encouraged it by spreading false reports, so as to make believe that his presence in Tabreez was necessary.

The Armenians, in order to appease the Mussulman classes, defrayed the expenses of a great religious ceremony in the mosque in their quarter of the city in honour of the recently deceased Mujtehed of Kerbela, Agha Fazel Maneeghani. The actual function, however, nearly became the cause of a serious disturbance. The service was to last for two days, and the first day passed off quietly enough. The question then arose as to which Mujtehed was, on the second day, to have the honour of uttering the last word in the ceremony. In sanctity, age, knowledge of theology, &c., Haji Hassan Agha was undoubtedly the superior of the Imam Jume'h, who, however, by his pushfulness, wealth, and number of adherents, makes up for his deficiencies in more technical qualities. It became known that there would be a brawl next day between the two rival parties, and the rowdies of Tabreez prepared to sack the

Armenian shops, when the local authorities, with surprising and commendable energy, intervened and prohibited the second day's service altogether.

The Commercial Mission reached Yezd on the 16th March, and was accorded a very satisfactory reception by the Governor, the Moayyed-ed-Dowleh. Mr. Grahame, His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz, met them there on the 20th March. While there he had some conversation with the Governor on the subject of the road robberies which have become so frequent in the neighbourhood. The latter's efforts were chiefly directed towards shielding his father-in-law and Vizier, the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, by casting the blame on the Kwam-ul-Mulk and the Shiraz authorities. It seems, however, that the chief offenders are the Lashwani tribe, who are fiefs of the Mushir-ed-Dowleh. From motives of thrift he lately dismissed the road guards supplied by the Central Government, and replaced them by Lashwani tribesmen; the latter are more inclined to join in than to prevent robberies.

It is remarkable that the two most disturbed districts in Central Persia, namely, Kumarij and Abarguh, are both fiefs of the Mushir-ed-Dowleh.

With reference to the attack near Mehrabad on Mr. Grahame's party, the sum of 300 tomans has been raised from the responsible district by the Zil-es-Sultan and handed over to Mr. Preece as compensation to the wounded sowar, and in payment of the expenses incurred by Dr. Palmer travelling from Shiraz.

While at Yezd, Mr. Grahame took the opportunity to mention to the Governor the grievances of certain Yezd Parsees who claim British protection. The Moayyed-ed-Dowleh assented to admit, at any rate, unofficial British intervention in their cases where their national status is not quite clear. The Parsees are not satisfied with the uncertainty of their position; they hold landed property in the province, and by Treaties foreigners are only allowed to hold land for business purposes; their present insecurity, they complain, adversely affects their material prosperity. The arrival of Mr. Bagdaley at Yezd, and his recognition by the Persian Government as Vice-Consul, may remedy matters somewhat.

Mashed.

On the 4th April a young soldier, accused of murder, was publicly executed, or rather slowly killed, with circumstances of a peculiarly revolting character.

A number of reports at Mashed tend to prove that on the outbreak of the recent riots the Russian Consul-General telegraphed direct to Ashkhabad for troops, and that from 100 to 300 Cossacks, one battery of artillery, and two battalions of infantry were actually put under orders from Mashed.

The Russian Minister at Tehran then heard of it, and telegraphed orders that the troops were not to start. All through the affair there has been a considerable divergence of opinion between M. de Speyer and the Russian Consul-General, who is said to have threatened to resign unless he is allowed to take up a strong line.

Meanwhile the Russians have put in a claim for compensation, which the Persian authorities of course said was excessive. At this juncture the Beglar Begi of Mashed discovered a lot of the looted property in the house of a Turk, a Russian subject, and this has allowed the Governor-General to repudiate all responsibility on the ground that the riot was caused by the quarrels of Russian Mussulmans with Russian Armenians. The Russian Consul-General of course replies that the loot was conveyed to, and hidden in, the Turk's house by the Beglar Begi himself.

It is not at all clear what has happened in respect to the pay of the Russian quarantine cordon in Khorassan, but it appears that, after the Governor-General had for a long time evaded finding the money, the Customs Department stepped in, and that the money has been disbursed by M. Castaigne.

The Karguzar's management of British cases has been so unsatisfactory, and he himself has become so incompetent and idle, even for a Persian, that when a particularly bad instance of injustice occurred His Majesty's Legation, at Colonel Minchin's request, addressed a strong note on the subject to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, requesting that he should be at least severely reprimanded.

Kerman.

The merchant whom Mr. Miller had induced to agree to act as Russian agent at Bam has now, owing to pressure exerted by the local Khans, decided to decline the post.

With reference to the kanat, or water channel, which was partially constructed

by the Telegraph Department at Nasratabad Sipeh (*vide* despatch No. 132 of the 19th July to Foreign Office), and which the Persian Government decided to make themselves, it appears that a mamur was actually sent down to have the work done. He engaged labourers and set them to work, but as he refused to pay them any hire they took sanctuary in the telegraph premises. The work is now less advanced than it was when abandoned by the Telegraph Department.

Representations have been made to the Persian Government on the subject by His Majesty's Legation.

Resht.

Two Armenians were recently arrested at Resht for smuggling in arms contrary to regulations. On being taken to the Prince-Governor they refused, even under the bastinado, to state with what object they had done so. They were then stripped and red-hot pots were applied to their bare skin, when they avowed that they were "agents provocateurs" employed by the Russian Bank to get up riots between Armenians and Mussulmans and to distribute fire-arms among the latter. Shortly afterwards they were claimed by the Russian Consulate as being under their protection.

These facts cannot be vouched for as absolutely correct, as they emanate, not from His Majesty's Consul, but from several independent Persian sources in Tehran. There seems, however, to be some truth in them, though how much it is not easy to say.

The new Russian Consul-General, M. von Brunner, arrived at Resht in March. Although the weather was excellent, he was so little satisfied with his new post that he immediately requested to be allowed to resign his appointment. He accordingly left Resht about a fortnight after his arrival there. He had spent the larger part of his official career in Leipzig and other German towns, and, to judge by the stories which reach Tehran, he expected Resht to be a very different place to what it actually is.

No. 128.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 73.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, June 5, 1905.

FOLLOWING sent to India:—

Persian Government have received a telegram from the Yemin-i-Nizam, reporting the arrest, by order of the Ameer, of the Afghan Boundary Commissioner, and his dispatch to Kabul as a prisoner.

No. 129.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, June 7, 1905.

PERSIAN loans.

My telegram No. 63 of the 10th May.

I reported in my despatch No. 118 of the 27th May that the Russian Government at first refused to make an unconditional advance of 100,000*l.* to Persia, but I understand that they are now willing to lend this amount, and have informed the Persian Government to that effect, conditional on the settlement of all questions at issue between the Governments. As the questions of the Russian telegraphists on the Seistan line and of a small frontier incident near Ardebil have been settled, and the Russian Minister says that there are no questions pending, M. Naus hopes that the money will be obtained for him in a few days by the Acting Bank Manager, who has again telegraphed to St. Petersburg.

A different and wider sense may, however, be attributed to the above conditions by the Russian Government.

No. 130.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 10.)

Sir,

India Office, June 9, 1905.

I AM directed to acknowledge receipt of Sir E. Gorst's letter of the 3rd instant as to the treatment of the mail bags of the British Post Office at Bushire by the Persian Customs authorities.

In reply, I am to state that Mr. Secretary Brodrick concurs in the proposal of the Marquess of Lansdowne to authorize Sir A. Hardinge to conclude an arrangement with the Persian Government on the lines of the procedure followed at Constantinople in regard to parcel mails from the United Kingdom. The details of the proposed arrangement will, presumably, be settled by Sir A. Hardinge in consultation with the Government of India, to whom a copy of your letter and its inclosures will be communicated by this week's mail.

As regards the question of pressing for an apology for the recent action of the Persian Customs officials, Mr. Brodrick agrees that the matter may be left to Sir A. Hardinge's discretion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

No. 131.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 10.)

Sir,

India Office, June 10, 1905.

IN reply to Sir E. Gorst's letter of the 3rd instant, relative to the punishment of the Direkward Lurs for the recent attack on Colonel Douglas and Mr. Lorimer, I am directed to say that Mr. Brodrick concurs in the course proposed by the Marquess of Lansdowne.

Mr. Brodrick observes that the facts reported in Sir A. Hardinge's despatch No. 109 of the 17th May, received with your letter of the 7th instant, have not led him to modify the terms of the settlement which he has proposed.

I am, &c.

(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

No. 132.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 112.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 21, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my despatch No. 102 of the 15th instant, that the Mushir-ed-Dowleh has been informed, in reply to a telegraphic inquiry addressed to the Director-General of Customs in Seistan, that Padaha is, according to the Holdich Agreement, in Persian territory. His Excellency was at first a good deal disturbed by this discovery; at an evening party two days ago at the Turkish Embassy he took me aside and rather reproachfully implied that I had tricked him, saying that he would be held responsible for the recognition of Padaha as British in the Protocol of the 13th instant. He also sent for M. Naus, who reluctantly quitted a game of bridge, and asked him if it was really the case that Padaha belonged or ought to belong to Persia. If it did, and this was proved by the map which Colonel MacMahon had promised me, could not the arrangement we had just signed be altered.

I explained, and so did M. Naus, that the positions both of Mirjawar and of the British post at Padaha in relation to the Holdich boundary could only accurately be verified by the delimitation on the ground itself, which both Governments had agreed in the Protocol of the 13th May to abandon. The boundary in question was an unknown line between two as yet unascertained points, viz., the junction of the so-called Talab and Mirjawar Rivers, and the nearest point (in a straight line running from that junction) on the Mirjawar watershed. It was conceivable that an accurate survey of this line might show Mirjawar to be just within British or Padaha just within Persian territory, but the object of the Agreement which the Shah had ordered his Excellency

to sign was to obviate the necessity of laborious inquiries into a question which was of no practical importance to either Government and to settle it on the basis of *uti possidetis*. M. Naus observed that he thought it probable from our maps that Padaba was in Persian territory and certain that Mirjavar was not; but he admitted that the maps on which his conjecture was based were unreliable. The Mushir-ed-Dowleh, who reverted to the subject at an interview yesterday, is, I believe, a little reassured by the explanations which have been given him, but I am inclined to think that it will be better not to propose any formal exchange of ratifications (even if such a course should be technically more correct) which would give the Persians any loophole for reopening the question.

The excessive sensitiveness displayed by the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, who in this reflects the views of the Shah, as to the possible alienation even of an acre of waterless desert (for he knows that Padaba has to get its water from Mirjavar) demonstrates, I venture to think, how impossible it would have been for me to induce the Persian Government to agree to Colonel MacMahon's "red line." One reason for this temper is of course the knowledge that Russia will exact compensation in the north for any slight rectification made in our favour in the south-east. There is still a small strip of disputed boundary in Azerbaijan, in the celebrated plain of Mogan (where the election of Nadir Shah as King of Persia was ratified by the army and people), and the Emperor of Russia consented, on the occasion of his last interview with the Shah, to let this question remain for the present open. The Mirjavar affair, as your Lordship knows, has been attentively watched by the Russians, and I think it very probable that the acceptance by Persia of the red line would have been the signal for revived claims by Russia in the more valuable Mogan district. The Persians at any rate believe this and would undoubtedly have obstinately insisted on the strict letter of the Haldich boundary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 133.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne,--(Received June 12.)

(No. 113. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 22, 1905.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 63 of the 25th ultimo, relative to the proposed appointment of a Military Attaché at Meshed.

Your Lordship does not direct me to express any opinion on the proposal, but I observe in the letter of Sir E. Gorst to Sir A. Godley, of the 11th February, which is inclosed in your despatch, that I may be called upon to furnish you with my views.

Your Lordship is doubtless aware that Captain Smyth, who was employed by His Majesty's Government in 1903 to report on the route of the Baghdad Railway, has been stationed for the past year at Meshed, with the provisional rank of Military Attaché to His Majesty's Consul-General in Khorassan. His duty is to collect intelligence, primarily military, but also political, from Transcaspia, Turkestan, Bokhara, Herat, and other regions of Central Asia in which we have no public Agents, and copies of his reports to the Government of India are regularly transmitted to your Lordship through His Majesty's Legation at Tehran.

The expenses of his mission are at present, I believe, entirely borne by the Government of India, and I presume that it is now contemplated that his position should be regularized.

I am not yet sufficiently acquainted with the nature and amount of the work falling to His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed to express any decided opinion as to whether in normal times he could unite with his ordinary functions the duties now performed by Captain Smyth. I hope in the course of the summer to visit Meshed and inform myself fully as to local conditions there. But I should be inclined to think, *a priori*, that the ordinary routine of the Consul-General's work and the general superintendence of British and Indian interests, political and commercial, in the vast province of Khorassan would leave him very little leisure for the special business at present devolving on Captain Smyth. What your Lordship and the Government of India, I imagine, want at Meshed is an intelligence office, which can obtain for you

full, early, and reliable particulars of all military movements and political events in Russian Central Asia and on the Russo-Afghan frontiers, similar to that which Sir Reginald Wingate used to procure when I was in Egypt for the Cairo War Office from Ondurnan, and, indeed, from the whole Soudan. Now this, I think, is work which, if it is to be properly and thoroughly done, requires the concentrated and undivided attention of one man, and cannot well be combined with the daily multifarious duties of the Agent and Consul-General at Meshed, though it would naturally be supervised by the latter officer. I am further of opinion that, at any rate while the Russo-Japanese war lasts, there is always a possibility of trouble, owing to a variety of easily conceivable causes, in the Middle East, and that it may be of considerable importance to British and Indian interests—which are, after all, identical—that we should be accurately informed of all occurrences and prepared for all possible contingencies in Central Asia. Meshed is, for these purposes, the best and nearest post of observation, and if, as seems probable, the war lasts for some time longer, I do not believe that money spent on the continued maintenance there of a capable officer for the purposes described above need be regarded by Government as thrown away. I should therefore welcome the continuation of Captain Smyth's more or less informal appointment as Military Attaché at Meshed, at least till the termination of hostilities in the Far East, and the allocation to him, whether from Indian or British revenues (it being beyond my province to express any opinion on this point), of whatever sum may be found necessary to procure the complete and early intelligence desired. Further than this I would not at present venture to go. The close of the war may greatly modify the entire political situation in this part of the Asiatic continent, and the question of the permanent appointment of an Intelligence Officer for Central Asia, under the designation of Military Attaché at Meshed, may then be usefully re-examined on its merits.

I am sending copies of this despatch, for any observations which they may have to offer on it, to the Government of India and to His Majesty's Consul-General in Khorassan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 134.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne,--(Received June 12.)

(No. 115. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 22, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Acting Consul at Resht, reporting the completion of the Resht-Kazian road and the present state of the harbour works at Enzeli. Both these enterprises, as your Lordship may remember, are in the hands of Russian concessionnaires, and their execution, by enabling ships to enter Enzeli in all weathers and transfer goods to carts or camels without the need of shipping them on to lighters between Enzeli and Piribazaar, will prove a great advantage to Russian trade via the Caspian.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

Inclosure in No. 134.

Acting Consul Churchill to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 15. Confidential.)

Sir,

Resht, May 16, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Kazian-Resht road can now be used for vehicular traffic, the work having been expedited in order that His Majesty the Shah should be able to arrive at Enzeli.

With regard to the port works at Enzeli, I believe little, if any, progress is being made, and I was confidentially told by my Russian colleague a short time ago that, in consequence of a report made by him to St. Petersburg after a visit of inspection, the chief Government engineer, Sultanoff, was recalled.

M. Olféiev would not give me reasons for this step, but his tone implied that the amount of money drawn does not represent the value of the work done. I understand that the equivalent of about 50,000*l.* has so far been spent, and if this is really the case there can be no doubt that the port, when completed, will have cost the Russian Government many times its value.

The relations between the Russian Consulate and the Russian Bank continue strained, owing, I think, to the manager of the latter considering the Banque d'Escompte to be politically much more important than the Consulate. M. Olféiev tells me that he is watched by bank spies, and, further, that he now suspects that the Russian telegraphist communicates the Consulate telegrams to the Banque d'Escompte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALFRED CHURCHILL

No. 135.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 116. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 24, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report with reference to my telegram No. 68 of the 22nd instant and to previous correspondence that on receipt of telegrams from Meshed and Seistan reporting that the Russian signallers in Khorassan were to be allowed access to the Persian offices on the Meshed-Seistan line, I called a few days ago on the Mushir-ed-Dowleh and asked if the information received by me was correct.

His Excellency replied that, as I was aware, the Persian Government had long insisted that these signallers should be recalled, and had refused to afford them the facilities for which they asked. On the eve of the Shah's departure, however, the Russian Government having renewed its pressure, the Shah had consented, as a provisional Concession, to allow them access to the telegraph offices, pending the discussion of this question at the interview which he hoped to have with the Emperor of Russia in the course of his European tour, and which, as I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 105 of the 15th instant, the Emperor has suggested may take place on the return journey. The Shah had, however, insisted that the signallers should only be allowed to use the telegraph offices "temporarily," the term "movakatur," which he dictated in this connection to the Grand Vizier being, as your Lordship will notice, if you refer to my despatch No. 104 of the 15th instant, the one inserted with a similar object in Article I of the Bunder Abbas Extension Agreement. The Mushir-ed-Dowleh begged me to regard the above information as strictly confidential, and suggested that if I wished for an official communication on the subject from the Persian Government, I should write him a note, the substance of which he would telegraph to the Shah at Resht, and to which he would send whatever answer His Majesty might direct. I said I presumed I might regard it as self-evident that whatever privileges were given on the Meshed-Seistan line to Russian signallers would be equally conceded to any English signallers we might depute; his Excellency replied in the affirmative, saying that there could be no question of differential treatment.

I have very little doubt that this Concession has been wrung from the Shah by a desire to please the Russians on the eve of his visit to Russian territory and to insure the brilliant and flattering reception which M. de Speyer has promised him and which, to so vain a Court as this, appeals with far greater force than any reasoning based on political considerations. It may also be intended to smooth the way for the grant of an advance on easy terms, for which my Russian colleague has been working, and which he would hardly fail to point out to the Persian Ministers would be facilitated by some evidence of their inclination to meet Russian wishes half way. Be that as it may, we may regard it as certain, however much the Persian Government may lay stress on the "temporary" character of the privileges given them, that the Russian signallers have come to stay, like the British ones in Seistan and the quarantine doctors, Russian and British, respectively stationed at Turbat-i-Haidari and in the Gulf. It is now for the Government of India to decide how many English signallers

it will dispatch. The Russians will have in all about thirteen, that is if all the men sent by them for the line are employed at once. We have two in Seistan, of whom one is just going on tour with Captain Macpherson to Birjand, and had, I should think, better be relieved at once by a new man from India. Perhaps two men at Birjand, one at Turbat-i-Haidari, one at Khaf, and one extra man at Meshed would for the present meet our requirements, but on this point I think the local knowledge of His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed and Consul at Seistan will be more useful to you than any suggestion which I could offer. The object of the Russians is, of course, twofold; they wish to acquire complete control over, and practical possession of, the Meshed-Seistan telegraph line, and to station a force of spies and political reporters in the guise of telegraphists and signallers along the entire length of the Perso-Afghan frontier.

I will lose no time in informing your Lordship of the Mushir-ed-Dowleh's reply to the official note which I have addressed to him on the subject, and in which I have once more broached the subject, so unpleasant to the Persian Government, of the Kuli-i-Malek Shah-Seistan extension.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 136.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 118. Secret.)

My Lord,

Tehran, May 26, 1905.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Shah arrived at Resht at midday on the 19th instant. His Majesty was, I hear, somewhat tired by his journey, in the course of which he was once or twice indisposed, and it had been arranged that he should rest for a few days at Resht. He suddenly recollected, however, that the Government House in which he was staying had been the scene two years ago of the tragic death of his favourite the Hakime-ul-Mulk, Vazir-i-Darbar, and under the influence of this impression he decided on the 22nd instant to leave at once for Euzeli, where he remains, as at present arranged, till the 28th instant, on which day he will start overland for Baku. He bestowed while at Resht the "Akdas," the highest decoration in his gift, on the Grand Vizier.

A person who is in close touch with the Valiahd's Court told me yesterday as a piece of positive, but as yet secret, intelligence that the Russian Government had just informed that of Persia that the latter's application, reported by me in my despatch No. 100 of the 12th instant for an advance of 100,000*l.*, to be made without political conditions, could not be entertained, and that it was possible, in view of this reply from St. Petersburg, that the European tour would fall through, and the Grand Vizier be in consequence dismissed. There are already rumours in Persian circles here that the Shah may return to Tehran, but the reasons given are the disturbed state of the Caucasus and the assassination just reported of the Governor of Baku.

M. Nans, with whom I dined last night, intimated to me that the Russian Government had informed M. de Speyer that his proposals for a loan to Persia of 100,000*l.* or 200,000*l.* without political conditions were inadmissible, but that the Russian Bank as distinct from the Legation would be authorized to enter, in the course of the next few days, into discussions with him as to possible terms. His Excellency added that M. Grube had recommended, in opposition to the views of my Russian colleague, that the question should be treated with the Persian Ministers, not here, but on their journey to or from Europe through Russia. M. Nans spoke guardedly, and hinted rather than said all this, *totidem verbis*, but the above was the conclusion that I arrived at by piecing his various statements together. "Son Gouvernement a débouté M. de Speyer," he observed.

I am inclined to think that what has really happened is (1) that Russia, while expressing her willingness to treat for a political loan, has made it clear that no financial assistance "on account current" or without political conditions will at the present juncture be afforded by her; and (2) that the Russian Government will view without regret, and, indeed, with satisfaction, as the result of this reply, the abandonment of the Shah's journey to Europe, and the consequent possible supersession of the Amir-ed-Dowleh by the Atabeg-i-Azam, for which, so M. Nans informs me, and

this information is confirmed in other quarters, a strong party among the courtiers is now working.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

No. 137.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 14, 1905.

THE arrangement proposed by Captain Williams, on the subject of the attack on Colonel Douglas and Mr. Larimer, should it become practicable, is concurred in by His Majesty's Government. (See your despatches Nos. 87 and 109 of the 17th April and the 15th May.)

The son of Mir Nandari and other culprits must, however, be surrendered, and exemplary punishment inflicted on them.

It is suggested by Colonel Douglas that a fine in rifles would be more effective instead of the proposed fine of 500 tomans.

No. 138.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 96.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 16, 1905.

THE Amin-es-Sultan asked me to receive him to-day at my own house. He explained that he was travelling incognito, and that his visit was strictly private.

During his tour round the world he had learned that he was in some quarters regarded as an enemy of this country, and he wished to correct that impression, if it existed. His position in Persia had been very difficult. He had a large family, and could not afford to quarrel with his employers. Russia was, in those days, strong and not easy to deal with. He had endeavoured to hold the balance as fairly as he could, and if on one or two occasions Persia had turned to Russia for aid it was because we had not availed ourselves of the opportunities which we might have taken if we pleased. He regarded me as a friend, and hoped I did not attribute anti-British feelings to him.

I said that I fully realized the difficulty of his position when he was Prime Minister, and that I had certainly no desire to accuse him of enmity to us, but all these events had passed into the region of history, and I thought it useless to discuss them now.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 139.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 77.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, June 17, 1905.

His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed telegraphs as follows:—

"On the 16th June twenty Russian Cossacks, under one officer, reached Meshed with two waggons. It is reported that if their arrival does not attract too much notice 200 Cossacks will be sent in the same way."

Should I take any action here, beyond making inquiries?

No. 140.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 85.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 17, 1905.

I HAVE considered, in communication with the Secretary of State for India and the Postmaster-General, your despatches Nos. 24 and 36 of the 4th and 24th February last, respecting the recent interference by the Customs officials at Bushire with the mail bags for the British Post Office.

I transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from the General Post Office,* forwarding a report from the British Postmaster at Constantinople, relative to the treatment at that place of parcel mails from the United Kingdom. You are authorized to conclude an arrangement with the Persian Government on the lines of the procedure followed at Constantinople. You will presumably settle the details of this arrangement in consultation with the Government of India, to whom copies of the correspondence have been communicated.

As regards the question of insisting upon an apology from the Persian Customs officials for their action in seizing the British mails, I consider that their conduct on this occasion was open to grave exception. As, however, the incident has been provisionally settled and is, in your opinion, unlikely to occur again, I am prepared to leave the matter to your discretion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 141.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahak, June 22, 1905.

FOLLOWING repeated to India and Meshed:—

In reply to a remonstrance by the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, the Russia Minister said that the twenty Cossacks had been dispatched partly to bring up the Russian guard to a strength of twenty-five, and thus make it nearly equal to the guard of thirty possessed by Great Britain, and partly to protect the Meshed Consulate in case of fresh riots.

An assurance that no more Cossacks would be sent was given by the Russian Minister.

No. 142.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 23.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy dated the 22nd June, relative to English signallers for the Meshed-Seistan telegraph line.

India Office, June 23, 1905.

Inclosure in No. 142.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 22, 1905.

TELEGRAPH signallers in Persia. Please refer to the letter of the 10th May from India Office to Foreign Office, and to the telegram of the 22nd idem from Sir A. Hardinge to Lord Lansdowne. We regard it as of the greatest importance that

* No. 109.

there should be no receding from fulfilment of the warning given by Sir A. Hardinge to the Persian Government that concessions identical with those granted to Russians would be claimed by us. Therefore, while regretting necessity for such a step, we propose, subject to your approval, to depute two more English signallers for service on the Meshed-Nasratabad line, to be posted at Turbat and Birjand respectively. Men would be sent as soon as weather permits. Government of India on their part would prefer compensation in some other direction—*e.g.*, the linking up of Robat with Nasratabad—but there seems little chance of securing this. We would withdraw signallers on northern section at any time in return for this concession.

I should be glad to be informed whether you approve of our proposal. Reference is invited in connection with the above to our despatch of the 11th May, No. 155 (Financial).

(Repeated to Tehran.)

No. 143.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 80.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 23, 1905.

FOLLOWING sent to India. Your telegram of the 22nd June.

The connection between Seistan and Kuli-melik-Siah has already been applied for by me, and the Mushir-el-Dowleh admitted verbally the reasonableness of my demand. Meanwhile, if English signallers are admitted to the northern section, we may make their withdrawal conditional on our securing permission for this connection as you suggest.

No. 144.

Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 24, 1905.

FOLLOWING repeated to India.

The organization of a service of motor-cars has been decided upon by the Russian Ministry of Finance. These cars are to ply on their Resht-Tehran, Kazvin-Hamadan, and Tahreez roads for the conveyance of Russian merchandize, and will bring up these goods in a third of the time and at a third of the cost at present incurred. It is hoped that in three or four months the service may be in regular working order, and meanwhile three cars have already arrived and forty more are ordered. If this scheme meets with success, and unless we on our side make some immediate counter-move, it is likely that British trade will be ousted from all the markets where it still holds its own in Central Persia.